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Natural	   disasters	   are	   happening	   more	   frequently	   and	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	  
destructive.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   this	   trend,	   NATO	   has	   increased	   its	   prominence	   in	  
international	   disaster	   relief	   assistance.	   Consequently,	   critics	   have	   expressed	   doubts	  
whether	  disaster	   relief	   operations	   are	   an	   appropriate	   field	   of	   activity	   for	   the	  Alliance.	  
The	   purpose	   of	   the	   dissertation	   is	   to	   justify	   NATO’s	   involvement	   by	   revealing	   that	  
disaster	  relief	  operations	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  founding	  principles	  of	  the	  Alliance	  
and	  further	  by	  demonstrating	  its	  added	  value.	  Supported	  by	  a	  case	  study,	  an	  extensive	  
literature	   review	   shows	   that	  NATO’s	   involvement	   is	   indeed	   appropriate	   and	   above	   all	  





















Disaster	   assistance;	   humanitarian	   assistance;	   relief	   operations;	  natural	  disasters,	   civil-­‐
military	   cooperation;	   the	   North	   Atlantic	   Treaty	   Organization	   (NATO);	   international	  
organizations;	  Civil	  Emergency	  Planning	  (CEP);	  NATO	  Response	  Force	  (NRF)	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In	  the	  past	  decade,	  the	  international	  community	  has	  been	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  impacts	  
of	  several	  major	  natural	  disasters,	   such	  as	   the	   Indian	  Tsunami	   in	  2004,	  and	  Hurricane	  
Katrina	   and	   the	   Pakistan	   Earthquake	   in	   2005.	   Haque	   (2005)	   provides	   us	   with	   the	  
following	  definition	  of	  natural	  disasters:	  “Natural	  disasters	  are	  broadly	  understood	  to	  be	  
consequences	  of	  the	  interface	  of	  a	  natural	  hazard	  and	  a	  vulnerable	  human	  community”	  
(p.	  371).	  Natural	  disasters	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  destructive	  and	  are	  happening	  on	  
a	  more	  frequent	  basis.	  Accordingly,	  NATO’s	  policy	  on	  international	  disaster	  relief	  (1998)	  
acknowledges	   that	   natural	   disasters	   are	  posing	   an	   increasing	   risk	   to	   the	   international	  
communities	   and	   predicts	   that,	   “the	   number	   of	   people	   at	   risk	   to	   natural	   and	  
technological	   disasters	   will	   increase	   dramatically	   over	   the	   next	   two	   decades”	   (“EAPC	  
policy	   on	   enhanced	   practical	   cooperation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   international	   disaster	   relief”,	  
para.	  2).	  	  	  
	  
In	   the	   wake	   of	   this	   trend,	   NATO	   has	   prominently	   assumed	   an	   important	   role	   in	  
international	   disaster	   relief	   by	   becoming	   involved	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   relief	   following	  
natural	   disasters.	   Importantly,	   this	   is	   not	   a	   recent	   trend:	   “As	   early	   as	   1953,	   following	  
disastrous	  North	   Sea	   floods,	  NATO	  had	   an	   agreed	  disaster	   assistance	   scheme”	   (NATO,	  
2001b,	  p.	  5).	  Ever	  since,	  NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  disaster	  assistance	  has	  evolved,	  namely	  
with	  the	  adoption	  of	  new	  tasks	  and	  activities	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  comprehensive	  approach,	  
designed	  to	  make	  the	  Alliance	  more	  capable	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  new	  threats	  and	  challenges	  
of	   the	   contemporary	   security	   environment	   following	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War.	   An	  
important	  component	  of	   this	  new	  approach	   is	  NATO’s	  growing	  humanitarian	  role.	  The	  
general	   public	   usually	   links	   NATO’s	   growing	   humanitarian	   role	   to	   the	   humanitarian	  
interventions,	  such	  as	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	  Kosovo,	  or	  Libya.	  However,	  less	  attention	  
is	  paid	  to	  NATO’s	  disaster	  relief	  operations,	  which	  aim	  to	  protect	  populations	  from	  the	  
consequences	  of	  disasters,	  such	  as	  floods	  and	  earthquakes.	  	  
	  
The	   topic	   is	   relevant,	   as	   both	   the	   frequency	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   natural	   disasters	   have	  
increased	   drastically	   over	   the	   years.	   Coppola	   (2015)	   explains,	   “more	   disasters	   are	  
occurring	   each	   year,	   with	   greater	   intensity,	   and	   that	   a	   great	   many	   more	   people	   are	  
affected	  by	  them,	  either	  indirectly	  or	  directly”	  (p.	  	  20).	  What	  is	  more,	  “despite	  even	  the	  
best	   efforts,	   however,	   the	   fury	   of	   nature	   regularly	   results	   in	   disastrous	   events	   that	  
overwhelm	  not	  only	  local	  response	  capacities,	  but	  also	  the	  response	  capacities	  of	  entire	  
nations,	   even	  entire	   regions”	   (Coppola,	  2015,	  p.	   xxiii).	   It	   is	   in	   these	   situations	   that	   the	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deployment	   of	   military	   capabilities,	   which	   can	   come	   from	   the	   Alliance	   but	   also	   from	  
other	  actors,	  can	  be	  of	  great	  value	   in	   the	  overall	  disaster	  response.	  Accordingly,	  NATO	  
can	  assist	  affected	  states	  in	  responding	  to	  humanitarian	  emergencies	  following	  disasters	  
by	  making	  available	  military	  assets.	  A	  coinciding	  trend	  is	  that	  the	  use	  of	  foreign	  military	  
assets	   during	   disaster	   response	   operations	   has	   become	   the	   norm,	   which	   means	   that	  
humanitarian	   actors	   and	   military	   actors	   have	   to	   work	   together	   (civil-­‐military	  
coordination).	  However,	   in	  the	  wake	  of	  this	  trend,	  many	  have	  voiced	  their	  criticism	  on	  
NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  disaster	  relief,	  questioning	  whether	  it	  is	  an	  inappropriate	  field	  of	  
activity	  for	  the	  Alliance.	  
	  
Focus	  
The	   central	   aim	  of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   an	  underexposed	   aspect	   of	   the	  
North	   Atlantic	   Treaty	   Organization,	   namely	   its	   involvement	   in	   disaster	   assistance.	   It	  
does	  so	  by	  showing	  that	  disaster	  relief	  operations	  are	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  1949	  founding	  
Treaty,	   therefore	   revealing	  an	  attitude	  of	  NATO	   that	   is	   coherent,	   although	   it	   is	  usually	  
not	  understood	  as	  such.	  The	  dissertation	   intents	   to	  contribute	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	  
NATO’s	  role	  in	  international	  disaster	  relief	  assistance,	  by	  discussing	  its	  added	  value,	  but	  
also	  by	  giving	  an	   insight	   to	   the	  possible	   implications	   that	   its	   involvement	  can	  prompt,	  
and	  identifying	  areas	  for	  improvement.	  Although	  disasters	  can	  be	  man-­‐made	  as	  well,	  the	  
focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  mainly	  on	  natural	  disasters.	  
	  
Following	  NATO’s	   participation	   in	  more	  high-­‐profile	   disaster	   responses,	   among	  which	  
the	   relief	   operation	   in	   response	   to	   the	   earthquake	   in	   Pakistan-­‐administered	   Kashmir,	  
which	  likewise	  serves	  as	  the	  case	  study	  for	  this	  dissertation,	  questions	  have	  been	  raised	  
whether	  it	  is	  appropriate	  for	  NATO	  to	  participate	  in	  disaster	  response	  operations,	  which	  
simultaneously	  serves	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  central	  research	  question:	  	  
• Is	  NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  disaster	  relief	  operations	  appropriate?	  
	  
Structure	  
In	   order	   to	   research	   whether	   NATO’s	   involvement	   in	   disaster	   relief	   operations	   is	  
appropriate,	   the	   dissertation	   first	   of	   all	   highlights	   the	   crucial	   aspects	   of	   the	   Alliance’s	  
founding	   Treaty	   of	   1949	   and	   discusses	   NATO’s	   evolution	   toward	   the	   contemporary	  
security	  context	  over	  the	  years.	  Then,	   it	   focuses	  more	  specifically	  on	  NATO’s	  increased	  
involvement	   in	   humanitarian	   assistance	   by	   discussing	  NATO’s	   growing	   concerns	  with	  
the	   protection	   of	   civilian	   populations	   through	   civil	   emergency	   planning.	   Moreover,	  
special	  attention	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  civil-­‐military	  coordination,	  as	  the	  increased	  presence	  of	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military	  assets	  in	  disaster	  responses	  has	  become	  the	  norm,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	  
a	  cause	  for	  friction.	  Next,	  NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  disaster	  assistance	  will	  be	  examined	  by	  
discussing	   its	   history,	   decision-­‐making	   processes,	   just	   as	   relevant	   frameworks	   and	  
policies.	   Also,	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   NATO’s	   relevant	   civil	   and	   military	   structures	   for	  
disaster	  relief	  operations	  will	  be	  provided,	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  
the	  following	  case	  study	  on	  the	  Pakistan	  earthquake	  relief	  operation	  in	  2005,	   in	  which	  
NATO’s	  role	  will	  be	  thoroughly	  evaluated.	  Finally,	  a	  conclusion	  will	  be	  drawn.	  
	  
Methods	  and	  materials	  
The	  dissertation	  will	  be	  written	  from	  an	  institutional	  liberalist	  point	  of	  view.	  Chatterjee	  
(2010)	   defines	   the	   theory	   as	   follows:	   “Institutional	   liberalism	   holds	   the	   view	   that	  
international	   institutions	   like	   the	   UNO	   (United	   Nations	   Organization),	   WTO	   (World	  
Trade	  Organization),	  NATO	  (North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization),	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  
help	   promote	   cooperation	   among	   states	   in	   the	   world	   and	   strengthen	   efforts	   for	  
international	  peace”	  (p.	  11).	  	  
	  
Robert	   Keohane	   (2012),	   one	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   institutional	   liberals,	   argues,	  
“institutions	   serve	   a	   crucial	   social	   purpose	   because	   they	   are	   essential	   for	   sustained	  
cooperation	   that	   enhances	   the	   interest	   of	   most,	   if	   not	   all,	   people”.	   What	   is	   more,	   he	  
claims	   that	   institutional	   liberalism	   is	   “an	   antidote	   to	   fatalism	   and	   a	   source	   of	   hope”	  
(“Twenty	   Years	   of	   Institutional	   Liberalism”,	   p.	   27).	   Institutional	   liberalism,	   therefore,	  
strives	   to	  build	  a	  cooperative	   international	  order	   for	  consolidating	   international	  peace	  
and	  ensuring	  good	  human	  conditions.	  	  	  
	  
Within	  this	  theoretical	  framework,	  NATO	  is	  characterized	  by	  continuous	  functional	  and	  
institutional	   reforms,	   eventually	   resulting	   in	   increased	   cooperation	   between	   states.	  
Institutional	   liberals	   therefore	  perceive	  NATO	  as	  a	  persisting	  effective	  actor	   in	   today’s	  
changing	   security	   environment.	   Whereas	   institutional	   liberals	   are	   in	   favor	   of	   NATO’s	  
evolving	  role	  after	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	  realists	  opine	   that	   the	  Alliance	  has	   lost	   its	  
importance	   and	   that	   NATO	   is	   solely	   an	   instrument	   for	   the	   Americans	   to	  maintain	   its	  
influence	  on	  the	  European	  military	  and	  foreign	  policies	  (Little	  and	  Smith,	  2006,	  p.	  106).	  	  
	  
David	  and	  Lévesque	   (1999)	   reason	   that	  member	   countries	   are	   in	   favor	  of	  multilateral	  
cooperation	   through	   institutions	   such	   as	   NATO,	   as	   they	   are	   unable	   to	   address	   most	  
contemporary	   security	   problems	   individually.	   Moreover,	   NATO	   reduces	   “the	  
significance	   of	   often	   divergent	   national	   interests	   by	   forcing	   states	   to	   negotiate	   and	   to	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respect	   common	   principles	   and	   standards”	   (p.	   18).	   Accordingly,	   the	   role	   that	   NATO	  
assumed	   in	   the	  changing	  security	  environment	   is	  necessary	   to	  strengthen	   the	  security	  
community	  and	  to	  ensure	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  area.	  	  
	  
A	   deductive	   approach	   was	   used	   by	   analyzing	   material	   from	   a	   literature	   review,	  
supplemented	   by	   an	   analysis	   of	   a	   case	   study	   of	   the	   2005	   NATO	   earthquake	   relief	  
operation	   in	   Pakistan.	   	   The	   case	   study	  was	   selected	   because	   it	  was	   the	   first	   time	   that	  
NATO	  took	  on	  such	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  an	  international	  disaster	  response	  of	  such	  clear	  
humanitarian	  nature.	  	  
Most	   information	   for	   the	   dissertation	   was	   retrieved	   through	   desk	   research,	   in	   which	  
relevant	   literature	   was	   reviewed.	   In	   order	   to	   establish	   a	   comprehensive	   view	   of	   the	  
evolution	   of	   NATO,	   from	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Alliance	   to	   its	   current	   role	   in	   the	  
contemporary	   security	   environment,	  mostly	   official	   NATO	   publications	   such	   as	   books	  
and	   readers	   have	  been	   consulted,	   just	   as	   official	   documents	   such	   as	   treaties,	   strategic	  
concepts,	   and	   policies.	   The	   dissertation	   also	   sheds	   light	   on	   the	   criticism	   of	   NATO’s	  
increased	   presence	   in	   the	   humanitarian	   sphere,	   mainly	   by	   analyzing	   reports	   from	  
independent	  humanitarian	  organizations	   and	   researchers,	   giving	  way	   to	   the	  matter	   of	  
civil-­‐military	   coordination.	   Also	   policies,	   guidelines,	   and	   frameworks	   relevant	   to	  
disaster	  relief	  operations	  have	  been	  examined,	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  Oslo	  Guidelines.	  In	  order	  
to	   accurately	   outline	   NATO’s	   exact	   roles	   and	   functions	   in	   disaster	   assistance,	   official	  
documents	  of	  the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  Disaster	  Response	  Coordination	  Centre	  (EADRCC)	  were	  
of	  great	  value.	  Moreover,	  working	  papers	  and	  articles	  in	  official	  journals	  by	  independent	  
researchers	  and	  official	  situation	  reports	  by	  international	  organizations	  were	  important	  
sources	   of	   information.	   The	   main	   source	   of	   information	   for	   the	   case	   study	   was	   the	  
personal	   interview	  with	   Colonel	   Lemos	  Pires,	  who	  was	   involved	   in	   the	   supervision	   of	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Chapter	  1	  -­‐	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Alliance	  purpose	  
§1.1	  The	  security	  context	  of	  the	  Alliance	  
The	  Second	  World	  War	  left	  Europe	  in	  ruins.	  Although	  the	  Allies	  had	  triumphed,	  they	  had	  
suffered	   heavy	   losses	   in	   human	   lives,	   millions	   of	   refugees	   were	   scattered	   over	   the	  
continent,	  and	  Europe’s	  economy	  was	  shattered.	  Europe	  struggled	  to	  recover	  from	  this	  
sweeping	   destruction,	   and	   although	   it	   was	   liberated,	   new	   tensions	   arose	   among	  
Europe’s	  communities.	  Throughout	  the	  continent,	  but	  particularly	  in	  Germany	  and	  Italy,	  
social	   and	   political	   structures	   had	   broken	   down	   completely.	   The	   institutions	   that	  
ensured	  peace,	  stability,	  and	  law	  and	  order	  before	  had	  vanished.	  As	  a	  result,	  Europe	  was	  
caught	  in	  the	  mire	  of	  fragmentation,	  disorder,	  and	  savagery.	  Lowe	  (2012)	  explains	  that	  
the	   situation	  was	  problematic	   as	   such,	   “that	  American	   observers	  were	  warning	   of	   the	  
possibility	   of	   Europe-­‐wide	   civil	   war”	   (p.	   xxi).	   Besides	   tensions	   occurring	   within	   the	  
continent,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   posed	   a	   great	   external	   threat,	   as	   it	   was	   making	   forceful	  
attempts	  to	  establish	  communist	  regimes	  in	  European	  countries.	  This	  development	  was	  
denounced	  by	  Churchill’s	  famous	  “Iron	  Curtain”	  speech	  in	  Fulton	  on	  5	  March	  1946:	  	  
“A	  shadow	  has	  fallen	  upon	  the	  scenes	  so	  lately	  lighted	  by	  the	  Allied	  victory.	  
Nobody	   knows	   what	   Soviet	   Russia	   and	   its	   Communist	   international	  
organization	  intends	  to	  do	  in	  the	  immediate	  future,	  or	  what	  are	  the	  limits,	  if	  
any,	  to	  their	  expansive	  and	  proselytizing	  tendencies”	  (Rosenberg,	  n.d.,	  para.	  
21).	  
	  
The	  communist	  insurgency	  in	  Greece	  marked	  a	  decisive	  shift,	  materialized	  by	  President	  
Truman’s	   response	   on	   12	   March	   1947,	   spelling	   a	   new	   American	   policy	   “to	   help	   free	  
peoples	   who	   are	   resisting	   subjugation	   by	   armed	   minorities	   or	   outside	   pressure”	  
(Norman,	  1997,	  p.	  1063).	  The	  new	  posture	  of	  the	  American	  administration	  developed	  in	  
a	   postulate	   widely	   known	   as	   containment,	   which	   was	   of	   defensive	   nature,	   calling	   for	  
close	   observations	   and	   a	   measured	   reaction	   to	   the	   Soviet’s	   policy	   shifts	   and	  
manoeuvres.	   In	   July	   of	   the	   same	   year,	   another	   gesture	   marked	   the	   American	  
preoccupation	   with	   a	   very	   instable	   and	   weak	   Europe.	   The	   Secretary	   of	   State	   George	  
Marshall	  presented	  the	  European	  Recovery	  Program,	  “to	  assist	   in	  the	  return	  of	  normal	  
economic	  health	   in	   the	  world,	  without	  which	   there	  can	  be	  no	  political	   stability	  and	  no	  
assured	   peace”	   (Davies,	   1997,	   p.	   1063).	   Naturally,	   this	   fostered	   cooperation	   between	  
Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  deepened	  the	  East-­‐West	  division.	  As	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  rejected	  the	  economic	  support	  and	  continued	  to	  firmly	  push	  through	  its	  
area	   of	   influence,	   the	   need	   for	   mutual	   defense	   among	   Western	   European	   countries	  
became	  more	  urgent	   than	  ever	   (NATO,	  2001a,	  p.	   29).	   For	   this	   reason,	   talks	  were	  held	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that	   envisioned	   the	   articulation	   of	   an	   Alliance	   involving	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	  
designed	  to	  guarantee	  its	  defense,	  preserve	  the	  democratic	  values,	  and	  safeguard	  peace	  
and	  freedom	  in	  the	  area.	  Eventually,	  these	  talks	  resulted	  in	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  of	  
1949.	  	  	  	  
The	   ratification	   of	   the	   North	   Atlantic	   Treaty	   in	   1949	   embodied	   the	   determination	   of	  
Western	   governments	   to	   deter	   Soviet	   expansionism.	   Besides,	   the	   need	   for	   European	  
political	  integration	  became	  stronger	  and	  a	  North	  American	  presence	  was	  also	  desirable	  
for	  preventing	  nationalist	  militarism	   to	   revive	   (NATO,	  n.d.,	   “A	   short	   history	  of	  NATO”,	  
para.	   1).	   The	   Treaty	   laid	   the	   foundation	   for	   a	   common	   defense	   system	   and	  
simultaneously	  strengthened	  the	  ties	  between	  the	  member	  countries.	  	  
	  
The	  founding	  principles	  
The	  1949	  Treaty	  has	  remained	  unchanged	  ever	  since	  its	  creation.	  It	  is	  thus	  important	  to	  
underline	   that	   all	   NATO’s	   activities	   are	   conducted	   in	   accordance	   with,	   and	   therefore	  
justified	  by,	  the	  Treaty’s	  principles.	  	  
The	  Treaty’s	  preamble	  starts	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  UN	  by	  reaffirming	  
the	  Parties’	  “faith	   in	  the	  purposes	  and	  principles	  of	   the	  Charter	  of	   the	  United	  Nations”,	  
followed	  by	  expressing	   its	  determination	   to	   “safeguard	   the	   freedom,	  common	  heritage	  
and	   civilization	   of	   their	   peoples,	   founded	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   democracy,	   individual	  
liberty	  and	  the	  rule	  of	   law”.	  Further,	   the	  Alliance	  seeks	   to	  “promote	  stability	  and	  well-­‐
being	   in	   the	   North	   Atlantic	   Area”	   and	   is	   “resolved	   to	   unite	   their	   efforts	   for	   collective	  
defense	   and	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   peace	   and	   security”	   (NATO,	   1949,	   “The	   North	  
Atlantic	  Treaty”,	  para.	  1).	  	  
The	   second	   sentence	   has	   been	   understood	   as	   the	   affirmation	   of	   the	   grand	   principle	  
underlying	  the	  Treaty.	  The	  latter	  two	  sentences,	  in	  turn,	  represent	  the	  different	  strategic	  
ways	   to	   achieve	   this	   grand	   principle.	   Kissinger	   (2001),	   among	   others,	   recognizes	   the	  
success	  of	  the	  Alliance’s	  basic	  principle:	  “The	  Wilsonian	  ideal	  of	  an	  international	  order	  
based	   on	   a	   common	   devotion	   to	   democratic	   institutions	   and	   settling	   its	   disputes	   by	  
negotiations	   rather	   than	   war	   has	   triumphed	   among	   the	   nations	   bordering	   the	   North	  
Atlantic”	  (p.	  32).	  The	  objective	  of	  achieving	  stability	  is	  then	  developed	  in	  Articles	  1	  and	  2	  
of	   the	   Treaty,	   dealing	  with	   the	   peaceful	   settlement	   of	   disputes	   in	  which	   they	  may	   be	  
involved	   and	   the	   development	   of	   “peaceful	   and	   friendly	   international	   relations	   by	  
strengthening	   their	   free	   institutions,	   by	   bringing	   about	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	  
principles	   upon	  which	   these	   institutions	   are	   founded,	   and	  by	  promoting	   conditions	   of	  
stability	  and	  well-­‐being”	  (NATO,	  1949,	  “The	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty”,	  para.	  3).	  The	  aim	  of	  
achieving	  their	  collective	  defense	  is	  outlined	  in	  Article	  3,	  related	  to	  the	  development	  of	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the	  Allies’	  “individual	  and	  collective	  capacity	  to	  resist	  armed	  attack”.	  Next,	  Article	  4	  sets	  
out	   the	   principle	   of	  mutual	   consult	   if	   any	   of	   the	   Parties	   feel	   threatened,	   and	  Article	   5	  
defines	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  defense,	  which	  means	  that	  an	  armed	  attack	  against	  any	  
Party	  shall	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  attack	  against	  them	  all	  and	  therefore	  each	  of	  them	  will	  
assist	  that	  or	  those	  attacked	  “as	  it	  deems	  necessary”	  (NATO,	  1965,	  p.	  15).	  Over	  time,	  this	  
meaningful	   triad	   of	   democracy,	   stability	   and	   collective	   defense	   has	   been	   maintained,	  
recognized,	   and	   in	   fact	   prioritized	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   changing	   international	   security	  
context.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
At	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   century,	   also	   Zorgbibe	   noted	   that	  NATO	  developed	   three	   functions.	  
The	  dissuasion	  of	  an	  eventual	  aggression,	  centered	  on	  the	  mutual	  assistance	  principle;	  
an	   “implicit”	   function	   of	   the	   integration	   the	   Allied	   states’	   integration	   via	   the	  
interdependence	   and	   a	   common	   culture	   developed	   over	   time;	   and	   the	   function	   of	  
“organizing	   the	   international	   political	   space”	   (Zorgbibe,	   2002,	   pp.	   12-­‐13).	   In	   addition,	  
following	  the	  discussions	  about	  NATO’s	  options	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  its	  out	  
of	  area	  intervention	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  Morrison	  (1995)	  concludes	  that	  it	  “all	  boils	  down”	  to	  
whether	   the	   priority	   is	   given	   to	   “collective	   defense”	   or	   “collective	   security”.	   That	   is,	  
should	  NATO	  “focus	  on	  collective	  defense	  as	  emphasized	  in	  the	  preamble	  and	  Articles	  3-­‐
6	   of	   the	   North	   Atlantic	   Treaty,	   or	   be	   transformed	   into	   or	   become	   part	   of	   a	   collective	  
security	   arrangement”	   (p.	   2).	   However,	   this	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   the	   best	   strategy	   for	   each	  
situation	  and	  not	  a	  change	  in	  NATO’s	  purpose	  or	  even	  character.	  
	  
In	  sum,	  the	  fundamental	  focus	  of	  the	  Alliance	  has	  been	  clear	  since	  the	  beginning,	  and	  has	  
remained	  unchanged	  ever	  since.	  All	  NATO’s	  activities	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Treaty,	  
even	  though	  some	  have	  criticized	  the	  Alliance	  of	  deviating	  from	  its	  “original	  purpose”	  by	  
taking	   on	   new	   tasks.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	  when	   people	   criticize	  NATO’s	   assumption	   of	   new	  
tasks,	   such	   as	   humanitarian	   assistance,	   they	   tend	   to	   overlook	   that	   these	   activities	   are	  
fully	  concurrent	  with	  the	  original	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  Alliance	  is	  founded.	  	  
	  
§1.2	  The	  evolution	  of	  NATO’s	  strategic	  posture	  
Post	  Cold	  War	  NATO	  
Throughout	  the	  years,	  NATO	  has	  transformed	  in	  many	  aspects.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  
shall	   be	   identified	   as	   a	  major	   turning	  point	   for	  NATO’s	   strategic	  posture.	  The	  Alliance	  
was	  conceived	  in	  a	  shattered	  security	  environment,	  mainly	  focused	  on	  the	  deterrence	  of	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  maintaining	  a	  strategic	  balance	  between	  East	  and	  West.	  But	  after	  
the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Eastern	  bloc,	  however,	  the	  situation	  would	  change	  dramatically.	  The	  
Warsaw	  Pact	  was	  declared	  dissolved	  in	  February	  1991	  and	  complex	  instabilities	  within	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the	  Soviet	  Union	  led	  to	  its	  collapse	  and	  disbandment	  in	  December	  1991.	  Hence,	  although	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   was	   a	   promising	   event	   for	   NATO’s	   objective	   of	   a	   peaceful	  
European	  order,	   the	   breakdown	  of	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  nonetheless	   gave	   rise	   to	   regional	  
instabilities,	  which	  thereupon	  induced	  new	  reasons	  for	  security	  concerns.	  The	  fall	  of	  the	  
Berlin	  Wall,	  therefore,	  caused	  NATO	  to	  adopt	  its	  most	  far-­‐reaching	  declaration	  thus	  far,	  
designed	   to	   ensure	   a	   united	   and	   peaceful	   Europe.	   On	   6	   July	   1990,	   the	   London	  
Declaration	  on	  a	  transformed	  North	  Atlantic	  Alliance	  demonstrated	  NATO’s	   immediate	  
response	  to	  this	  sudden	  shift	  in	  the	  security	  environment.	  The	  first	  paragraph	  perfectly	  
illustrates	  the	  changed	  conditions:	  	  
“Europe	   has	   entered	   a	   new,	   promising	   era.	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe	   is	  
liberating	  itself.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  has	  embarked	  on	  the	  long	  journey	  toward	  
a	  free	  society.	  The	  walls	  that	  once	  confined	  people	  and	  ideas	  are	  collapsing.	  
Europeans	  are	  determining	   their	  own	  destiny.	  They	  are	  choosing	   freedom.	  
They	   are	   choosing	   economic	   liberty.	   They	   are	   choosing	   peace.	   They	   are	  
choosing	  a	  Europe	  whole	  and	  free.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  this	  Alliance	  must	  and	  
will	   adapt.”	   (NATO,	   1990,	   ”Declaration	   on	   a	   transformed	   North	   Atlantic	  
Alliance”,	  para.	  1)	  
The	  NATO	  Allies	  moreover	  announced	  their	  readiness	  to	  “help	  build	  the	  structures	  of	  a	  
more	   united	   continent”	   and	   declared	   their	   intention	   “to	   enhance	   the	   political	  
component”	   of	   the	   Alliance	   as	   described	   in	   Article	   2	   of	   the	   Treaty	   (NATO,	   1990,	  
“Declaration	   of	   a	   transformed	   North	   Atlantic	   Alliance”,	   para.	   2).	   One	   of	   the	   most	  
fundamental	   proposals	   was	   the	   invitation	   of	   the	  Warsaw	   Pact	  members	   to	   “solemnly	  
state	   that	   we	   are	   no	   longer	   adversaries”,	   and	   to	   establish	   diplomatic	   relations	   with	  
NATO.	  A	  range	  of	  several	  new	  structures	  was	  about	  to	  be	  created.	  
	  
Yet,	   the	  situation	   in	  Europe	   further	  deteriorated,	  particularly	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  several	  
crises	  that	  resulted	  from	  the	  breakup	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  already	  announced	  after	  a	  period	  of	  
political	   crises	   in	   the	   1980s.	   In	   addition,	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   the	   Soviet	   army	   from	  
Afghanistan	  in	  February	  1989	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  return	  of	  trained	  and	  endured	  Jihadists	  to	  
their	  countries	  of	  origin,	  causing	  to	  further	  destabilize	  Algeria,	  Egypt	  Bosnia,	  Tajikistan,	  
Chechnya,	  and	  other	  regions	  (Hassan,	  2011,	  pp.	  123-­‐124).	  	  
	  
The	  Strategic	  Concept	  of	  November	  1991	  would	  represent	   the	  efforts	   to	  adapt	  NATO’s	  
triad	  of	  principles	   to	  a	  different	  security	  context.	  The	  concept	   therefore	  acknowledged	  
the	  radical	  political	  change	  in	  Europe	  that	  led	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  massive	  full-­‐
scale	  attack	  against	  NATO;	  the	  substantial	  progress	  in	  several	  arms	  control	  agreements	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like	   the	   Stockholm	   Conference	   on	   Confidence	   and	   Security	   Building	   Measures	   and	  
Disarmament	   (CDE),	   the	   Intermediate	   Range	   Nuclear	   Forces	   Treaty	   	   (INF),	   and	   the	  
Confidence	   and	   Security-­‐Building	   Measures	   Agreements	   under	   the	   Commission	   for	  
Cooperation	  and	  Security	  in	  Europe	  (CSCE);	  and	  the	  positive	  role	  of	  other	  organizations,	  
such	  as	  the	  European	  Commission,	  to	  constitute	  new	  forums	  of	  consultations	  and	  to	  help	  
overcoming	  the	  divisions,	  particularly	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  (NATO,	  1991,	  “The	  
Alliance’s	  New	  Strategic	  Concept”,	  para.	  1-­‐22	  ).	  	  
Nonetheless,	   although	   the	   threat	   of	   a	  massive,	   classical	   attack	   had	   disappeared,	   other	  
risks	   remained	   that	  were	   “multi-­‐faceted	   in	   nature	   and	  multi-­‐directional,	  which	  makes	  
them	  hard	  to	  predict	  and	  assess”	  (NATO,	  1991,	  “The	  Alliance’s	  New	  Strategic	  Concept”,	  
para.	   8).	   They	  may	   result	   from	   the	   “serious	   economic,	   social	   and	   political	   difficulties,	  
including	  ethnic	  rivalries	  and	  territorial	  disputes”.	  These	  new	  risks	  can	  develop	  in	  crises	  
perturbing	  and	  affecting	  the	  European	  stability	  and	  even	  provoking	  armed	  conflicts	  that	  
can	  “spill	  over	  into	  NATO	  countries,	  having	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Alliance”	  
(NATO,	   1991,	   “The	   Alliance’s	   New	   Strategic	   Concept”,	   para.	   9).	   Besides,	   the	   Strategic	  
Concept	   opened	   the	   preoccupations	   to	   the	   Southern	   Flank	   and	   to	   the	   Middle	   East,	  
acknowledging	  that	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  countries	  on	  the	  southern	  periphery	  were	  
relevant	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Alliance	  as	  well.	  
	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  new	  security	  context	  leads	  to	  the	  explicit	  conclusion	  that	  it	  does	  not	  
alter	   “the	  purpose	  or	   the	   security	   functions	  of	   the	  Alliance”	  but	   that	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  
develop	  a	  new	  strategy	  based	  on	  a	  “broad	  approach	  to	  security”	  including	  a	  wide	  range	  
of	   problems	   such	   as	   organized	   crime,	   environmental	   challenges,	   and	   social,	   economic	  
and	  political	   instabilities	  (The	  Alliance’s	  New	  Strategic	  Concept,	  1991,	  para.	  7-­‐14).	  The	  
broad	  approach	   to	  security	   is	  also	  reflected	   in	   “three	  mutually	  reinforcing	  elements	  of	  
Allied	   security	   policy:	   dialogue,	   co-­‐operation,	   and	   the	   maintenance	   of	   a	   collective	  
defence	   capability”	   (The	   Alliance’s	   New	   Strategic	   Concept,	   1991,	   para.	   24).	   The	  
emphasis	   on	   dialogue	   led	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   net	   of	   new	   official	   NATO	   bodies,	  
briefly	   explained	   in	   the	   following	   paragraph.	   The	   element	   of	   cooperation,	   based	   on	  
inseparability	   of	   security,	   brought	   together	   different	   countries	   of	   Europe,	   Asia,	   and	  
Africa,	  sharing	  some	  of	   the	  risks	   identified	  before	  and	  ready	  to	  work	  together	  to	  solve	  
complex	   crises	   as	   those	   arising	   in	   the	   Balkans.	   The	   collective	   defense	   tasks	   led	   to	   a	  
profound	  restructure	  of	  the	  type	  and	  readiness	  of	  the	  military	  forces	  of	  the	  Alliance.	  
	  
The	   1991	   Strategic	   Concept	   demonstrated	   that	   NATO	   was	   now	   moving	   toward	   a	  
broader	   approach	   to	   security	   by	   setting	   long-­‐term	   objectives	   and	   increasing	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transparency.	  Europe	  was	  confronted	  with	  much	  instability,	  such	  as	  political	  and	  social	  
turbulence,	   taking	   place	   mainly	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   but	   also	   out	   of	   area.	   NATO	   thus	  
acknowledged	  that	  adopting	  a	  broader	  approach	  to	  security	  was	  crucial.	  Therefore,	  the	  
1991	   Strategic	   Concept	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   safeguarding	   and	   expanding	  
European	   security,	   by	   establishing	   partnerships	   and	   promoting	   cooperation	   and	  
dialogue.	   Moreover,	   the	   concepts	   of	   crisis	   management	   and	   conflict	   prevention	   were	  
introduced	  in	  this	  first	  unclassified	  NATO	  Strategic	  Concept.	  
	  
Strengthening	  cooperation	  and	  partnership	  
The	  1991	  Rome	  Declaration	  marked	   the	  era	   in	  which	   institutions	  would	  prove	   to	  gain	  
importance.	  The	  North	  Atlantic	  Cooperation	  Council	  (NACC)	  was	  established	  one	  month	  
following	   the	   1991	   Rome	   Declaration	   and	   provided	   a	   new	   forum	   for	   consultation	  
through	   the	   expanded	   participation	   of	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   European	   countries,	  
previously	  belonging	  to	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  or	  the	  USSR.	  The	  Commission	  on	  Security	  and	  
Cooperation	  in	  Europe	  (CSCE),	  in	  addition,	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  interlocking	  institution	  to	  
respond	   to	   regional	   problems	   that	   arose	   after	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  
through	  opening	  up	  the	  possibilities	  for	  security	  cooperation	  and	  peacekeeping	  efforts.	  
This	  was	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	  history	  of	  NATO	   that	   the	   idea	  of	  peacekeeping	  activities	  
was	  put	   forward.	  Moreover,	   the	  Alliance	  also	  expanded	   the	  cooperation	  southward	  by	  
the	   creation	   of	   the	   Mediterranean	   Dialogue,	   involving	   six	   non-­‐member	   countries,	  
seeking	  to	  foster	  security	  in	  stability	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  through	  dialogue.	  The	  Euro-­‐
Atlantic	   Partnership	   Council	   (EAPC)	   eventually	   replaced	   the	   NACC	   in	   1997	   and	   the	  
Partnership	   for	   Peace	   (PfP)	   would	   prove	   to	   become	   an	   important	   actor	   in	   NATO’s	  
expanded	   framework,	   preparing	   partners	   to	   participate	   in	   common	   peace	   support	  
operations	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  Members	  of	  the	  PfP	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  consult	  NATO	  in	  
case	  of	  direct	   security	   threats,	  which	  eventually	   results	   in	  better	  political	  and	  military	  
cooperation	  for	  crisis	  management	  actions.	  Throughout	  the	  years,	  NATO	  has	  continued	  
to	  accept	  new	  members	  and	  create	  new	  partnerships.	  
In	  1997,	  NATO	   institutionalized	   its	   relations	  with	  Russia	   through	   the	  Founding	  Act	  on	  
Mutual	  Relations,	  Cooperation	  and	  Security	  “partly	  to	  pacify	  Russian	  concern	  over	  NATO	  
enlargement”	  that	  included	  Poland,	  The	  Czech	  Republic,	  and	  Hungary	  (Kissinger,	  2001,	  
p.	   44).	   Subsequently,	   the	   NATO-­‐Russia	   Permanent	   Joint	   Council	   was	   established,	  
involving	  all	  NATO	  members	  and	  the	  Russian	  representative.	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  a	  similar	  
development	  took	  place	  after	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  NATO-­‐Ukraine	  Charter	  on	  a	  Distinctive	  
Partnership,	   resulting	   in	   the	   NATO-­‐Ukraine	   Commission.	   In	   2002,	   the	   NATO-­‐Russia	  
Council	  replaced	  the	  NATO-­‐Russia	  Permanent	  Joint	  Council.	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Specifically	   important	   for	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	   Euro-­‐Atlantic	   Disaster	   Response	  
Coordination	  Centre	  (EADRCC),	  as	  created	  by	  EAPC	  in	  1998.	  The	  Centre’s	  task	  is	  to	  make	  
sure	  that	  all	  actors	  work	  together	  effectively	  when	  responding	  to	  natural	  or	  man-­‐made	  
disasters.	  The	  EADRCC	  is	  thus	  NATO’s	  most	  important	  disaster	  response	  mechanism	  in	  
the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  area.	  The	  first	  operation	  carried	  out	  was	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  troublesome	  
flow	  of	  refugees	  in	  the	  Balkans	  following	  the	  Kosovo	  conflict,	  and	  ever	  since,	  the	  centre	  
has	  been	  involved	  in	  numerous	  disaster	  response	  operations.	  	  
	  
New	  challenges	  ahead	  
Despite	  the	  promising	  prospects	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  the	  Alliance	  was	  faced	  
with	   new	   security	   threats,	   some	   emerging	   outside	   its	   traditional	   arena.	   Following	   the	  
unrest	  in	  the	  Gulf	  area	  caused	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait	  and	  the	  failed	  diplomatic	  
efforts	  by	   the	  UN,	  NATO	  backed	  the	  crisis	  response	  by	  providing	  measured	  support	   to	  
the	   coalition	   force	   in	   1990-­‐91,	   mostly	   through	   command	   and	   control	   systems.	   The	  
complexities	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  conflict,	  and	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  European	  Community	  and	  
the	  United	  Nations	  Protection	  Force	   (UNPROFOR)	   to	  stabilize	   the	  situation,	  eventually	  
led	  to	  the	  first	  military	  intervention	  of	  the	  Allies	  in	  1995,	  followed	  by	  the	  much-­‐disputed	  
1999	  Kosovo	  intervention.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  Alliance	  became	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  
the	  changing	  security	  environment	  and	  the	  new	  challenges	  lying	  ahead.	  The	  possibility	  
of	  a	  general	  war	  within	  Europe	  had	  gradually	  vanished	  and	  was	  being	  replaced	  by	  other	  
risks	   such	   as	  political	   and	   economic	   instability,	   violations	  of	   human	   rights,	   and	   ethnic	  
conflicts.	  
	  
The	   Balkan	   crisis	   eventually	   resulted	   in	   NATO’s	   first	   out	   of	   area	   military	   crisis	  
management	  operation.	  Therefore,	  NATO’s	  experiences	  during	  the	  Balkan	   intervention	  
had	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   new	   Strategic	   Concept	   that	   was	   agreed	   upon	   during	   the	  
Washington	   Summit	   meeting	   in	   1999,	   demonstrating	   NATO’s	   transformation	   into	   a	  
more	  reactive	  and	  dynamic	  organization.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Washington	  Summit,	  NATO	  
was	   involved	   in	   the	   Kosovo	   Air	   Operation	   and	   Poland,	   Czech	   Republic,	   and	   Hungary	  
participated	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   a	   NATO	   Summit.	   NATO	   continued	   to	   build	   upon	   the	  
foundations	   as	   laid	   down	   during	   its	   creation.	   The	   aspiration	   was	   a	   comprehensive	  
approach,	   by	   developing	   both	   political	   and	   military	   means	   and	   putting	   a	   strong	  
emphasis	  on	  cooperation,	  rather	  than	  confrontation.	  Focus	  points	  of	  this	  new	  strategic	  
concept	   were	   crisis	   response	   operations,	   increased	   dialogue,	   enlargement,	   and	   the	  
continued	  development	  of	  military	  expertise.	  There	  was	  a	  gradual	  change	   in	   the	  allied	  
military	  forces,	  expressed	  in	  the	  assumption	  of	  new	  tasks	  and	  an	  increasingly	  important	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role	  on	  peacekeeping	  and	  crisis	  management	  operations,	  wherefore	  they	  became	  better	  
mobilized	  and	  able	  to	  come	  into	  action	  more	  quickly.	  	  
	  
Interestingly,	   Carpenter	   (2001)	   offers	   a	   rather	   sceptic	   view	   on	   the	   1999	   Strategic	  
Concept	  and	  even	  calls	   it	  an	  “uneasy	  compromise”	  (p.	  7).	  The	  Strategic	  Concept	  had	  to	  
bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   conflicting	   objectives	   among	   the	  members,	   but	   Carpenter	  
believes	  the	  Alliance	  did	  a	  poor	  job	  in	  doing	  so	  and	  claims	  that	  the	  Strategic	  Concept	  is	  
too	   vague.	   Within	   the	   Alliance	   there	   were	   different	   camps,	   presenting	   competing	  
objectives	   with	   respect	   to	   NATO’s	   role	   for	   the	   future	   (Carpenter,	   2001,	   pp.	   8-­‐15).	   It	  
would	   have	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   traditionalists,	   like	   Kissinger,	   who	   strongly	  
backed	  the	  idea	  that	  NATO’s	  core	  purpose	  should	  remain	  centred	  around	  Article	  5,	  and	  a	  
more	  progressive	  bloc	  that	  supported	  the	  notion	  that	  NATO’s	  core	  purpose	  should	  move	  
beyond	   the	   principle	   of	   collective	   defense.	   The	   progressive	   bloc,	   then	   again,	   was	  
subdivided	   into	   two	   groups,	  which	   could	   be	   identified	   as	  moderately	   progressive	   and	  
very	   progressive.	   The	   former	   supported	   missions	   outside	   NATO’s	   territory,	   Europe’s	  
periphery	  more	   specifically,	   in	   order	   to	   defend	   the	   collective	   interests.	   The	   European	  
NATO	  members	  mainly	  supported	  this	  idea.	  The	  latter	  group,	  which	  included	  the	  Clinton	  
Administration,	   advocated	   for	   a	   boundless	   NATO,	   without	   any	   geographical	   limits.	  
Where	  traditionalists	  rather	  saw	  NATO’s	  tasks	  restricted	  to	  its	  traditional	  territory	  and	  
were	  not	  in	  favour	  of	  enlargement	  because	  it	  would	  implicate	  the	  process	  of	  consensus,	  
progressives	   were	   convinced	   that	   extraterritorial	   activities	   were	   crucial	   for	   NATO	   in	  
order	   to	  maintain	   its	   role	  as	  an	   important	  actor	  on	   the	  world	   stage,	   and	   to	  protect	   its	  
values	   and	   interests	  where	   they	  were	   attacked.	  Moreover,	   progressives	   advocated	   for	  
membership	  expansion,	  as	  it	  would	  benefit	  stability	  in	  the	  transatlantic	  region.	  	  
When	   reading	   the	   1999	   Strategic	   Concept,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   Carpenter’s	   view	  
might	  have	  been	  too	  sceptic	  as	  the	  Alliance	  did	  manage	  to	  capture	  the	  different	  views	  in	  
a	  positive	  way	  and	  subsequently	  shape	  a	  proper	  framework.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  cannot	  be	  
denied	  that	  the	  Strategic	  Concept	  remained	  rather	  vague	  on	  some	  topics.	  For	   instance,	  
the	  encounter	  of	  the	  different	  opinions	  mentioned	  above	  was	  that	  NATO	  “will	  work	  with	  
other	   nations	   and	   organizations	   to	   advance	   security,	   prosperity	   and	   democracy	  
throughout	   the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  Region”	   (NATO,	  1999,	   “The	  Alliance’s	  Strategic	  Concept”,	  
para.	   2).	   The	   text	   of	   the	   Strategic	   Concept	   repetitively	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   common	  
interests	   should	   be	   defended,	   but	   nowhere	   is	   specified	  what	   these	   common	   interests	  
exactly	  are	  and	  how	  to	  protect	   them.	  Moreover,	   following	   the	  enlargement	  process,	  as	  
envisioned	  in	  the	  Strategic	  Concept,	  it	  could	  be	  questioned	  whether	  it	  is	  even	  possible	  to	  
speak	  of	   common	   interests.	  Considering	   the	  extent	  of	   the	  diversity	  of	  values,	   interests	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and	  objectives	  within	  the	  Alliance,	  is	  it	  even	  possible	  to	  have	  a	  truly	  unified	  vision?	  Then	  
there	  is	  also	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  Europe-­‐US	  relation.	  Some	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  further	  away	  
actions	  are	  conducted,	  the	  more	  probabilities	  there	  are	  of	   increasing	  the	  divergence	  of	  
interests	  between	  allies.	  The	  public	  debates	  on	  the	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  demonstrated	  
this	   matter.	   These	   are	   two	   issues	   that	   will	   most	   likely	   remain	   topic	   of	   debate	   in	   the	  
future.	  	  
Notwithstanding	   these	   two	   issues	   of	   debate,	   the	   1999	   Strategic	   Concept	   has	   been	   a	  
positive	   development	   from	   a	   general	   viewpoint,	   as	   it	   established	   new	   patterns	   of	  
cooperation	  and	  expanded	   its	   tasks	   that	  benefited	  stability	   in	   the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	   region	  
and	  most	  importantly	  reaffirmed	  NATO’s	  importance.	  After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  
traditional	  role	  of	  NATO	  faded	  away	  and	  therefore	  it	  had	  to	  find	  a	  new	  way	  to	  remain	  an	  
important	   actor	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   new	   challenges	   in	   the	   international	   security	  
environment.	  	  
	  
In	   November	   2010,	   the	   Strategic	   Concept	   was	   updated	   once	   again,	   and	   basically	  
followed	   the	   steps	  of	   the	  1999	  Strategic	  Concept	  by	   stressing	   the	   importance	  of	   crisis	  
management	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	   international	   security	   through	   cooperation,	   while	  
not	   losing	  out	  of	  sight	  its	  traditional	  functions.	  Whereas	  the	  previous	  strategic	  concept	  
did	  not	  clearly	  define	   the	  security	   threats,	   the	  2010	  one	  did.	  Extremism	  and	  terrorism	  
are	  explicitly	  mentioned	  as	  being	  direct	  threats	  to	  the	  security	  of	  NATO	  countries,	  just	  as	  
the	   role	  of	   technology	   in	  modern-­‐day	   threats.	  The	  September	  11	  attacks	   are	   the	  main	  
reason	   for	   this	   clear	  definition	  of	   security	   threats,	   as	   this	   act	   of	   terrorism	  has	   given	   a	  
new	  dimension	   to	   the	   arena	   of	   global	   conflict.	   Ambassador	  Daniel	   R.	   Coats	   accurately	  
remarks	   that	  besides	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   September	  11	  was	   “a	  defining	  moment	  
that	  changed	  many	  things	  from	  that	  point	  forward”	  (Weissinger-­‐Baylon,	  2002,	  p.	  xxix).	  
As	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   terrorism	   is	   something	   completely	   different	   from	   traditional	  
conflicts,	   it	  needed	  an	  entirely	  new	  approach.	  Consequently,	  NATO	  developed	  counter-­‐
terrorism	  policy	  guidelines.	  Moreover,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  1999	  Strategic	  Concept,	  natural	  
disasters	  are	  also	  listed	  as	  being	  a	  part	  of	  the	  security	  environment,	  and	  therefore	  have	  
“the	   potential	   to	   significantly	   affect	   NATO	   planning	   and	   operations”	   (NATO,	   2010b,	  
“Strategic	  Concept”,	  p.	  13).	  
	  
In	  sum,	  ever	  since	   its	  creation	  after	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War	   the	  Alliance	  has	  
continuously	   reinvented	   itself,	   while	   abiding	   by	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   the	  
founding	   treaty.	   NATO	   showed	   to	   be	   a	   spirited	   organization	   able	   to	   identify	   the	   new	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threats	  and	  challenges,	  and	  respond	  to	  these	  accordingly	  through	  constantly	  adapting	  its	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Chapter	  2	  -­‐	  NATO’s	  humanitarian	  approach	  
Over	   the	   years,	   NATO	   has	   been	   actively	   present	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   civil	   protection	   and	  
humanitarian	   support.	   Already	   since	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Alliance	   in	   1949,	   NATO’s	  
commitment	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   civilian	   population	   became	   evident.	   During	   the	  
Cold	  War	  NATO	  started	  to	  develop	  its	  expertise	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Civil	  Emergency	  Planning	  
(CEP)	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  protect	  the	  populations	  in	  case	  a	  severe	  conflict	  would	  erupt	  
in	  Europe,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  possible	  catastrophic	  escalation	  of	  the	  nuclear	  
threshold.	  In	  fact,	  the	  primary	  aim	  of	  CEP	  was	  to	  maintain	  “the	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  
of	   member	   nations	   and	   ensuring	   the	   survival	   of	   their	   populations	   during	   and	   after	  
hostilities”	   (NATO,	   1989,	   p.	   259).	   Hence,	   civil	   protection	   initially	   focused	   on	   the	  
consequences	  of	  war.	  
There	   would	   soon	   be	   a	   shift	   in	   focus,	   however.	   In	   1953,	   instead	   of	   responding	   to	   a	  
conflict,	   NATO	   conducted	   its	   first	   disaster	   assistance	   operation	   following	   a	   natural	  
disaster.	  The	  North	  Sea	  floods	  had	  left	  England,	  but	  most	  of	  all	  the	  Netherlands	  in	  a	  state	  
of	  destruction.	  At	  the	  time	  when	  the	  floods	  hit,	  both	  countries	  were	  still	  suffering	  from	  
the	  damage	  caused	  by	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  therefore	  the	  already	  strongly	  weakened	  
infrastructures	  of	  the	  countries	  could	  not	  stand	  up	  against	  the	  massive	  floods.	  From	  this	  
point	   onward,	   NATO	   strongly	   developed	   its	   expertise	   in	   the	   area	   of	   disaster	   relief	  
assistance	  and	  civilian	  protection.	  After	   the	   fall	  of	   the	  Berlin	  wall,	  more	  changes	  came	  
about	   as	   NATO	   included	   more	   members	   and	   developed	   friendly	   relations	   and	  
partnerships	   with	   countries	   spreading	   from	   Central	   Europe	   to	   Eastern	   Russia.	   As	  
already	   mentioned	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   the	   understanding	   of	   security	   had	   enlarged,	  
encompassing	  issues	  that	  could	  endanger	  common	  peace	  and	  stability,	  such	  as	  regional	  
crises	  and	  tensions	   that	  could	   lead	  to	   instabilities	  or	  conflicts.	  Over	   time,	  NATO	  would	  
receive	  demands	  for	  humanitarian	  support	  not	  only	  from	  allies,	  but	  also	  from	  partners	  
like	   Armenia,	   Kirghizstan	   or	   Moldavia,	   which	   will	   be	   briefly	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	  
chapter.	   NATO	   moreover	   participated	   in	   out	   of	   area	   peace	   operations	   and	   crisis	  
management	  operations	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  
	  
Over	  time,	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  emergency	  planning	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  adaptations.	  In	  2006,	  
NATO	  provided	  the	  following	  definition:	  
The	   aim	   of	   Civil	   Emergency	   Planning	   (CEP)	   in	   NATO	   is	   to	   collect,	   analyze	  
and	   share	   information	   on	   national	   planning	   activity	   to	   ensure	   the	   most	  
effective	   use	   of	   civil	   resources	   for	   use	   during	   emergency	   situations,	   in	  
accordance	  with	  Alliance	  objectives.	  It	  enables	  Allies	  and	  Partner	  nations	  to	  
assist	   each	   other	   in	   preparing	   for	   and	   dealing	   with	   the	   consequences	   of	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crisis,	  disaster	  or	  conflict.	  (NATO,	  2006,	  p.	  1)	  	  
The	   emphasis	   on	   civil	   emergency	   planning	   has	   not	   gone	   unnoticed.	  As	   Byman	   et	   al.	  
(2000)	   already	   accurately	   pointed	   out:	   where	   NATO	   was	   “once	   a	   marginal	   actor	   in	  
relation	   to	   relief	   operations,	   it	   is	   now	   an	   important	   vehicle	   for	   civilian	   and	   military	  
planning	  in	  this	  sphere”	  (p.	  131).	  	  
	  	  
In	  order	  to	  clarify	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  it	   is	  important	  to	  make	  the	  distinction	  
between	   humanitarian	   assistance	   and	   humanitarian	   intervention,	   which	   are	   different	  
concepts.	   Military	   interventions,	   either	   in	   typical	   war	   actions	   or	   crisis	   management	  
operations,	  can	  have	  a	  humanitarian	  component.	  There	  may	  even	  be	  military	  operations	  
to	  enforce	  peace	  in	  which	  the	  aim	  is	  of	  humanitarian	  nature.	  These	  types	  of	  operations	  
are	   typically	   called	   humanitarian	   interventions.	   As	   underlined	   by	   Bercovitch	   and	  
Jackson	  (2009):	  “Humanitarian	  intervention	  is	  coercive	  and	  implies	  the	  use	  of	  force	  for	  
humanitarian	   aims;	   assistance,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   associated	  with	   the	   provision	   of	  
relief”	   (p.	   103).	   Peacekeeping	  missions,	   therefore,	   do	   not	   fall	  within	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  
dissertation,	   as	   those	   types	   of	   missions	   are	   considered	   humanitarian	   interventions.	  
Disaster	  assistance,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  categorized	  as	  humanitarian	  assistance	  and	  is	  a	  
specifically	   important	   component	   of	   NATO’s	   civil	   emergency	   planning,	   which	   gives	  
prominence	   to	   the	   civilian	   feature	   of	   NATO’s	   crisis	  management	   activities,	   and	   is	   the	  
primary	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
	  	  
§2.1	  Civil	  Emergency	  Planning	  
Due	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   demands	   for	   civil	   protection,	   the	   concept	   of	   CEP	  
underwent	  many	   changes	  over	   time.	  Byman	  et	   al.	   (2000)	   confirm	   that	  NATO	  has	  now	  
broadened	  the	  civil	  emergency	  focus,	  which	  traditionally	  was	  “managing	  refugee	  crises	  
behind	  a	  conventional	   front	   in	  Western	  Europe	  or	  reconstruction	  after	  nuclear	  attack”	  
(p.	   131).	   Whereas	   natural	   disasters	   continue	   to	   pose	   a	   great	   threat	   to	   civilian	  
populations,	  the	  world	  also	  has	  been	  exposed	  to	  new	  threats	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  national	  
borders.	   One	   of	   the	  main	   events	   causing	   the	   shift	   toward	   threats	  with	   a	   transatlantic	  
character	  have	  been	  the	  September	  11	  attacks,	  which	  caused	  terrorism	  to	  become	  one	  of	  
the	   most	   prominent	   threats	   to	   civilian	   populations	   nowadays.	   The	   current	   security	  
environment	   is	   thus	   characterized	   by	   threats	   that	   are	   both	   asymmetric	   and	  
transnational.	   It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   civil	   emergency	   planning	   has	   become	   more	  
important	  than	  ever,	  allowing	  an	  adequate	  and	  effective	  response	  during	  civilian	  crises.	  
NATO	   civil	   emergency	   planning,	   hence,	   is	   a	   small-­‐scale	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   wide-­‐




At	  the	  core	  of	  NATO	  CEP	  stands	  a	  network	  of	  experts	  who	  are	  specialized	  in	  the	  area	  of	  
civilian	   resources.	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   use	   of	   civilian	   resources	   during	   a	   military	  
operation	  is	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  CEP,	  this	  network	  of	  experts	  allows	  NATO	  to	  offer	  countries	  
the	  best	  possible	  guidance	  on	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  civil	  resources	  during	  a	  disaster	  relief	  
operation	  (NATO,	  2001a,	  p.	  188).	  Besides	  this	  network	  of	  civil	  experts,	  the	  Senior	  Civil	  
Emergency	   Planning	   Committee	   (SCEPC)	   serves	   as	   the	   top	   NATO	   advisory	   body	   for	  
disaster	  relief	  operations,	  as	  its	  role	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  support	  for	  national	  authorities	  is	  
executed	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   Alliance’s	   objectives.	   The	   SCEPC’s	   strength	   is	   that	   it	  
brings	   together	   national	   government	   officials	   and	   experts	   from	   both	   the	   civil	   and	  
military	  area	  in	  order	  to	  optimize	  guidance	  for	  civil	  emergency	  planning.	  	  
	  
A	  key	  feature	  of	  CEP	  is	  the	  central	  role	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  national	  authorities.	  
It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   the	   question	   of	   what	   happens	   with	   civil	   assets	   remains	   a	  
domestic	  affair;	   therefore	  each	  country	  should	  bear	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  civil	  
emergency	  planning.	  	  However,	  when	  a	  disaster	  has	  struck	  on	  such	  a	  large	  scale,	  causing	  
the	   country	   to	  be	   incapable	  of	  providing	   the	  necessary	  disaster	   assistance,	  NATO	  gets	  
involved.	  NATO’s	   primary	   function	   is	   thus	   to	   help	   nations	   to	   such	   an	   extent,	   allowing	  
them	  to	  adequately	  protect	  their	  civilian	  populations	  in	  times	  of	  crisis.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  first	  
of	  all	  serving	  as	  a	  forum	  where	  knowledge	  can	  be	  exchanged	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  civil	  
emergencies.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Alliance	   offers	   assistance	   in	   the	   coordination	   of	   civil	  
emergency	  operations	  by	  making	  available	  the	  necessary	  assets	  in	  case	  jointly	  action	  is	  
needed.	   Subsequently,	   “NATO	   Civil	   Emergency	   Planning	   activities	   benefit	   the	   NATO	  
Allies	   and	  Partners	  nations	  who	  gain	   from	  cooperation	  at	   international	   level	   to	  better	  
handle	  emergency	  situations,	  particularly	  those	  with	  trans-­‐national	  dimensions”	  (NATO,	  
2006,	  p.	  6).	  
	  
§2.2	  NATO’s	  civil	  emergency	  response	  mechanisms	  
The	  EADRCC	  
Within	   the	   perimeter	   of	   the	   civil	   emergency	   structure,	   the	   Euro-­‐Atlantic	   Disaster	  
Response	   Coordination	   Centre	   (EADRCC)	   serves	   as	   NATO’s	   primary	   practical	   civil	  
emergency	  response	  mechanism	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  coordination	  of	  international	  
relief	  efforts	  in	  any	  of	  the	  50	  EAPC	  states.	  The	  creation	  EADRCC	  was	  initiated	  following	  a	  
proposal	  from	  Russia	  to	  enhance	  the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  response	  capability,	  resulting	  in	  the	  
“EAPC	   Policy	   on	   Enhanced	   Practical	   Cooperation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   International	   Disaster	  
Relief”.	  The	  policy,	  developed	  by	  the	  SCEPC	  and	  endorsed	  by	  the	  EAPC	  in	  1998,	  stresses	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that	  natural	  and	   technological	  disasters	  pose	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	   risk	   to	  populations	  of	  
EAPC	  members,	  even	  more	  than	  other	  types	  of	  emergencies	  (NATO,	  1998,	  “EAPC	  Policy	  
on	   enhanced	   practical	   cooperation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   international	   disaster	   relief”,	   p.	   1).	  
Simultaneously,	   this	   implies	   a	   rising	   need	   for	   international	   support	   in	   the	   area	   of	  
disaster	   assistance.	   The	   policy	   furthermore	   stresses	   that	   the	   UNOCHA	   remains	   the	  
primary	   actor	   in	   international	   disaster	  management,	   and	   that	   the	   EADRCC’s	   role	   is	   a	  
complementary	  one.	  As	  Hough	  (2013)	  points	  out,	  “The	  EADRCC	  represents	  a	  means	  of	  
assisting	  UN	   relief	  when	  disaster	   occurs	   in	   a	  EAPC	   state	   or	   of	   coordinating	   assistance	  
within	  the	  EAPC	  area	  if	  the	  UN-­‐OCHA	  is	  distracted	  elsewhere”	  (p.	  210).	  	  
	  
Already	  in	  1994,	  the	  UN	  acknowledged	  that	  natural	  disasters	  pose	  an	  increasing	  risk	  to	  
civilian	   populations.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   frameworks	   for	   disaster	   reduction	   have	   been	  
established	  with	  the	  objective	  to	  save	  human	  lives	  through	  an	   integrated	  approach	  for	  
disaster	  management,	   therefore	   reducing	   the	   level	   of	   destruction	   following	   a	   disaster.	  
This	   integrated	   approach	   mainly	   focuses	   on	   improving	   and	   promoting	   disaster	  
prevention	   and	   preparedness.	   So	   far,	   there	   have	   been	   created	   three	   frameworks:	  
Yokohoma	  Strategy	   (1994),	   the	  Hyogo	  Framework	   (2005),	  and	   the	  Sendai	  Framework	  
(2015).	   Each	   framework	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   improved	   and	   updated	   version	   of	   the	  
previous	  one.	  For	  a	  brief	  explanation	  of	  the	  frameworks	  please	  refer	  to	  Appendix	  2.	  	  
	  
The	   EADRCC	   monitors	   the	   deployment	   of	   the	   Euro-­‐Atlantic	   Disaster	   Response	   Unit	  
(EADRU).	  Where	   the	  Centre	   coordinates	   the	  disaster	   response	  of	  NATO	  members,	   the	  
Unit	  gets	  detached	  to	  the	  disaster	  site	  upon	  request	  of	  the	  stricken	  country.	  “The	  EADRU	  
will	   be	   considered	   to	   have	   been	   activated	   whenever	   one	   or	   more	   EAPC	   member	  
countries	  deploy	  capabilities	  in	  response	  to	  the	  initiative	  of	  the	  EADRCC”	  (NATO,	  1998,	  
“EAPC	   policy	   on	   enhanced	   practical	   cooperation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   international	   disaster	  
relief”,	   p.	   5).	   The	   Unit	   comprises	   a	  mixture	   of	   civilian	   and	  military	   elements	   that	   are	  
contributed	   by	   EAPC.	   These	   contributions	   can	   for	   example	   be	   medical	   and	   rescue	  
personnel,	   but	   also	   equipment	   and	   other	   types	   of	   assets.	   The	   unit	   operates	   in	   close	  
cooperation	  with	   the	  UN	  and	   relevant	   international	  organizations	   (IOs).	  Naturally,	   the	  
EADRU	   can	   only	   be	   deployed	   within	   the	   EAPC	   area.	   However,	   “In	   exceptional	  
circumstances,	  should	  there	  be	  a	  request	  for	  assistance	  for	  a	  stricken	  non-­‐EAPC	  country,	  
political	  guidance	  will	  be	  obtained	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  urgency	  before	  initiating	  any	  disaster	  
response	   via	   the	   EADRCC”	   (NATO,	   1998,	   “EAPC	   policy	   on	   enhanced	   practical	  




Globally,	  the	  EADRCC	  fulfils	  three	  primary	  functions:	  coordination,	  information	  sharing,	  
and	  training	  and	  exercises.	  First,	  the	  Centre	  has	  a	  coordinating	  role,	  in	  which	  it	  does	  not	  
only	  coordinate	  requests	  from	  affected	  states,	  but	  also	  the	  offers	  of	  assistance	  by	  EAPC	  
members.	  Kerigan-­‐Kyro	   (2014)	   stresses	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  EADRCC’s	   coordinating	  
role:	   “EADRCC	   has	   an	   important	   coordinating	   role	   between	   NATO	  members,	   working	  
closely	  with	  the	  military	  in	  each	  country,	  and	  with	  international	  organizations,	  enabling	  
expertise	  and	  assistance	  to	  be	  on	  the	  ground	  very	  quickly”	  (p.	  2).	  Accordingly,	  the	  Centre	  
does	  not	  have	  a	  commanding	  role	  in	  any	  way.	  Indeed,	  this	  coordinating	  role	  takes	  place	  
in	   close	   consultation	   with	   UN-­‐OCHA	   and,	   if	   necessary,	   with	   other	   international	  
organizations.	  When	  the	  Centre	  receives	  a	  request	  for	  assistance	  from	  a	  nation	  that	  has	  
been	   struck	  by	  a	  natural	   or	  man-­‐made	  disaster,	   it	   first	   contacts	   the	   stricken	  nation	   to	  
confirm	  that	  the	  request	  has	  been	  received	  and	  retrieves	  additional	  information	  on	  the	  
requirements	   for	   assistance	   when	   necessary.	   Next,	   consultations	   with	   the	   UN	   and	  
possibly	  other	  IOs	  take	  place	  in	  order	  to	  decide	  what	  the	  exact	  response	  by	  the	  EADRCC	  
will	  be	  and	  which	  elements	  are	  needed.	  Once	   the	  requirements	   for	  disaster	  assistance	  
have	   been	   determined,	   the	   information	   is	   distributed	   among	   all	   EAPC	  members,	   who	  
will	   then	  individually	  decide	  whether	  they	  will	  provide	  assistance	  through	  the	  EADRU.	  
Countries	   can	  also	  decide	   to	   individually	  offer	  direct	  assistant	  and	   therefore	   carry	  out	  
relief	   efforts	   independently.	   As	   soon	   as	   it	   is	   clear	  which	   elements	   the	   EAPC	   countries	  
will	   deploy	   in	   response	   to	   the	   disaster,	   it	   is	   the	   role	   of	   the	   EADRCC	   to	   report	   this	  
information	  to	  the	  affected	  country.	  	  
Second,	  the	  EADRCC	  greatly	  values	  the	  promotion	  of	  information	  sharing,	  and	  it	  does	  so	  
by	   organizing	   seminars	   and	   conferences.	   In	   2004,	   the	   EADRCC	   organized	   the	   first	  
seminar,	   taking	   place	   in	   Dubrovnik,	   Croatia.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   seminar	   was	   to	   evaluate	  
lessons	  learned	  from	  NATO	  disaster	  relief	  efforts	  ever	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  EADRCC	  
in	   1998.	   National	   experiences	   and	   the	   role	   of	   IOs	   during	   disaster	   relief	   efforts	   were	  
discussed	   during	   the	   program.	   “The	   overall	   idea	   with	   the	   seminar	   is	   to	   improve	   the	  
EADRCC	  ability	  to	  support	  the	  nations	  when	  disasters	  occur	  and	  international	  assistance	  
is	  needed”.	  Moreover,	   it	  allowed	  to	  “assess	   the	  EAPC	  nations	  capability	   to	  provide	  and	  
receive	  assistance”	  (EADRCC,	  2006,	  “Seminar	  on	  Lessons	  Learned	  from	  operations	  and	  
exercises	  conducted	  by	  the	  EADRCC”,	  para.	  5).	   In	  2013	  the	  second	  seminar	  took	  place,	  
and	   its	   focus	   was	   to	   evaluate	   the	   EADRCC	   operations	   conducted	   between	   2004	   and	  
2013.	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  seminar	  was	  the	  same	  as	  the	  previous	  one,	  namely	  to	  identify	  
further	  areas	  of	  improvement	  for	  NATO’s	  role	  in	  humanitarian	  operations.	  	  
Last,	  training	  and	  exercises	  are	  very	  important	  aspects	  for	  both	  the	  Centre	  and	  the	  Unit	  
because	   it	   fosters	   effective	   functioning,	   preparedness,	   and	   maximizes	   the	   level	   of	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interoperability.	   Therefore,	   the	   EADRCC’s	   role	   is	   to	   “facilitate	   close	   and	   continuing	  
cooperation	   for	   training	   and	   exercises	   among	   voluntary	   groupings	   of	   EAPC	   member	  
countries”	  (NATO,	  1998,	  “EAPC	  policy	  on	  enhanced	  practical	  cooperation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
international	   disaster	   relief”.	   p.	   6).	   NATO	   organizes	   training	   and	   exercise	   events	   on	   a	  
regular	   basis,	   and	   these	   preparations	   are	   open	   to	   all	   partners.	   The	   protection	   of	   the	  
civilian	   population	   is	   the	   fundamental	   tenet	   during	   the	   trainings	   and	   exercises.	   Field	  
exercises	   are	   organized	   each	   year	   and	   serve	   the	   objective	   of	   enhancing	   cooperation	  
between	  nations	  during	  operations	  by	  practicing	  the	  Centre’s	  procedures	  and	  the	  Unit’s	  
capabilities.	   With	   a	   total	   number	   of	   35	   participating	   countries,	   the	   2012	   exercise	  
Georgia	  was	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  field	  exercises	  organized	  by	  the	  EADRCC.	  “It	  proved	  to	  be	  
a	  well-­‐developed	  rigorous	  exercise	  that	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  safe	  manner	  with	  no	  major	  
injuries	   or	   casualties.	  	   It	   was	   well	   designed,	   in	   that	   it	   promoted	   cooperation	   among	  
responders	   from	   the	   participating	   nations”	   (EADRCC,	   2013,	   “Georgia	   to	   host	  
NATO/EAPC	   disaster	   response	   exercise”,	   para.	   3).	   Countries	   can	   individually	   decide	  
what	  their	  participating	  role	  will	  be	  during	  the	  field	  exercise.	  For	  instance,	  countries	  can	  
choose	   to	   send	  specialized	   teams	  or	   staff	   support,	  but	  also	   to	   just	   send	  observers.	  For	  
each	  annual	  exercise,	  the	  scenario	  differs.	  The	  scenario	  for	  the	  Georgia	  exercise	  involved	  
an	   earthquake,	   which	   would	   be	   followed	   by	   chemical	   incidents,	   transportation	  
accidents,	   and	   other	   complex	   dangers.	   These	   types	   of	   exercises	   are	   not	   only	   very	  
important	   for	   the	  EADRCC	  and	   the	  EADRU,	  but	   also	   for	   the	   country	   in	  which	   the	   field	  
exercise	  takes	  place.	  To	  illustrate,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  objectives	  of	  the	  Georgia	  exercise	   is	  
“to	   strengthen	  Georgia’s	   capabilities	   to	   receive	   international	   assistance	   and	  effectively	  
organize	  and	  co-­‐ordinate	  consequence	  management	  operations	   involving	   international	  
rescue	  teams”	  (EADRCC,	  2012,	  “Extract	  from	  the	  exercise	  instructions	  –	  exercise	  Georgia	  
2012”,	  p.	  4).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  an	  extremely	  valuable	  experience	  for	  the	  host	  country	  
as	   well.	   Besides	   strengthening	   the	   consequence	   management	   capabilities	   of	   the	  
EADRCC,	   the	  EADRU	  and	   the	  host	   countries,	   trainings	   and	   exercises	   also	   foster	   cross-­‐
border	  cooperation	  between	  nations	  and	  IOs.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  a	  good	  way	  for	  all	  parties	  to	  
get	   familiar	   with	   the	   internationally	   agreed	   guidelines.	   Finally,	   field	   exercises	   can	   be	  
used	   for	   lessons	   learned,	   as	   the	   scenarios	   are	   as	   close	   as	  possible	   to	   the	  possible	   real	  
situation.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  Rapid	  Reaction	  Team	  and	  the	  Advisory	  Support	  Team	  (AST)	  
In	   addition,	   the	   Rapid	   Reaction	   Team	   and	   the	   Advisory	   Support	   Team	   (AST)	   are	   two	  
other	  non-­‐military	   instruments	   for	  CEP.	  The	  Civil	  Emergency	  Planning	  Rapid	  Reaction	  
Team	  was	  established	  in	  2006	  by	  the	  SCEPC	  and	  has	  the	  capability	  to	  deploy	  a	  team	  of	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civil	  experts	  shortly	  after	  a	  country	  has	  been	  struck	  by	  a	  disaster.	  Upon	  arrival,	  the	  team	  
of	   civil	   experts	   evaluates	   which	   civil	   needs	   and	   capabilities	   are	   required,	   which	   is	   of	  
great	  support	  during	  NATO	  disaster	  relief	  operations.	  Moreover,	  the	  team	  evaluates	  the	  
situation	   in	  close	  cooperation	  with	  the	  stricken	  nation	  and	  the	  UN.	  Whereas	  the	  Rapid	  
Reaction	   Team	   only	   provides	   assistance	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   a	   crisis,	   the	   Advisory	  
Support	   Team	   focuses	   on	   the	   phase	   prior	   to	   a	   potential	   disaster.	   The	   team	   aims	   to	  
prepare	   countries	   and	   IOs	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   they	   will	   be	   better	   capable	   of	  
responding	  to	  disasters.	  The	  AST	  thus	  provides	  nations	  with	  advice,	  aiming	  to	  improve	  
the	  preparedness,	  response	  and,	  recovery	  capabilities	  of	  nations	  in	  case	  they	  get	  hit	  by	  a	  
disaster.	   Besides	  making	   assessments	   and	   providing	   advice,	   the	   team	   also	   engages	   in	  
training	   and	   exercises.	   An	   AST	   is	   solely	   deployed	   when	   a	   nation	   directly	   requests	  
assistance	   through	   the	   SCEPC.	   Moreover,	   the	   nation	   is	   not	   obliged	   to	   implement	   the	  
recommendations	  given	  by	  the	  AST	  following	  their	  assessment.	  
	  
§2.3	  Civil-­‐military	  coordination	  in	  humanitarian	  emergencies	  
Perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   most	   complex	   aspects	   about	   disaster	   relief	   activities	   is	   the	  
interaction	   between	   civilian	   actors	   and	   military	   authorities.	   Processes	   of	   disaster	  
assistance	   have	   become	   intertwined,	   as	   military	   and	   civilian	   actors	   participate	  
simultaneously	   in	   these	   operations.	   Armies	   increasingly	   engage	   in	   non-­‐military	  
functions,	   which	   causes	   military	   assistance	   in	   humanitarian	   emergencies	   to	   be	  
specifically	  important	  in	  the	  field	  of	  civil	  emergency	  planning.	  In	  complex	  humanitarian	  
situations,	   where	   regions	   or	   countries	   are	   devastated	   and	   lack	   administrative	  
authorities,	  the	  military	  gets	  involved	  in	  the	  use	  of	  civilian	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  
essential	  services.	  Logically,	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  each	  situation	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  
the	  crisis	  which	  services	  require	  restoration.	  Examples	  are	  rebuilding	  the	  infrastructure,	  
facilitating	   electrical	   power,	   and	   protecting	   medical	   services	   and	   amenities.	   Before	  
military	  means	   can	   be	   used	   in	   disaster	   relief	   operations,	   authorization	   by	   the	   NAC	   is	  
necessary:	  “The	  North	  Atlantic	  Council	  (NAC)	  will	  have	  to	  authorize	  the	  use	  of	  collective	  
Allied	   military	   resources	   for	   such	   civil	   activities”	   (Policy	   Coordination	   Group,	   2001,	  
“NATO	  Military	  Policy	  on	  Civil-­‐Military	  Co-­‐operation	   (Cimic)”,	   p.	   2).	  Thus,	   the	  Alliance	  
forces	   may	   contribute	   to	   managing	   responses	   to	   humanitarian	   emergencies	   through	  
military	  assets	  and	  units,	  when	  approved	  by	  the	  NAC.	  	  
Civilian	  assets	  can	  be	  of	  great	  support	  for	  military	  operations,	  whereas	  military	  assets	  in	  
turn	   can	   be	   of	   great	   value	   during	   disaster	   relief	   operations.	   NATO	   argues	   that	   the	  
cooperation	   between	   the	   two	   actors	   is	   indispensible	   to	   these	   types	   of	   operations,	   as	  
stressed	  in	  the	  1999	  Strategic	  Concept:	  “The	  interaction	  between	  Alliance	  forces	  and	  the	  
	  	  
27	  
civil	  environment	  (both	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental)	  in	  which	  they	  operate	  is	  
crucial	   to	   the	   success	   of	   operations”	   (NATO,	   1999,	   “the	   Alliance’s	   Strategic	   Concept”,	  
para.	  60).	  Important	  is,	  that	  military	  forces	  are	  only	  deployed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  exceptional	  
circumstances	   in	  which	   they	  are	  enabled	   to	   take	  on	   tasks	   that	   traditionally	   fall	  within	  
the	   domain	   of	   civil	   authorities.	   Hence,	   the	   military	   only	   carries	   out	   these	   types	   of	  
activities	  when	  the	  appropriate	  civil	  authority	  is	  unable	  to	  do	  so	  in	  that	  specific	  moment,	  
in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   occurrence	   of	   a	   problematic	   power	   vacuum.	   This	   takeover	   of	  
control	  by	  the	  military	  is	  only	  a	  temporary	  event,	  and	  that	  the	  civil	  authorities	  will	  pick	  
up	  the	  threads	  again	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  situation	  is	  stabilized	  as	  such.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  cooperation	  and	  enhance	  the	  relationship	  between	  Alliance	  forces	  
and	   civil	   actors,	   NATO	   created	   a	   policy	   on	   civil-­‐military	   cooperation	   (CIMIC)	   in	   July	  
2001.	   CIMIC	   is	   primarily	   important	   in	   non-­‐Article	   5	   Crisis	   Response	   Operations	  
(NA5CRO),	  because	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  these	  types	  of	  operations	  often	  requires	  
the	  involvement	  of	  both	  military	  and	  civil	  actors.	  	  The	  official	  policy	  document	  describes	  
CIMIC	  as	  follows:	  
“The	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  co-­‐operation,	  in	  support	  of	  the	  mission,	  between	  the	  
NATO	  Commander	  and	  civil	  actors,	   including	  national	  population	  and	  local	  
authorities,	   as	   well	   as	   international,	   national	   and	   non-­‐governmental	  
organizations	   and	   agencies.”	   (Policy	   Coordination	   Group,	   2001,	   “NATO	  
military	  policy	  on	  civil-­‐military	  co-­‐operation	  (Cimic)”,	  p.	  1)	  
The	   CIMIC	   policy	   acknowledges	   the	   complex	   circumstances	   caused	   by	   dissimilarities	  
between	  military	  and	  civilian	  actors,	  such	  as	  cultural,	  political	  and	  religious	  differences:	  
“It	   must	   be	   recognized,	   however,	   that	   even	   where	   such	   relationships	   or	   planning	  
mechanisms	  exist,	  it	  may	  not	  always	  be	  possible	  to	  conduct	  them	  on	  a	  formal	  basis”	  (p.	  
4).	  For	  this	  reason,	  shaping	  an	  effective	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  groups	  is	  a	  vital	  
component	  for	  minimizing	  the	  extent	  of	  a	  crisis	  and	  stabilizing	  the	  situation.	  In	  order	  to	  
reach	   the	   right	   level	   of	   agreement	   and	   coordination	   in	   the	   civil-­‐military	   relationship	  
NATO	   emphasizes	   the	   importance	   of	   establishing	   common	   goals	   at	   an	   early	   stage,	  
“consistent	  with	  political	  guidance,	  which	  military	  commanders	  must	  integrate	  into	  the	  
planning	   for	   the	   execution	  of	   their	   operations”	   (p.	   5).	   Particularly	   important	   herein	   is	  
the	  notion	  of	  transparency,	  allowing	  the	  creation	  of	  trust	  and	  mutual	  understanding.	  	  
	  
The	  Oslo	  Guidelines	  
Besides	   the	   CIMIC	  Policy,	   the	  Oslo	  Guidelines	   on	   the	  Use	   of	   Foreign	  Military	   and	  Civil	  
Defence	  Assets	  (MCDA)	  in	  Disaster	  Relief	  serve	  as	  a	  major	  guide	  for	  NATO	  disaster	  relief	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operations.	   The	   official	   author	   of	   the	   Oslo	   Guidelines	   is	   the	   UN	   Office	   for	   the	  
Coordination	  of	  Humanitarian	  Affairs	  (UNOCHA),	  and	  the	  guidelines	  have	  been	  written	  
over	   a	   period	   of	   two	   years,	   involving	   numerous	   states	   and	   organizations,	   including	  
NATO.	   The	   first	   version	   of	   the	   Guidelines	   was	   published	   in	   1994	   and	   has	   undergone	  
several	   alternations	   ever	   since,	   the	   last	   one	   being	   in	   2007	   (OCHA,	   2007,	   “Oslo	  
Guidelines”,	   p.	   1).	   The	   principle	   aim	   of	   the	   Oslo	   Guidelines	   is	   to	   “establish	   the	   basic	  
framework	  for	  formalizing	  and	  improving	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
foreign	   military	   and	   civil	   defense	   assets	   in	   international	   disaster	   relief	   operations”	  
(OCHA,	  2007,	  “Oslo	  Guidelines”,	  p.	  4).	  	  Moreover,	  the	  Guidelines	  are	  based	  upon	  the	  core	  
humanitarian	  principles	  of	  humanity,	  impartiality	  and	  neutrality.	  Member	  states	  are	  not	  
obliged	   to	   follow	   the	   Guidelines,	   which	   makes	   it	   a	   non-­‐binding	   document	   that	   solely	  
seeks	   to	   establish	   a	   framework	   and	   therefore	   serves	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	   enhanced	  
coordination	  of	  military	  and	  civilian	  assistance.	  
	  
The	   Guidelines	   define	   humanitarian	   assistance	   as	   “aid	   to	   an	   affected	   population	   that	  
seeks,	   as	   its	   primary	   purpose,	   to	   save	   lives	   and	   alleviate	   suffering	   of	   a	   crisis-­‐affected	  
population”.	  Additionally,	  international	  disaster	  relief	  assistance	  (IDRA)	  is	  described	  as	  
“material,	   personnel	   and	   services	   provided	   by	   the	   international	   community	   to	   an	  
Affected	   State	   to	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   those	   affected	   by	   a	   disaster”	   (OCHA,	   2007,	   “Oslo	  
Guidelines”,	   p.	   3).	   Next,	   the	   document	   classifies	   different	   types	   of	   humanitarian	  
assistance:	  direct	  and	   indirect	  assistance,	  and	   infrastructure	  support.	  Correspondingly,	  
MCDA	  efforts	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  two	  latter	  types	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance,	  in	  which	  
the	  population	   is	   not	  directly	   exposed	   to	   relief	   activities	  by	   the	  military	   and	   the	  main	  
focus	   is	   to	   transport	  goods	  or	  personnel	   and	   to	  provide	  general	   services	   to	   restore	  or	  
improve	   infrastructural	   services.	   Accordingly,	   direct	   assistance	   activities	   are	   left	   to	  
humanitarian	  organizations,	  such	  as	  handing	  out	  food	  supplies	  to	  affected	  populations.	  
However,	   sometimes	   it	   does	   happen	   that	   military	   forces	   get	   involved	   in	   direct	  
humanitarian	  assistance.	  When	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  is	  very	  important	  that	  there	  remains	  a	  
clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  regular	  roles	  of	  military	  and	  humanitarian	  actors.	  	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  identification	  and	  security	  of	  foreign	  personnel,	  the	  Guidelines	  emphasize	  
the	   principle	   that	   “foreign	  military	   and	   civil	   defence	   personnel	   deploying	   on	   disaster	  
relief	   missions	   will	   do	   so	   unarmed	   and	   in	   national	   uniforms”	   (OCHA,	   2007,	   “Oslo	  
Guidelines”,	   p.	   8).	   Correspondingly,	   in	   the	  model	   agreement	   that	   covers	   the	   status	   of	  
MCDA	  and	   likewise	   serves	   as	   a	  draft	   agreement	  between	   the	  UN,	   the	   receiving	   states,	  
and	   the	   assisting	   states,	   it	   is	   written	   that,	   “members	   of	   the	  MCDA	   operation	   shall	   be	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permitted	   to	   wear	   the	   national	   military	   or	   civil	   defence	   uniforms	   of	   their	   State”.	  
However,	   it	   also	   underlines	   that	   “the	   affected	   state	   will	   determine	   as	   part	   of	   this	  
agreement	  if	  members	  of	  the	  MCDA	  operation	  may	  carry	  arms	  for	  their	  own	  protection,	  
while	  performing	  official	  duties”	  (OCHA,	  2007,	  “Oslo	  Guidelines”	  “Annex	  1”,	  p.	  6).	  Hence,	  
although	   foreign	  military	   personnel	   could	   be	   allowed	   to	   carry	   arms	   during	   the	   relief	  
operation,	   it	   is	  desired	   that	   they	  do	  not,	   but	   the	  affected	   states	  have	   the	  possibility	   to	  
take	   specific	   decisions	   resulting	   from	   particular	   security	   environments.	   The	   Oslo	  
Guidelines	  underline	  the	  distinction	  between	  United	  Nations	  Military	  and	  Civil	  Defence	  
Assets	   (UN	  MCDA)	   and	   “other	   deployed	   forces”	   (OCHA,	   2007,	   “Oslo	  Guidelines”,	   p.	   3).	  
Respectively,	   NATO	   would	   fall	   under	   the	   latter	   group.	   Whereas	   the	   UN	   MCDA	   are	  
controlled	   by	   UN	   humanitarian	   agencies,	   the	   resources	   of	   other	   deployed	   forces	   fall	  
under	  the	  command	  of	  the	  corresponding	  entity.	  	  
	  
The	  NATO	  CIMIC	  policy	  and	   the	  Oslo	  Guidelines	  are	  predominantly	  based	  on	  common	  
grounds.	   For	   instance,	   just	   as	   NATO,	   the	   UN	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   quick	   and	  
effective	  response,	  given	  that	  an	  immediate	  response	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  crisis	  situation	  
is	   usually	   crucial	   for	   the	   success	   of	   the	   operation.	   Second,	   both	   entities	   promote	   a	  
harmonious	   relation	  between	  civilian	  and	  humanitarian	  actors,	  based	  on	  dialogue	  and	  
cooperation.	  Finally,	  military	  and	  civil	  defense	  assets	  should	  only	  be	  deployed	  as	  a	  last	  
resort	  when	  no	  other	   civilian	  alternative	   is	  available,	   and	  when	  militaries	   can	  provide	  
unique	  capabilities.	  In	  other	  words,	  dependency	  on	  military	  assets	  should	  be	  avoided	  at	  
all	  costs.	  Most	  questions	  are	  raised	  over	  the	  latter	  principle.	  Wiharta	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  found	  
that	   the	   last	   resort	   concept	   is	   interpreted	  differently	   among	   all	   actors,	   resulting	   in	   an	  
uneven	  application	  of	  the	  Guidelines:	  
	  “There	   is	   considerable	   disagreement	   among	   governments	   and	  
humanitarian	   actors	   about	   how	   much	   weight	   to	   give	   these	   ‘unique’	  
characteristics	   when	   balancing	   them	   against	   issues	   such	   as	   cost	   burdens,	  
the	   risk	   of	   militarizing	   the	   relief	   effort	   and	   how	   the	   presence	   of	   foreign	  
troops	  affects	  civilian	  humanitarian	  actors’	   safety	  and	   freedom	  to	  operate”	  
(p.	  xi)	  
Another	   reason	  why	   the	   last	   resort	   concept	   is	   a	   difficult	   one	   is	   because	   in	   the	   initial	  
stage	  of	  the	  disaster	  response	  there	  is	  hardly	  time	  to	  assess	  whether	  there	  truly	  are	  no	  
other	  civilian	  options	  left.	  	  
Another	  critique	  on	  the	  Guidelines	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  address	  the	  coordination	  with	  the	  
military	  of	  the	  affected	  state,	  although	  this	  is	  often	  a	  crucial	  matter.	  Likewise,	  Metcalfe	  et	  
al.	  (2012)	  identify	  a	  “tendency	  of	  foreign	  militaries	  and	  the	  international	  humanitarian	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community	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  national	  military	  in	  crisis	  response”	  (p.	  
17).	  
	  
Importantly,	  the	  Oslo	  Guidelines	  solely	  apply	  to	  the	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  
in	  emergency	  situations	  in	  times	  of	  peace	  and	  fully	  respect	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  state	  
that	  receives	  disaster	  assistance.	  Hence,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  any	  regard	  to	  the	  use	  of	  foreign	  
MCDA	   in	  armed	  conflict	   situations.	  There	   is	  a	  different	  document	   for	   the	  use	  of	  MCDA	  
for	   the	   so-­‐called	   “complex	   emergencies”:	   the	  UN	  Civil-­‐Military	  Guidelines	   for	   Complex	  
Emergencies,	   which	   provides	   a	   foundation	   for	   relief	   operations	   focused	   on	   the	  
reconstruction	   and	   rehabilitation	   of	   a	   (post-­‐)	   conflict	   society.	   The	   definition	   of	   a	  
complex	  emergency	  is	  as	  follows:	  “a	  humanitarian	  crisis	  in	  a	  country,	  region,	  or	  society	  
where	  there	  is	  a	  total	  or	  considerable	  breakdown	  of	  authority	  resulting	  from	  internal	  or	  
external	   conflict	   and	   which	   requires	   an	   international	   response	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	  
mandate	  or	  capacity	  of	  any	  single	  agency	  and/or	  the	  ongoing	  UN	  country	  program”	  (UN,	  
2003,	   “Guidelines	   on	   the	   use	   of	   military	   and	   civil	   defense	   assets	   to	   support	   United	  
Nations	  humanitarian	  activities	   in	  complex	  emergencies”,	  p.	  3).	  Whereas	  humanitarian	  
agencies	   usually	   make	   the	   request	   for	   disaster	   assistance	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   complex	  
emergency,	   disaster	   relief	   operations	   in	   peacetime	   are	   carried	   out	   when	   the	   affected	  
state	   files	   an	   official	   request	   for	   international	   humanitarian	   assistance	   following	   a	  
technological,	  environmental	  or	  natural	  disaster.	  	  
	  
Both	   guidelines	   are	   currently	   the	  principle	   frameworks	   concerning	   the	  deployment	  of	  
military	  assets	  in	  disaster	  relief	  operations.	  	  
	  
A	  controversial	  matter	  
Among	   others,	   natural	   disasters	   have	   been	   happening	   more	   frequently	   over	   the	   last	  
decades,	   and	  when	   they	   strike,	   they	   are	   they	   are	   generally	  more	  destructive	   (Leaning	  
and	  Guha-­‐Sapir,	   2013,	   “Natural	  disasters,	   armed	  conflict,	   and	  public	  health”).	  This	  has	  
invoked	   a	   substantial	   increase	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   foreign	   military	   assets	   in	   disaster	  
responses.	  This	  growing	  availability	  on	  the	  side	  of	  military	  actors	  to	  engage	  in	  disaster	  
response	   probably	   has	   to	   do	   with	   several	   factors.	   First,	   the	   media	   attention	   and	   the	  
subsequent	   public	   pressure	   that	   often	   comes	   along	   with	   major	   disasters	   work	   as	   a	  
strong	  incentive	  to	  decide	  to	  engage	  in	  disaster	  relief	  operations.	  Second,	  these	  types	  of	  
operations	  are	  excellent	  training	  opportunities	  for	  military	  forces	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  
staff	   morale.	   The	   employment	   of	   military	   forces	   in	   complex	   disasters	   and	   crises	  
broadens	   their	   field	   of	   expertise	   and	   ascertains	   their	   role	   in	   the	   changing	   security	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environment.	   Finally,	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   armed	   forces	   taking	   on	   humanitarian	  
assistance	  tasks	  is	  also	  in	  line	  with	  the	  more	  comprehensive	  approaches	  to	  international	  
security.	  Whereas	   before	   disaster	   relief	   operations	  were	  mainly	   focused	   on	   providing	  
logistics	   and	   technical	   support	   to	   the	   affected	   state,	   the	   military’s	   role	   in	   providing	  
humanitarian	  aid	  during	   these	   types	  of	  operations	   is	   growing.	  The	   involvement	  of	   the	  
military	  has	  thus	  become	  inevitable	  and	  “the	  question	  for	  humanitarian	  organizations	  is	  
no	   longer	   whether	   to	   engage	   with	   the	   military,	   but	   rather	   how	   and	   when	   to	   do	   so”	  
(Hoffman	  and	  Hudson,	  2009,	  p.	  31).	  	  
	  
It	   is	  exactly	  the	  military	  involvement	  in	  humanitarian	  assistance	  that	  has	  caused	  much	  
controversy,	   and	   questions	   have	   been	   raised	   whether	   it	   is	   appropriate	   for	   foreign	  
military	  forces	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  humanitarian	  aid.	  However,	  according	  to	  Wheeler	  and	  
Harmer	  (2006),	  “military	  engagement	  in	  the	  response	  to	  natural	  disasters	  is	  perhaps	  the	  
least	  contentious	  aspect	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  military	  and	  the	  humanitarian	  
worlds”	   (p.	   7).	   Nonetheless,	   the	   trend	   of	   utilizing	   foreign	   military	   assets	   in	   disaster	  
response	   becoming	   the	   norm	   has	   been	   subject	   to	   much	   criticism,	   especially	   because	  
experiences	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  smooth	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  appears	  to	  be	  
an	   issue	   that	   seems	   hard	   to	   achieve.	   Tensions	   especially	   arise	   in	   complex	   situations	  
because	   of	   differences	   in	   approaches	   to	   security	   among	   humanitarians	   and	   military	  
actors;	   notwithstanding	   that	   they	   generally	   have	   the	   same	   objectives	   regarding	   the	  
outcomes	   of	   the	   disaster	   response.	   Madiwale	   and	   Virk	   (2011)	   explain	   that	   military	  
actors	  usually	  operate	   according	   to	   the	  principles	  of	  deterrence	  and	  physical	   security,	  
often	   involving	   fortified	   compounds	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   arms.	   	   Humanitarian	   actors,	  
conversely,	  focus	  on	  security	  based	  on	  acceptance	  among	  all	  stakeholders,	  while	  usually	  
opposing	  the	  presence	  of	  arms	  (p.	  1086).	  	  
	  
Factors	  for	  effective	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  
A	   research	   by	   Wiharta	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   for	   the	   Stockholm	   International	   Research	   Peace	  
Institute	  (SIPRI)	  that	  focuses	  on	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  identifies	  several	  areas	  that	  
determine	  whether	   the	   deployment	   of	   foreign	  military	   assets	  will	   be	   effective	   or	   not:	  
timeliness,	   appropriateness,	   efficiency,	   absorptive	   capacity,	   and	   coordination	   (pp.	   33-­‐
42).	  	  	  
The	   concept	   of	   timeliness	   concentrates	   on	  whether	   the	  military	   assets	   arrive	   on	   time	  
and	   also	   become	   operational	   at	   the	   right	   moment.	   “The	   ideal	   scenario	   would	   be	   a	  
minimal	   delay	   between	   the	   signing	   of	   any	   status	   of	   force	   agreement,	   dispatch	   and	  
operation”(Wiharta	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   34).	   It	   goes	  without	   saying	   that	   this	   is	   particularly	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hard	  to	  achieve	   in	  reality,	  considering	  the	  complex	  conditions	  and	  the	   large	  amount	  of	  
involved	   actors.	  Natural	   disasters	   require	   an	   immediate	   response,	   as	   the	   initial	   phase	  
right	   after	   the	   disaster	   has	   struck	   is	   usually	   crucial,	   especially	   when	   it	   concerns	  
earthquakes.	   When	   military	   assets	   arrive	   too	   late,	   it	   loses	   its	   unique	   capability.	   A	  
particularly	   important	  aspect	   for	   the	  military	   to	  be	  able	   to	  arrive	  on	   time	   is	   the	   initial	  
needs	   assessment,	   which	   evaluates	   the	   impact	   and	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   disaster.	   A	  
correct	   initial	   needs	   assessment	   is	   thus	   crucial	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   good	  
perception	   of	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   disaster	   and	   the	   urgency	   of	   assistance	   by	   the	  
international	   community.	   For	   instance,	   “in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Indian	   Ocean	   Tsunami,	   the	  
scale	  and	  severity	  of	  the	  disaster	  were	  immediately	  clear	  and	  prompted	  rapid	  response	  
from	   the	   international	   community	   with	   all	   of	   its	   available	   resources”	   (Wiharta	   et	   al.,	  
2008,	   p.	   33).	   In	   some	   situations,	   however,	   the	   initial	   needs	   assessment	   does	   not	  
appropriately	   sketch	   the	   true	   graveness	   of	   the	   situation,	   which	   can	   cause	   foreign	  
military	  assets	  to	  arrive	  too	  late.	  Further,	  civilian	  actors	  hardly	  include	  military	  actors	  in	  
their	  needs	  assessments,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  other	  way	  around.	  As	   a	   result,	   coordination	   is	  
already	   troubled	   in	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   the	   disaster	   response.	   Wiharta	   et	   al.	   (2008),	  
therefore,	   strongly	   recommends	   for	   civilian	  and	  military	  actors	   to	   conduct	   joint	  needs	  
assessments	   (p.	   41).	   Another	   factor	   that	   can	   hinder	   the	   rapid	   deployment	   of	  military	  
assets	   is	   the	  bureaucratic	  processes.	   It	   is	   important	  whether	  there	  are	  procedures	  and	  
mechanisms	  in	  place	  between	  the	  military	  and	  civilian	  actors,	  and	  if	  these	  do	  exist,	  that	  
they	  function	  effectively.	  	  
Second,	   appropriateness	   reflects	   whether	   the	   deployed	   military	   assets	   meet	   the	  
humanitarian	  needs	  or	  not.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  right	  assets	  are	  being	  
used	  for	  the	  right	  situation	  and	  in	  the	  right	  place.	  If	  not,	  this	  can	  decrease	  efficiency	  and	  
reverse	  the	  achieved	  progress	  of	  a	  quick	  arrival	  of	  the	  military	  assets.	  	  
Efficiency	   is	   the	   third	   area,	   which	   stands	   for	   the	   efficient	   and	   optimal	   use	   of	   the	  
deployed	  assets.	   In	  some	  cases	  there	  are	  external	   factors	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  military’s	  
control	  that	  might	  thwart	  the	  efficiency,	  such	  as	  mandates.	  
Fourth,	  “the	  capacity	  of	  the	  affected	  country	  to	  effectively	  utilize	  and	  coordinate	  foreign	  
military	   assets	   during	   a	   disaster	   relief	   operation	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   for	   successful	  
civil-­‐military	  coordination”	  (Wiharta	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  39).	  It	  further	  matters	  whether	  the	  
affected	  state	  concerns	  a	  strong	  or	  weak	  state,	  and	  whether	  the	  state	  has	  a	  (functioning)	  
disaster	  management	  structure.	  	  
Finally,	  a	  smooth	  coordination	  between	  different	  actors	  is	  a	  determent	  for	  a	  successful	  
operation.	   Disaster	   relief	   operations	   comprise	   a	   very	   high	   total	   number	   of	   involved	  
actors	  and	  military	  troops	  are	  usually	  outnumbered	  by	  civil	  humanitarian	  contingents.	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The	   fact	   that	   all	   civilian	   and	   military	   actors	   work	   according	   to	   different	   cultural	  
backgrounds,	  orders,	  and	  guidelines	  can	  make	  the	  effective	  coordination	  even	  harder.	  In	  
addition,	   the	   relationship	   between	   foreign	  military	   actors	   and	   the	   national	  military	   of	  
the	  affected	  country	   is	   crucial	   as	  well	   (military-­‐military	   coordination).	  Nonethless,	   the	  
research	  revealed	  that	  the	  affected	  governments	  generally	  found	  it	  more	  complicated	  to	  
coordinate	  with	  humanitarian	  actors	  than	  with	  foreign	  militaries	  (Wiharta	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  
p.	  42).	  	  	  
	  
An	  evaluation	  of	  the	  criticism	  
Despite	  a	  growing	  acceptance	  within	  the	  humanitarian	  community,	  most	  critical	  sounds	  
on	   the	   increased	  presence	  of	  military	  actors	  have	   come	   from	   this	   group.	  For	   instance,	  
Hoffman	  and	  Hudson	  (2009,	  p.	  31),	  writing	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  British	  Red	  Cross,	  refer	  that	  
“humanitarian	  organizations	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  engage	  more	  strategically	  with	  the	  
military	   in	  order	   to	   limit	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   their	   involvement”.	   Further,	   they	   argue	  
that	  potential	   benefits	   should	  be	  maximized.	  When	   looking	   closely	   at	   these	   sentences,	  
the	  negative	  attitude	  towards	  the	  military	  involvement	  is	  evident,	  especially	  because	  of	  
their	   statement	   referring	   to	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	  military,	   and	  
that	  these	  should	  be	  limited.	  It	  almost	  implies	  that	  the	  Red	  Cross	  in	  fact	  does	  not	  accept	  
military	   involvement,	   and	   that	   they	   just	   have	   to	   make	   the	   best	   of	   a	   bad	   situation.	  
Nevertheless,	  they	  do	  acknowledge	  the	  importance	  of	  dialogue	  between	  the	  two	  actors.	  
	  
The	   argument	  used	   the	  most	   against	  military	   engagement	   in	  disaster	   response	   is	   that	  
the	  involvement	  of	  the	  military	  in	  humanitarian	  aid	  jeopardizes	  humanitarian	  space	  and	  
that	   it	   is	   contrary	   to	   principles	   upon	   which	   the	   humanitarian	   community	   is	   based.	  
However,	   “humanitarian	   principle	   dictates	   that	   all	   available	   resources	   –	   including	  
military	   assets	   –	   should	   be	   used	   to	   minimize	   the	   human	   cost	   of	   a	   natural	   disaster”	  
(Whiharta	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   ix).	   In	   addition,	   the	   UN	   Oslo	   Guidelines	   and	   the	   UN	  	  
Civil-­‐Military	   Guidelines	   for	   Complex	   Emergencies	   both	   emphasize	   that	   humanitarian	  
actors	   and	   military	   actors	   should	   act	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   humanity,	  
neutrality,	   impartiality,	   independence	   and	   distinction.	   As	   a	   rule,	   militaries	   use	   these	  
guidelines	  when	  being	  deployed	  in	  natural	  disaster	  responses.	  
Further,	   critics	   claim	   that	   military	   engagement	   is	   not	   only	   inappropriate,	   but	   also	  
inefficient	   and	   inadequate.	   Putting	   it	   mildly,	   these	   claims	   seem	   unfounded.	   The	  
deployment	  of	  military	  assets	  in	  disaster	  relief	  operations	  has	  many	  advantages.	  First	  of	  
all,	   military	   assets	   are	   “typically	   on	   permanent	   standby,	   available	   in	   large	   numbers,	  
ready	   to	   deploy	   at	   a	  moment’s	   notice,	   and	   thus	   able	   to	   reach	   the	   scene	   of	   a	   disaster	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quickly”	   (Wiharta	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   32).	   A	   speedy	   arrival	   of	  military	   assets	   in	   the	   surge	  
phase	   is	   a	   decisive	   constituent	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   disaster	   relief	   operation.	   Military	  
helicopters,	   for	   instance,	   can	   be	   of	   great	   importance	   during	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   a	   relief	  
operation	   for	   reaching	   affected	   populations	   and	   transporting	   essential	   relief	   goods.	  
However,	   it	   is	   often	   the	  presence	  of	  military	   forces	   after	   the	   initial	   phase	  of	   the	   relief	  
operation	   that	   raises	   questions.	   A	   further	   advantage	   of	   military	   assets	   in	   disaster	  
response	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   military	   forces	   possess	   useful	   capabilities	   that	   other	  
organizations	   do	   not	   have.	  Madiwale	   and	  Virk	   (2011)	   identify	   several	   crucial	  military	  
contributions:	   the	  excellent	  capacity	   for	  search	  and	  rescue	  activities,	   the	  expertise	  and	  
resources	   for	   logistics	   and	   infrastructure	   support,	   highly	   trained	   manpower,	   and	   the	  
ability	   to	   provide	   security	   to	   relief	   workers	   (p.	   1086).	  What	   is	  more,	   “military	   assets	  
bring	   with	   them	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   self-­‐sufficiency	   and	   do	   not	   strain	   local	   resources.	  
Further,	  they	  can	  operate	  under	  extreme	  conditions	  for	  protracted	  and	  intense	  periods,	  
including	  day	  and	  night	  operations”	  (Wiharta	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.39).	  
A	   third	   frequently	   heard	   argument	   opposing	   the	   increased	   prominence	   of	   military	  
actors	   is	  that	  they	  are	  “driven	  by	  political	   imperatives	  rather	  than	  humanitarian	  need”	  
(Hoffman	  and	  Hudson,	  2009,	  p.	  30).	  Considering	  the	  fact	  that	  military	  forces	  are	  send	  by	  
their	  state,	  some	  might	  question	  whether	  the	  forces	  genuinely	  operate	  according	  to	  the	  
principles	   of	   independence,	   neutrality	   and	   impartiality,	   or	   whether	   their	   actions	   are	  
directed	   by	   political	   principles.	   Yet,	   military	   engagement	   in	   disaster	   response	   is	  
perceived	  as	  relatively	  politically	  uncomplicated	  (Wheeler	  and	  Harmer,	  2006,	  p.	  7).	  	  	  
Apart	   from	   these	   political	  motives,	   some	   critics	   also	   argue	   that	  military	   forces	  mostly	  
engage	  in	  disaster	  relief	  operations	  to	  improve	  its	  image	  and	  generate	  goodwill.	  	  From	  a	  
certain	   perspective,	   this	   argument	   might	   be	   valid.	   In	   fact,	   however,	   NATO	   needed	   to	  
position	   itself	   in	   a	   changed	   security	   environment,	   and	   it	   did	   so	   by	   taking	   on	   a	  wider	  
range	  of	  tasks,	  among	  which	  also,	  but	  not	  only,	  disaster	  response	  operations.	  These	  new	  
activities	  can	  indeed	  lead	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  NATO	  by	  the	  general	  public,	  
and	  perhaps	  to	  more	  sympathy.	  However,	  NATO’s	  main	  intention	  by	  taking	  on	  disaster	  
relief	  activities	  was	  not	  to	  brush	  up	  its	  global	  image;	  this	  would	  solely	  be	  an	  unintended	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Chapter	  3	  -­‐	  NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  disaster	  assistance	  
Although	  NATO	  is	  mainly	  known	  as	  a	  collective	  defense	  organization	  with	  the	  purpose	  
of	  preserving	  the	  territorial	   integrity	  of	   its	  members,	  the	  fact	   is	  that	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  
Alliance	  is	  not	  only	  involved	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  populations	  against	  the	  effects	  of	  war,	  
but	   also	   uses	   its	   capabilities	   to	   protect	   populations	   against	   the	   effects	   of	   natural	  
disasters,	   such	   as	   floods	   and	   earthquakes.	   These,	   and	   other	   activities	   conducted	   by	  
NATO	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  Article	  5	  (mutual	  defense)	  umbrella	  are	  labeled	  as	  “Non-­‐
Article	  5”	  and	  grouped	  under	  the	  concept	  of	  crisis	  response	  operations.	   “Non-­‐Article	  5	  
crisis	   response	   operations	   (NA5CRO)	   can	   be	   described	   as	   multifunctional	   operations	  
that	   encompass	   those	   political,	   military,	   and	   civil	   activities,	   initiated	   and	   executed	   in	  
accordance	   with	   international	   law,	   including	   international	   humanitarian	   law,	  
contributing	   to	   conflict	   prevention	   and	   resolution	   and	   crisis	   management,	   or	   serve	  
humanitarian	   purposes,	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   declared	   Alliance	   objectives“	   (NATO,	   2010a,	  
“Allied	   joint	   doctrine	   for	   non-­‐article	   5	   crisis	   response	   operations”,	   p.	   xi).	   Disaster	  
response	  operations	  in	  its	  purity	  do	  not	  result	  from	  the	  collective	  defense	  principle,	  and	  
thus	   fall	  under	  NA5CRO.	  NATO	  has	   the	  capability	   to	  deploy	  military	   forces	   in	  NA5CRO	  
situations:	   “In	   many	   cases,	   the	   main	   support	   from	   the	   military	   will	   be	   to	   provide	   a	  
secure	  environment	  where	  the	  humanitarian	  actors	  can	  perform	  their	  functions”	  (NATO,	  
2010a,	   “Allied	   joint	   doctrine	   for	   non-­‐article	   5	   crisis	   response	   operations”,	   p.	   3).	   As	   a	  
result,	   Schrogl	  et	  al.	   (2009)	  accurately	  point	  out,	   “distinctions	  between	  war	  and	  relief,	  
between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  deployments,	  are	  breaking	  down”	  (p.262).	  
	  
§3.1	  The	  evolution	  of	  NATO	  disaster	  relief	  operations	  	  	  
Complex	  disasters	   can	   surpass	   the	   capacity	  of	   a	   single	  nation	  or	  other	   entities	   to	  deal	  
with	  the	  crisis.	  Moreover,	  besides	  the	  disaster	  itself,	  there	  are	  usually	  other	  factors	  that	  
make	   a	   humanitarian	   emergency	   even	   more	   complex,	   such	   as	   economic,	   social	   or	  
political	   instability	   in	   the	   affected	   region.	  When	   analyzing	  NATO’s	   historical	   record	   of	  
disaster	  relief	  activities,	  the	  humanitarian	  nature	  of	  the	  operations	  varies.	  As	  mentioned	  
before,	  the	  North	  Sea	  Floods	  of	  1953	  were	  the	  reason	  for	  NATO	  to	  develop	  a	  policy	  for	  
disaster	   assistance	   in	   peacetime.	   NATO’s	   assistance	   in	   this	   specific	   operation	   was	   of	  
great	   humanitarian	   value.	   However,	   not	   all	   NATO	   responses	   were	   of	   direct	  
humanitarian	  nature.	  For	  instance,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  1966	  Arno	  floods	  in	  Italy,	  NATO’s	  
assistance	  was	  mainly	  technical,	  wherefore	  the	  Alliance	  did	  not	  directly	  engage	  in	  direct	  
humanitarian	  assistance.	  Importantly,	  already	  from	  the	  beginning	  NATO	  stressed	  that	  it	  
does	  not	  profile	  itself	  as	  a	  humanitarian	  organization:	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“NATO	   is	   not	   a	   humanitarian	   organization,	   NATO	   is	   an	   organization	   for	  
peace,	  security	  and	  stability.	  However,	   in	  the	  view	  of	  NATO,	  it	  was	  entirely	  
in	  line	  with	  the	  purposes	  of	  peace,	  security	  and	  stability	  to	  use	  all	  possible	  
resources	  to	  bring	  relief	   to	  victims	  of	  disaster,	  and	  to	  do	  so	   in	  cooperation	  
with	   the	   World	   Community,	   including	   NATO’s	   cooperation	   partners	   in	  
Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.”	  (NATO,	  2001b,	  p.	  13)	  
	  
Toward	  enhanced	  cooperation	  
From	   its	   first	  disaster	  operation	   in	  1953	  until	  1995,	  NATO	  conducted	  various	  disaster	  
operations	   following	  natural	  disasters,	   such	  as	  ones	   in	  Turkey,	   Italy,	  and	  Armenia	  and	  
Kyrgyzstan.	   However,	   it	   could	   be	   stated	   that	   NATO’s	   disaster	   assistance	   before	   1995	  
was	  rather	  conditioned.	  Originally,	  NATO	  would	  only	  provide	  direct	  disaster	  assistance	  
to	  countries	  located	  within	  the	  NATO	  area.	  When	  it	  would	  concern	  a	  non-­‐NATO	  member	  
or	  even	  a	  NATO	  partner,	  the	  Alliance	  would	  only	  provide	  disaster	  assistance	  if	  requested	  
by	   a	   relevant	   IO.	   In	   other	   words,	   before	   1995,	   when	   the	   government	   of	   a	   non-­‐NATO	  
country	  or	  a	  NATO	  partner	  would	  request	  NATO	  for	  disaster	  assistance	  after	  it	  had	  been	  
struck	   by	   a	   natural	   disaster,	   NATO	   would	   not	   provide	   disaster	   assistance,	   unless	  
requested	   by	   a	   relevant	   IO	   or	   if	   the	   request	  was	  made	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	  NATO	  member.	  
Floods	  in	  Moldavia	  in	  1994	  highlighted	  this	  bottleneck,	  which	  initiated	  the	  review	  of	  the	  
NATO	  policy	  for	  disaster	  assistance	  (NATO,	  2001b,	  p.	  15).	  Subsequent	  to	  this	  alteration	  
of	  the	  disaster	  assistance	  policy,	  governments	  of	  NACC	  and	  PfP	  members	  were	  allowed	  
to	   request	   direct	   assistance.	   Consequently,	   the	   area	   of	   NATO’s	   disaster	   assistance	  
activities	   greatly	   expanded.	   Afterwards,	   on	   the	   initiative	   of	   Russia,	   the	   Euro-­‐Atlantic	  
Partnership	   Council	   (EAPC)	   established	   the	   Euro-­‐Atlantic	   Disaster	   Response	  
Coordination	  Centre	  (EADRCC)	  and	  the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  Disaster	  Response	  Unit	  (EADRU)	  
in	  1998,	  which	  enhanced	  cooperation	  even	  further	  in	  the	  field	  of	  disaster	  relief.	  	  
	  
The	  1998	  Albanian	  refugee	  crisis	  as	  a	  decisive	  event	  
The	   1998	   Albanian	   refugee	   crisis	   marked	   another	   relevant	   change,	   as	   it	   caused	   the	  
Alliance	   to	   become	   involved	   in	   a	   disaster	   relief	   operation	   in	   a	   so-­‐called	   complex	  
emergency	   situation,	   as	   defined	   previously.	   Importantly,	   this	   specific	   relief	   operation	  
was	   in	   response	   to	  a	  man-­‐made	  disaster.	  As	  a	   result	  of	   the	  Kosovo	  crisis,	  Albania	  was	  
confronted	   with	   a	   massive	   refugee	   crisis,	   and	   civil	   organizations	   alone	   were	  
underprepared	  and	  therefore	  not	  able	  to	  adequately	  cope	  with	  this	  critical	  situation.	  For	  
this	   reason,	   NATO	   agreed	   to	   launch	   Operation	   Allied	   Harbor	   in	   1999,	   which	   allowed	  
military	   contributions	   to	   the	   relief	   efforts.	   “NATO	   troops	   constructed	   refugee	   camps,	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participated	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  aid,	  provided	  logistics	  help	  and	  improved	  transport	  
infrastructure	   in	  Albania	  and	  the	  FYROM”	  (Seybolt,	  2007,	  p.	  123).	   It	  was	   the	   first	   time	  
that	  NATO	  provided	   immediate	  humanitarian	   relief	   in	  a	   complex	  emergency	  situation,	  
namely	  in	  a	  (post-­‐)	  conflict	  zone.	  	  
Seybolt	   makes	   an	   interesting	   observation,	   however,	   by	   arguing	   that	   this	   specific	  
humanitarian	   effort	   by	   NATO	   was	   an	   incidental	   one	   (p.	   123).	   When	   the	   Kosovo	   war	  
finally	  came	  to	  an	  end,	  “Serbian	  actions	  had	  generated	  approximately	  863000	  refugees	  
and	  590000	   IDPs	  –	  90	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  population.	  Almost	  all	   the	   refugees	   fled	  west	   to	  
Albania	   or	   east	   to	   the	   FYROM”	   (p.	   124).	   Humanitarian	   organizations	   were	   unable	   to	  
provide	   an	   adequate	   response	   to	   the	   massive	   refugee	   flows	   because	   they	   had	   not	  
anticipated	  to	  such	  a	   large	  number	  of	  refugees.	  Consequently,	  NATO	  received	  requests	  
from	   both	   Albania	   and	   the	   Former	   Yugoslav	   Republic	   of	   Macedonia	   (FYROM)	   for	  
humanitarian	   assistance.	   The	   main	   reason	   for	   this	   request	   was	   the	   simple	   fact	   that	  
NATO	   already	   had	   humanitarian	   intervention	   forces	   present	   in	   the	   regions	   anyways,	  
which	   allowed	   a	   quick	   response.	   “For	   political,	   military	   and	   humanitarian	   reasons,	  
NATO	   willingly	   took	   on	   the	   humanitarian	   challenge”	   (Seybolt,	   2007,	   p.	   124).	   NATO	  
military	  forces	  intensely	  engaged	  in	  humanitarian	  activities	  in	  Albania.	  The	  situation	  in	  
FYROM	   was	   different	   from	   the	   situation	   in	   Albania,	   however.	   Whereas	   the	   FYROM	  
Government	   did	   not	   allow	   humanitarian	   organizations	   into	   the	   country	   to	   prepare	   a	  
humanitarian	  response,	   “the	  NATO	  troops,	   in	  contrast,	  were	  welcomed,	  partly	  because	  
of	  the	  political	  aspirations	  of	  the	  FYROM	  Government	  with	  regard	  to	  future	  membership	  
of	   both	  NATO	   and	   the	   European	  Union”	   (Seybolt,	   2007,	   p.	   124).	   	   Hence,	   NATO	   forces	  
were	   simply	   the	   only	   ones	   that	   were	   allowed	   to	   conduct	   humanitarian	   aid	   activities,	  
because	  the	  FYROM	  Government	  was	  keeping	  out	  humanitarian	  organizations.	  	  
This	   incidental	   humanitarian	   effort	   by	  NATO	   has	   greatly	   shaped	   all	   succeeding	  NATO	  
disaster	   assistance	   activities.	   After	   the	   requests	   for	   assistance	   following	   the	   Kosovo	  
refugee	   crisis,	   NATO	   suddenly	   got	   engaged	   in	   a	   disaster	   assistance	   operation	  
(humanitarian	   assistance),	   besides	   the	   already	   existing	   peacekeeping	   operation	  
(humanitarian	  intervention).	  Therefore,	   it	  had	  to	  quickly	  adapt	  to	  a	  new	  wide	  range	  of	  
actors	   involved	   and	   develop	   its	   humanitarian	   assistance	   capabilities.	   Military	   groups	  
were	   no	   longer	   the	  main	   actors	   in	   the	   conflict,	   but	   also	   civil	   entities.	   It	   is	   for	   NATO’s	  
sudden	  engagement	   in	   these	  disaster	  assistance	  efforts	   that	   the	  operation	  did	  not	   run	  
flawless,	  but	  due	   to	  NATO’s	   rapid	  response	  many	   lives	  have	  been	  saved,	  despite	  some	  
difficulties	  with	  coordination	  and	  assistance.	  Ever	  since	  NATO’s	  disaster	  relief	  operation	  
in	   response	   to	   the	   massive	   refugee	   crisis	   caused	   by	   the	   Kosovo	   War,	   EADRCC	   “has	  
responded	   to	  more	   than	   60	   requests	   for	   assistance,	  mainly	   states	   stricken	   by	   natural	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disasters”	   (NATO,	   2015,	   “The	   Euro-­‐Atlantic	   Disaster	   Response	   Coordination	   Centre”,	  
para.	  6).	  	  
	  
Recent	  operations	  
From	   2005	   onwards,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   considerable	   increase	   in	   disaster	   response	  
operations.	   In	   this	   year,	   NATO	   responded	   to	   two	   natural	   disasters	   in	   the	   US	   and	  
Pakistan,	   probably	   the	   two	   largest	   and	   most	   high-­‐profile	   NATO	   involvements	   in	  
humanitarian	   operations.	   These	   operations	   clearly	   demonstrated	   the	   added	   value	   of	  
certain	   military	   capabilities	   in	   disaster	   relief	   efforts	   when	   the	   affected	   states	   and	  
humanitarian	  organizations	  are	  incapable	  to	  come	  up	  with	  an	  adequate	  response.	  	  
On	   4	   September	   2005,	   the	   US	   requested	   NATO	   assistance,	   following	   the	   disastrous	  
consequences	   of	   Hurricane	   Katrina.	   The	   US	   was	   in	   need	   of	   financial	   and	   medical	  
assistance,	   food	  supplies,	  and	  equipment.	  Correspondingly,	  the	  EADRCC	  sent	  the	  list	  of	  
requirements	   to	   the	   EAPC	   and	   coordinated	   the	   disaster	   response.	   Only	   five	   days	  
following	  the	  request,	  a	  NATO	  transport	  operation	  was	  approved,	  allowing	  aid	  supplies	  
from	  Europe	  to	  the	  US.	  	  In	  addition,	  “two	  civil	  aviation	  experts	  reinforced	  the	  EADRCC	  as	  
of	  Friday,	  9	  September	  to	  provide	  advice	  and	  coordinate	  aviation	  transport	  matters	  with	  
donating	  nations”	   (EADRCC,	   “EADRCC	  Final	  Report	   (Nº	  15)	  Hurricane	  Katrina	   –	  USA”,	  
2005,	  p.	  1).	  On	  2	  October	  2005	  the	  NATO	  disaster	  relief	  operation	  was	  completed,	  as	  the	  
US	  did	  not	  have	  further	  requests	  to	  NATO	  for	  assistance.	  According	  to	  the	  EADRCC	  Final	  
Report	   on	   the	   Hurricane	   Katrina	   operation,	   in	   total	   39	   NATO	   member	   and	   partner	  
countries	   have	   offered	   assistance	   to	   the	   US,	   of	  which	   23	   directly	   communicated	   their	  
offered	   assistance	   to	   the	   EADRCC,	   12	   have	   offered	   their	   assistance	   through	   the	   EU	  
Community	  Civil	  Protection	  Mechanism,	  and	  4	  did	  not	  report	  their	  offers	  of	  assistance.	  
(EADRCC,	  2005,	   “EADRCC	  Final	  Report	  (Nº	  15)	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  –	  USA”,	  p.	  1).	   It	  was	  
the	  first	  time	  NATO	  carried	  out	  a	  disaster	  relief	  operation	  in	  the	  US.	  	  
In	   the	   same	   year,	   a	   powerful	   earthquake	   struck	   the	   India-­‐Pakistan	   border,	   causing	  
particular	   destruction	   in	   the	   Kashmir	   region.	   The	   Kashmir	   region	   is	   located	   between	  
India	   and	   Pakistan	   and	   characterized	   by	   decade	   long	   conflict.	   Subsequent	   to	   the	  
disastrous	   earthquake,	   “health	   care	   services	   and	   structures	   in	   all	   of	   Pakistan	   faced	  
considerable	  difficulty	  in	  coping	  with	  thousands	  of	  traumatized	  people	  seeking	  cure	  and	  
care”	   (Rietjens	   and	   Bollen,	   2008,	   p.	   81).	   Despite	   relief	   efforts	   from	   the	   international	  
relief	   community,	   the	   Pakistani	   government	   urgently	   requested	   NATO	   for	   disaster	  
assistance	  on	  8	  October	  2005.	  Subsequently,	  NATO	  approved	  this	  request	  and	  initiated	  
the	  two-­‐stage	  disaster	  relief	  operation	  two	  days	  later.	  The	  NATO	  relief	  mission	  included	  
airlifts	   and	   the	   deployment	   of	   engineers	   and	   medical	   personnel.	   In	   total,	   42	   NATO	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members	  and	  partners	  provided	  assistance	  to	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  disaster	  relief	  operation	  
lasted	   three	   months.	   NATO’s	   relief	   operation	   in	   the	   Kashmir	   region	   will	   be	   briefly	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  5	  by	  means	  of	  a	  case	  study.	  	  
	  
Up	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  NATO	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  44	  disaster	  relief	  efforts	  and	  enhanced	  
its	  dimension	  of	  disaster	  assistance,	   and	  at	   the	   same	   time	  reaffirmed	   its	  global	   role	   in	  
the	   international	   security	   arena	   after	   the	   disaster	   assistance	   operations	   following	  
Hurricane	  Katrina	   and	   the	  Kashmir	   earthquake.	  Most	  ones	  were	   carried	  out	   following	  
natural	   disasters	   such	   as	   floods,	   snowfalls,	   and	   forest	   fires.	   There	   are	   only	   a	   few	  
humanitarian	  crises	   listed	   that	  were	  caused	  by	  man-­‐made	  disasters.	   If	   this	  happens	   to	  
be	  the	  case,	  however,	  all	  operations	  are	  focused	  on	  providing	  disaster	  relief	  assistance	  
for	   refugees	   and/or	   internal	   displaced	   persons	   (IDP)	   (NATO,	   2015,	   “Euro-­‐Atlantic	  
Disaster	   Response	   Coordination	   Centre	   (EADRCC)	   –	   Operations”).	   For	   instance,	   NATO	  
has	   received	   requests	   through	   the	  EADRCC	   from	  Turkey	   (2012	  and	  2014)	   and	   Jordan	  
(2014)	  because	  the	  countries	  were	  unable	  to	  individually	  deal	  with	  the	  massive	  flows	  of	  
Syrian	   refugees.	  Moreover,	   EADRCC	   received	   an	   urgent	   relief	   assistance	   request	   from	  
Iraq	   on	   19	   August	   2014,	   as	   the	   country	   faced	  massive	   populations	   of	   IDP’s	   after	   ISIL	  
took	  control	  of	  the	  city	  Mosul.	  Since	  then,	  the	  situation	  only	  worsened	  and	  the	  country	  is	  
being	  taunted	  by	  among	  others	  food	  shortages,	  a	  lack	  of	  clean	  water,	  power	  cuts,	  and	  a	  
shortage	   of	   fuel	   (EADRCC,	   2014,	   “EADRCC	   urgent	   relief	   assistance	   request	   Iraq	   –	   IDP	  
crisis”,	  p.	  2).	  
	  
§3.2	  Types	  of	  disaster	  assistance	  	  
There	   is	  a	  great	  variation	   in	  the	  type	  of	  disaster	  relief	  support	  offered	  by	  the	  assisting	  
nations.	   Moreover,	   the	   number	   of	   allied	   and	   partner	   nations	   that	   provide	   assistance	  
differs	   greatly,	   depending	   on	   the	   stricken	   country	   in	   question	   and	   the	   scale	   of	   the	  
disaster.	  Besides	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  disaster,	  Wiharta	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  identified	  several	  other	  
factors	   upon	   which	   the	   contribution	   of	   countries	   depends:	   geographic	   proximity,	  
country’s	   policies,	   national	   interests,	   relations	   with	   the	   affected	   country,	   and	   media	  
coverage	  and	  public	  pressure	  (p.	  x).	  	  
To	   illustrate,	   the	   EADRCC	   received	   an	   urgent	   request	   for	   assistance	   from	   Bosnia	   and	  
Herzegovina	   on	   22	   August	   2013	   (EADRCC,	   2013,	   “EADRCC	   urgent	   disaster	   assistance	  
request	  forest	  fires	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina”).	  The	  type	  of	  disaster	  was	  identified	  as	  
“large	   scale	  wind	   fires”	   (p.1).	   The	   fires	   had	   already	   started	   approximately	   one	  month	  
prior	  to	  request	  for	  assistance,	  but	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  request	  the	  situation	  was	  getting	  to	  
dangerous	  levels	  given	  the	  circumstances.	  The	  terrain	  was	  unreachable	  due	  to	  the	  scale	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of	  the	  fires	  and	  the	  landmines	  and	  unexploded	  ordnance	  caused	  the	  situation	  to	  be	  even	  
riskier.	   In	   the	  meantime,	   fires	   were	   spreading	   rapidly	   and	   started	   to	   reach	   inhabited	  
areas,	  while	  damaging	  infrastructures.	  After	  assessing	  the	  situation,	  EADRCC	  identified	  
the	   following	   requirements	   for	   disaster	   assistance:	   fire-­‐fighting	   aircrafts,	   helicopters	  
with	   fire-­‐fighting	   capabilities,	   and	   aviation	   gasoline.	   According	   to	   the	   final	   situation	  
report	  by	  EADRRC	  (2013),	  four	  countries	  provided	  disaster	  assistance	  in	  total:	  Turkey,	  
Croatia,	   Slovenia,	   and	   Ukraine	   (EADRCC,	   “Situation	   report	   no.	   2	   (final)	   forest	   fires	   in	  
Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina”,	  p.	  2).	  Where	  Turkey	  and	  Croatia	   contributed	   to	   the	  disaster	  
relief	   efforts	   by	   providing	   helicopters	   and	   fire-­‐fighting	   airplanes,	   Slovenia’s	   and	  
Ukraine’s	  offers	  were	   rejected	  as	   the	   situation	  was	  already	  under	   control	   as	   such	   that	  
further	   international	   assistance	   was	   no	   longer	   necessary.	   The	   coordinated	   response,	  
thus,	   in	   this	  case	  was	  a	  rather	  small-­‐scaled	  one,	  with	  relatively	   few	  countries	   involved	  
and	   a	   limited	   list	   of	   requirements.	   In	   addition,	   although	   the	   operation	   had	   the	   aim	   to	  
protect	   the	   civilian	   population,	   NATO	   itself	   did	   not	   directly	   engage	   in	   humanitarian	  
assistance.	  	  
On	   the	   contrary,	   NATO’s	   most	   recent	   disaster	   response	   was	   bigger	   and	   more	  
humanitarian	  in	  nature.	  The	  disaster	  assistance	  request	  was	  made	  on	  5	  February	  2015	  
by	  Albania,	  because	  heavy	  snowfall	  and	  floods	  had	  affected	  the	  country	  (EADRCC,	  2015,	  
“EADRCC	  urgent	  assistance	   request	  Albania	   snowfall	   and	   floods”).	  Unlike	   the	  previous	  
case,	   Albania	   filed	   the	   request	   already	   a	   few	   days	   later	   after	   the	   heavy	   snowfall	   and	  
rainfalls.	  The	  situation	  was	  getting	  particularly	  alarming	  because	  the	  weather	  conditions	  
were	   expected	   to	   get	  worse,	  which	   required	   an	   immediate	   response.	  Moreover,	   there	  
were	  over	  600	  displaced	  families,	  there	  was	  a	  troubling	  lack	  of	  resources,	  and	  a	  food	  and	  
water	   shortage	   was	   likely	   to	   occur	   in	   the	   short	   term.	   The	   situation	   of	   the	   displaced	  
families	  was	  particularly	  concerning	  because	  of	   insufficient	  space	  and	  very	  poor	   living	  
conditions.	   The	  EADRCC	  divided	   the	  disaster	   assistance	   requirements	   into	   three	  main	  
categories:	   food	   and	   family	   items,	   such	   as	   flour,	   soap,	   and	   rice;	   manufactured	   goods,	  
such	   as	  water	   suction	  pumps,	   blankets,	   tents,	   and	   rainproof	   suits’	   and	   equipment	   and	  
vehicles,	  such	  as	  snow	  and	  earth	  moving	  vehicles,	  bridge	  construction,	  scuba	  gear,	  and	  
uniforms.	   The	   assistance	   provided	   by	  Allied	   and	   partner	   nations	  was	  much	  more	   far-­‐
reaching	   than	   the	   previously	   illustrated	   operation.	   In	   total,	   14	   nations	   offered	  
assistance,	   ranging	   from	   money	   donations	   up	   to	   assistance	   covering	   more	   than	   one	  
category	  of	  disaster	  assistance.	  For	  instance,	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  donated	  400.000	  
USD,	   Qatar	   offered	   9	   tons	   of	   food,	   Belgium	   offered	   blankets	   and	   tents,	   and	   Austria	  
provided	   power	   generators	   (EADRCC,	   2015,	   EADRCC	   situation	   report	   no.	   6	   (final)	  
Albania	  snowfall	  and	  floods,	  pp.	  2-­‐4).	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Hence,	  these	  two	  examples	  illustrate	  that	  each	  disaster	  assistance	  response	  is	  different	  
in	  regard	  to	  the	  type	  of	  assistance	  and	  the	  involved	  parties,	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  
the	  extent	  of	  the	  disaster.	  Also,	  the	  level	  of	  humanitarian	  involvement	  of	  NATO	  can	  differ	  
greatly.	   Besides,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   involvement	   of	   IOs	   in	  
disaster	   assistance	   operations,	   as	   the	   EADRCC	   also	   coordinates	   their	   responses.	   For	  
instance,	   the	  Canadian	  Red	  Cross	  and	   the	  Netherlands	  Red	  Cross	  were	   involved	   in	   the	  
international	  disaster	  assistance	  in	  Albania.	  
	  
To	  summarize,	  NATO’s	  successful	  history	  of	  disaster	  relief	  operations	  goes	  back	  a	   long	  
way,	   which	   means	   that	   it	   is	   an	   experienced	   actor	   in	   disaster	   assistance.	   The	  
organization’s	  dimension	  of	  disaster	  assistance	  has	  evolved	  over	  the	  years,	  causing	  it	  to	  
be	  capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  crises	  of	  different	  kinds,	  ranging	  from	  relatively	  large-­‐scaled	  
ones	   with	   a	   low	   level	   of	   humanitarian	   engagement	   to	   greatly	   destructive	   ones	   that	  




















Chapter	  4	  -­‐	  NATO’s	  organizational	  structure	  
NATO	  disaster	  assistance	  operations	  cannot	  be	  conducted	  properly	  without	  an	  effective	  
cooperation	   and	   functioning	   of	   both	   the	   civilian	   and	   military	   structure.	   NATO’s	  
headquarters	  is	  located	  in	  Brussels,	  Belgium	  and	  correspondingly	  serves	  as	  the	  physical	  
heart	  of	  the	  organization	  where	  all	  political	  decisions	  are	  taken	  and	  administrative	  tasks	  
are	   performed.	   It	   is	   the	   place	   where	   the	   North	   Atlantic	   Council	   (NAC)	   seats	   as	   the	  
highest	  authority	  of	   the	  Alliance,	  embodying	  the	  decisions	  of	   the	  Allied	  nations,	  as	   laid	  
down	  in	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty:	  “The	  Parties	  hereby	  establish	  a	  Council,	  
on	   which	   each	   of	   them	   shall	   be	   represented,	   to	   consider	   matters	   concerning	   the	  
implementation	   of	   this	   Treaty”	   (NATO,	   1949,	   “The	   North	   Atlantic	   Treaty”,	   para.	   9).	  
Meetings	  of	  the	  NAC	  can	  be	  at	  different	  levels,	  such	  as	  meetings	  between	  heads	  of	  states	  
or	   at	  ministerial	   level,	   but	   it	   has	   a	  permanent	   structure,	   composed	  of	   ambassadors	  or	  
permanent	   representatives	   from	   all	   member	   nations	   and	   all	   decisions	   are	   taken	   by	  
consensus.	   Moreover,	   national	   delegates	   have	   a	   supporting	   function	   by	   representing	  
their	   countries	   on	   different	   NATO	   committees,	   which	   are	   a	   vital	   part	   of	   the	   decision-­‐
making	  process	  within	  the	  Alliance.	  	  
The	  Military	  Committee	   (MC),	  which	   is	   the	  highest	  military	  authority,	   is	  also	  seated	  at	  
the	   NATO	   headquarters.	   Under	   the	   political	   authority	   of	   the	   NAC,	   the	   MC	   has	   the	  
responsibility	   to	   provide	   it	  with	  military	   recommendations	   and	   advice,	   to	   execute	   the	  
decisions	   of	   the	   Council	   at	   the	   military	   level,	   and	   to	   lead	   the	   military	   commands	   of	  
NATO.	   It	   is	   composed	   by	   the	  member	   nations’	   Chiefs	   of	   Staff	   and	   also	   functions	   on	   a	  
continuous	   basis	   with	   permanent	   Military	   Representatives	   appointed	   by	   each	   nation.	  
Both	  of	   these	  bodies,	   and	   in	   fact	   all	  NATO	  bodies,	  decide	  by	   consensus.	  For	  a	  detailed	  
description	  of	  NATO’s	  military	  structure	  please	  refer	  to	  appendix	  3.	  
	  
§4.1	  Civilian	  structure	  
As	  NATO	  nowadays	  deals	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  there	  is	  an	  extensive	  structure	  of	  
committees.	   One	   of	   the	   committees,	   specifically	   important	   for	   this	   dissertation,	   is	   the	  
Senior	   Civil	   Emergency	   Planning	   Committee	   (SCEPC).	   The	   SCEPC	   is	   made	   up	   of	   civil	  
experts	   and	   therefore	   advises	   on	  NATO	  missions	   and	   operations	   that	   require	   support	  
for	  national	  authorities	  following	  civil	  emergencies	  and	  the	  use	  of	  civil	  resources	  during	  
NATO	   military	   operations.	   Evidently,	   the	   SCEPC	   is	   also	   the	   main	   advisory	   body	  
concerning	  disaster	  assistance	  operations	  as	  it	  is	  concerned	  with	  civilian	  protection	  and	  




Besides	   the	   NATO	   Committees,	   the	   International	   Staff	   (IS)	   is	   also	   an	   important	  
component	  dedicated	  to	  support	  the	  NAC’s	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  as	  it	  aims	  to	  foster	  
a	   harmonious	   decision-­‐making	   process	   by	   conducting	   work	   prior	   to	   and	   following	  
decisions	  by	   the	  NATO	  committees.	   Just	   as	   there	   are	  various	   committees	  designed	   for	  
different	  topics,	  the	  IS	  is	  divided	  into	  different	  divisions.	  Specifically	  important	  for	  NATO	  
disaster	   assistance	   is	   the	   Operations	   division,	   which	   duty	   is	   to	   ensure	   NATO’s	  
operational	  capability	  in	  crisis	  management	  and	  peacekeeping	  operations,	  just	  as	  in	  civil	  
emergency	   planning	   and	   training.	   The	   Operations	   division	   has	   several	   tasks	   that	   are	  
important	   to	   NATO	   disaster	   assistance.	   First,	   it	   provides	   the	   “development	   of	   the	  
arrangements	   for	   the	  use	   of	   civil	   resources	   in	   support	   of	  Alliance	  defence	   and	   for	   the	  
protection	  of	  civil	  populations”	  (NATO,	  2001a,	  p.	  226).	  Second,	  the	  Operations	  division	  
provides	   staff	   support	   to	   both	   the	   SCEPC	   and	   CEP	   boards.	   Third,	   it	   supervises	   the	  
EADRCC.	   Finally,	   the	   Operations	   division	   comprises	   the	   NATO	   Situation	   Centre	  
(SITCEN),	  which	   serves	   as	   a	   linking	  mechanism	  between	  NATO’s	   civilian	   and	  military	  
structure.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  gathering	  as	  much	  crisis	  management	  information	  as	  possible	  in	  
order	  to	  optimize	  the	  situational	  awareness	  and	  therefore	  allow	  the	  Alliance	  to	  give	  the	  
best	  response	  to	  a	  certain	  crises.	  	  	  
	  
§4.2	  Military	  structure	  
There	   are	   two	   elements	   that	   mark	   the	   military	   peculiarity	   of	   NATO.	   First,	   it	   has	   a	  
permanent	   and	   integrated	   Command	   Structure,	   made	   up	   of	   military	   and	   civilian	  
elements	  of	  all	  the	  different	  nations,	  responsible	  to	  direct	  the	  NATO	  operations	  in	  time	  
of	  peace	  and	  war.	  Second,	  The	  NATO	  Force	  Structure	  (NFS)	  constitutes	  all	  the	  forces	  or	  
other	   capabilities	   provided	   by	   the	   member	   nations,	   in	   line	   with	   a	   certain	   type	   of	  
readiness	  and	  availability.	  
Since	  the	  integrated	  military	  structure	  comprises	  elements	  from	  all	  member	  countries,	  a	  
high	   level	   of	   cohesion	   is	   indispensible	   for	   accomplishing	   the	   effective	   functioning.	  
Therefore,	   solidarity	   and	   cohesion	   are	   key	   concepts	   within	   the	   military	   structure.	  
NATO’s	  military	  capabilities	  can	  be	  used	  for	  Article	  5	  operations,	  which	  are	  conducted	  to	  
safeguard	   the	   territorial	   integrity	   of	   the	   member	   countries,	   while	   simultaneously	  
guaranteeing	   their	   political	   independence.	   NATO’s	   forces	   nowadays,	   however,	   are	  
predominantly	  used	   in	  NA5CRO,	   covering	  a	  wide	   range	  of	  missions,	   including	  disaster	  
assistance	  operations.	  	  
Over	   the	   years,	   both	   NATO’s	  Military	   Command	   and	   Force	   Structure	   have	   undergone	  
transformations	   along	   with	   changes	   in	   NATO’s	   defense	   posture,	   mainly	   through	   the	  
assumptions	   of	   new	   tasks	   and	   activities.	   While	   preserving	   the	   importance	   of	   the	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traditional	   role	   of	   the	   Alliance,	   NATO’s	   crisis	   management	   capabilities	   have	   been	  
enhanced	   through	   reforms	   in	  military	   structure.	   Interestingly,	   Young	   (1997)	   remarks	  
that	  NATO’s	  military	  transformation	  to	  rapidly	  formed	  task	  forces	  designed	  for	  specific	  
short-­‐term	   emergencies	  was	   a	   huge	   change,	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   up	   until	   then,	   NATO’s	  
strength	  was	   the	  robust	  and	  static	  military	  structure,	  designed	  to	  conduct	   lengthy	  and	  
broad	   territorial	   defense	   missions.	   Accordingly,	   he	   compares	   NATO’s	   military	  
transformation	   with	   “organizing	   and	   training	   a	   professional	   football	   team	   among	  
players	  accustomed	  to	  playing	  infrequently	  and	  with	  little	  practice	  as	  a	  team”	  (p.	  30).	  As	  
a	   consequence	   of	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   NFS,	   which	   among	   others	   included	   a	  
reduction	   in	   the	   number	   of	   forces,	   there	   has	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   effectiveness	   and	  
cohesion.	   Additionally,	   the	   present	   NATO	   military	   forces	   are	   characterized	   by	   their	  
flexibility	  and	  multinationality.	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  NATO	  has	  maintained	   its	   conventional	   role	  of	  ensuring	   the	  concept	  of	  
collective	   defense,	   while	   anticipating	   to	   the	   new	   security	   environment	   through	   the	  
assumption	   of	   new	   roles	   and	   tasks.	   Garnett	   (2003),	   Chief	   of	   Staff	   of	   SHAPE	   in	   2003,	  
explains	  NATO’s	   transformation	   as	   follows:	   “There	  was	   a	   clear	  need	   to	   transform,	  not	  
just	   in	   terms	   of	   military	   capability	   and	   responsiveness,	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   political	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  order	  to	  deploy	  forces”	  (“NATO	  Response	  Force”,	  p.	  20).	  	  	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  elements	  of	  the	  military	  structure	  that	  should	  be	  clarified	  for	  the	  purpose	  
of	   this	   dissertation:	   the	   concept	   of	   Combined	   Joint	   Task	   Force	   (CJTF)	   and	   the	   NATO	  
Response	  Force	  (NRF).	  Both	  were	  deployed	  during	  the	  Pakistan	  relief	  operation,	  which	  
is	  used	  for	  this	  dissertation’s	  case	  study	  and	  therefore	  serve	  as	  a	  possible	  measure	  of	  the	  
of	   the	   Alliance’s	   effectiveness.	   The	   concepts	   will	   be	   briefly	   discussed	   in	   the	   sections	  
below.	  
	  
The	  Combined	  Joint	  Task	  Force	  (CJTF)	  concept	  
When	  analyzing	  the	  NATO	  publications,	   it	  could	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  CJTF	  is	   in	   fact	  a	  
concept	   that,	   anticipating	   the	   probability	   of	   NATO	   to	   work	   in	   crisis	   management	  
operations	  with	  Allies,	  partners,	  or	   just	  concerned	  nations,	  was	  conceived	  to	  allow	  the	  
coordinated	  integration	  of	  all	  in	  a	  common	  effort.	  The	  concept,	  therefore,	  aims	  to	  bring	  
different	   origins	   and	   capabilities	   together:	   “Through	   the	   permanent	   establishment	   of	  
deployable	   multinational	   joint	   task	   forces,	   NATO	   hopes	   to	   develop	   a	   unique	   hybrid	  
capability	   within	   its	   force	   structure	   that	   combines	   the	   best	   characteristics	   of	   both	  
Alliance	  and	  coalition	  forces”	  (Jones,	  1999,	  “NATO’s	  combined	  joint	  task	  force	  concept	  –	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a	   viable	   tiger	   or	   a	   paper	   dragon?”,	   p.	   14).	   It	   represents	   all	   the	   concepts	   of	   NATO’s	  
transformed	   military	   capabilities:	   effectiveness,	   cohesion,	   flexibility,	   and	  
multinationality.	   Literally,	   CJTF	   means	   the	   participation	   of	   military	   forces	   of	   two	   or	  
more	  nations	  during	  NATO	  missions.	  	  
The	  overall	  process	  of	  the	  creation	  was	  a	  lengthy	  one:	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  combined	  joint	  task	  
force	   was	   first	   coined	   in	   1993	   by	   the	   US,	   whereupon	   NATO	   endorsed	   the	   concept	   in	  
1994.	  Then,	  the	  concept	  was	  completed	  in	  1996	  and	  finally	  fully	  implemented	  in	  1997.	  
The	  concept	  was	  designed	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  new	  1991	  Strategic	  Concept	  
and	   therefore	   anticipates	   to	   the	   new	   security	   environment	   in	   which	   threats	   have	  
become	   more	   diverse	   and	   unpredictable.	   As	   a	   result,	   it	   is	   crucial	   for	   NATO	   to	   have	  
flexible	   forces	   at	   its	   disposable	   that	   can	   be	   rapidly	   deployed	   in	   case	   of	   a	   crisis.	  NATO	  
(2001a)	   describes	   the	   CJTF	   as	   “easily	   deployable,	   multinational,	   multiservice	   and	  
military	  formations	  tailored	  to	  specific	  kinds	  of	  military	  tasks”	  (p.	  254).	  Specific	  types	  of	  
military	  tasks	  include	  humanitarian	  relief,	  peacekeeping,	  and	  peace	  enforcement.	  	  
The	   CJTF	   has	   several	   important	   features.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   concept	   would	   become	   the	  
cornerstone	   of	   NATO’s	   new	   force	   structure	   because	   deploying	   CTJFs	  will	   become	   the	  
primary	  modus	  operandi	  of	  standing	  Alliance	  in	  peacetime	  (Young,	  1997,	  p.	  30).	  Second,	  
it	   gives	   the	   force	   structure	   the	   flexibility	   to	   provide	   an	   effective	   response	   in	  NA5CRO	  
beyond	   the	  NATO	   area.	   Admiral	   Gehman	   (1999),	   former	   Supreme	  Allied	   Commander,	  
observes	   that	   “the	   new	   security	   environment	   increases	   the	   likelihood	   that	   NATO	  
military	  forces	  will	  be	  required	  to	  conduct	  operations	  around	  the	  periphery	  of	  NATO’s	  
defended	   territory”	   (“Transforming	   NATO’s	   defense	   capabilities	   for	   the	   21st	   century”,	  
para.	  16).	  Third,	  it	  allows	  the	  inclusion	  of	  PfP	  partner	  countries	  in	  NATO	  crisis	  response	  
operations.	   When	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   non-­‐NATO	   partner	   countries	   can	   augment	   NATO	  
nucleus	   staff	   while	   agreeing	   to	   operate	   in	   compliance	   with	   NATO	   arrangements	   and	  
procedures.	   CJTF,	   therefore,	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   for	   increased	   cooperation	  between	  
NATO	  member	  countries	  and	  PfP	  partner	  countries.	  Finally,	  the	  CJTF	  has	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
responsibilities	   including	   intelligence,	   the	   command	   and	   control	   of	   forces,	   and	   liaison	  
with	   relevant	   actors.	   Depending	   on	   the	   operational	   environment,	   however,	   logistics	  
might	   also	   be	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   CJTF,	   although	   commonly	   this	   is	   a	   national	  
primary	   responsibility.	   Jones	   (1999)	   observes	   that,	   “in	   out-­‐of-­‐area	   missions,	   NATO's	  
present	   luxury	  of	   interior	   lines,	   fixed	  bases,	  established	   infrastructure	  and	  host	  nation	  
support	   will	   be	   potentially	   replaced	   by	   long	   lines	   of	   communications,	   dilapidated	  
infrastructure,	  and	  meagre	  host	  nation	  support,	  especially	  in	  areas	  hit	  by	  humanitarian	  
disaster”	   (pp.	  18-­‐19).	  As	   a	   consequence,	  CJTF	  needs	   to	   adopt	   logistics-­‐related	   tasks	   in	  
some	  cases.	  	  
	  	  
46	  
The	  NATO	  Response	  Force	  
A	  vital	  element	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  NATO	  Force	  Structure	  was	  the	  introduction	  
of	  the	  NATO	  Response	  Force	  (NRF).	  Unlike	  the	  CJTF,	  the	  NRF	  is	  not	  a	  concept	  but	  a	  force	  
designed	   to	   operate	   in	   high	   intensity	   conflicts,	   also	   occurring	   outside	   the	   NATO	   area,	  
and	   is	   especially	   vital	   in	   disaster	   relief	   operations,	   as	   the	   forces	   are	   characterized	   by	  
their	  high	  state	  of	   readiness	  and	   flexibility.	   It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   the	  NRF	  has	  been	  
first	  used	  during	  disaster	  relief	  efforts	  both	   following	  Hurricane	  Katrina	   in	   the	  US	  and	  
the	  earthquake	  in	  Pakistan.	  The	  NRF	  is	  not	  to	  mistake	  with	  the	  CJTF	  concept;	  whereas	  
the	  CJTF	  is	  more	  an	  attitude	  or	  concept,	  the	  NRF	  is	  an	  actual	  force.	  Moreover,	  the	  CJTF	  
does	   not	   have	   self-­‐sustaining	   ability	   and	   relies	   on	   parent	   headquarters,	   the	   NRF	   is	   a	  
trained	  force,	  ready	  to	  be	  employed,	  and	  has	  the	  capability	  to	  be	  self-­‐sustaining	  up	  to	  30	  
days.	   After	   a	   certain	   period	   of	   time,	   under	   full	   availability	   for	   operations,	   the	   NRF	   is	  
replaced	  by	  another	  package.	  
	  
The	   first	  prototype	  of	   the	   force	  was	   introduced	   in	  2003,	  approximately	  one	  year	  after	  
the	  MC	  endorsed	  the	  NRF	  concept	  at	  the	  Prague	  Summit.	  “For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  its	  history,	  
NATO	   would	   be	   able	   to	   field	   an	   integrated	   joint	   and	   combined	   force	   under	   a	   single	  
commander;	   a	   force	   trained	   and	   certified	   together	   and,	   if	   necessary,	   ready	   to	   go	   into	  
combat	  together”	  (Garnett,	  2003,	  “NATO	  Response	  Force”,	  p.	  21).	  In	  fact,	  the	  idea	  for	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  NATO	  Response	  Force	  came	  from	  the	  Americans,	  who	  were	  concerned	  with	  
the	   fact	   that	   NATO	   was	   not	   adequately	   prepared	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   new	   challenges,	  
especially	  after	  9/11.	  However,	  the	  Americans	  and	  the	  EU	  Allies	  had	  different	  interests	  
in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  NRF.	  Where	  the	  Americans	  perceived	  the	  NRF	  as	  a	  “good	  vehicle	  
for	   showing	   off	   US	   leadership”	   (Krugler,	   2007,	   p.	   6),	   the	   Europeans	   were	   more	  
concerned	  with	   enhancing	   NATO’s	   relevance	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   access	   to	   the	   US’s	  
expertise.	   The	   approval	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  NRF	   is	   rather	   unique	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  
among	  the	  three	  major	  European	  powers	  France,	  usually	  opposing	  US	  leadership,	  was	  in	  
favor	  of	  the	  proposal.	  Bialos	  and	  Koehl	  (2005)	  wrote	  a	  rather	  critical	  paper	  on	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  NRF	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  US-­‐EU	  relations	  in	  particular.	  Interestingly,	  they	  state	  that	  
the	  creation	  of	  the	  NRF	  was	  a	  means	  to	  revitalize	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  European	  
allies	   and	   the	  US,	  which	   has	   been	   characterized	   by	   tensions	   ever	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
Cold	  War.	  	  These	  tensions	  have	  been	  mainly	  based	  on	  geopolitical,	  technology	  transfer,	  
and	   economic	   matters.	   The	   relations	   between	   the	   US	   and	   the	   EU	   have	   been	  
characterized	   by	   conflicting	   views	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   security	   matters,	   aggravated	   by	   the	  
conviction	  of	  the	  European	  allies	  that	  the	  US	  is	  unwilling	  to	  share	  technology	  (Bialos	  and	  
Koehl,	   2005,	  p.4).	  Krugler	   even	  argues	   that,	   “to	   an	   important	  degree,	   the	  NRF’s	   future	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will	   depend	   upon	  U.S.	  willingness	   to	   expedite	   the	   technology	   transfer	   process	   for	   the	  
Europeans”	  (2007,	  p.	  14).	  Hence,	  the	  NRF	  was	  perceived	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  bridge	  the	  
gap	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  and	  create	  a	  common	  ground.	  Still,	  the	  NRF	  currently	  is	  
mainly	  a	  European	  force,	  although	  the	  US	  has	  showed	  an	  increased	  involvement	  in	  the	  
past	  few	  years,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  VJTF	  concept.	  Moreover,	  the	  NRF	  
is	  an	  important	  linkage	  between	  NATO	  and	  the	  European	  Union’s	  Rapid	  Reaction	  Forces.	  
	  
The	  NRF	   it	   is	   a	   very	  high	   readiness	   force,	   tailored	   for	  different	   types	  of	  missions.	   The	  
NRF	  package	  currently	  consists	  “of	  some	  20,000	  troops,	  supporting	  a	  brigade-­‐sized	  land	  
element,	  a	  combined	  naval	  task	  force,	  and	  an	  air	  element	  capable	  of	  undertaking	  some	  
200	  combat	  missions	  each	  day”	  (Garnett,	  2003,	  “NATO	  Response	  Force”,	  p.21).	  The	  first	  
and	   second	   force	  package	   solely	   involved	  NATO	  nations,	  NRF	   three	   and	   four	   included	  
invited	  countries	  and	  integrated	  the	  use	  of	  the	  NRF	  force	  for	  disaster	  relief	  operations,	  
and	   finally	   NRF	   five	   and	   six	   also	   included	   the	   partner	   nations.	   The	   NRF	   has	   the	  
capability	  of	  being	  rapidly	  deployed	  under	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  circumstances.	  Therefore,	  
the	   variety	   of	   tasks	   consists	   of	   immediate	   collective	   defense	   operations,	   crisis	  
management	   and	   peace	   support	   missions,	   and	   disaster	   assistance	   efforts	   and	   the	  
protection	  of	  infrastructure.	  However,	  the	  NRF	  is	  mainly	  designed	  for	  the	  latter	  types	  of	  
missions,	   as	   the	   force	   is	   tailored	   for	   the	   21st	   century	   approach,	   not	   the	   traditional	  
approach	   of	   fixed	   collective	   defense.	   Its	   forces	   comprise	   both	   forces	   from	   NATO’s	  
military	  structure	  and	  forces	  from	  other	  nations.	  An	  important	  element	  of	  the	  NRF	  is	  the	  
Deployed	  Joint	  Task	  Force	  (DJTF),	  which	  contributes	  to	  the	  process	  of	  a	  rapid	  response	  
by	  its	  expected	  capacity	  to	  deploy	  within	  five	  days.	  	  
	  
The	   overall	   command	   of	   the	   NRF	   lays	   with	   SACEUR,	   the	   commander	   of	   the	   Allied	  
Command	  Operations	   (ACO),	  who	   carries	   the	  principle	   responsibility	   of	   the	   standards	  
and	  procedures,	  and	  the	  exercises	  and	  trainings	  of	   the	   force.	  The	  role	  of	   the	  SACT,	   the	  
commander	   of	   the	   Allied	   Command	   Transformation	   (ACT),	   one	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   to	  
develop	  the	  NRF	  doctrine	  and	  improve	  the	  capabilities	  for	  NRF’s	  continuous	  adaptation	  
to	  changes	  in	  the	  security	  environment.	  Garnett	  (2003)	  remarks	  that	  “ACT	  will	  'supply'	  
ACO,	   as	   its	   'customer',	  with	   all	   aspects	   of	  military	   transformation,	  with	   the	   necessary	  
development	   of	   doctrine,	   policy,	   training	   and	   education,	   manpower,	   logistics,	   and	  
material	   capabilities,	   resulting	   in	   the	   cultural	   transformation	   of	   the	   Alliance”	   (“NATO	  
Response	   Force”,	   p.	   23).	   Please	   consult	   appendix	   3	   for	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	  
concepts	  and	  command	  structure.	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The	   operational	   command	   of	   the	   NATO	   Response	   Force	   is	   assigned	   to	   a	   Joint	   Force	  
Command	   (JFC)	   each	   year	   on	   basis	   of	   rotation.	   Currently,	   JFC	   Naples	   is	   the	   lead	  
headquarters.	  The	  rotation	  system	  determines	  the	  constitution	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  
NRF.	  The	  process	  is	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	  all	  nations	  choose	  which	  types	  of	  force	  
elements	   they	  will	   contribute	   to	   the	  NRF.	  Second,	   trainings	  will	  be	  held	   in	   the	   form	  of	  
joint	   exercises.	   Then,	   the	   force	   is	   operational	   for	   one	   year	   and	   therefore	   ready	   to	   be	  
deployed.	  A	  high	   level	  of	   flexibility	  and	  multinationality,	   just	  as	   training	  and	  exercises,	  
between	  all	  components	  of	  the	  NRF,	  such	  as	  headquarters	  and	  forces,	   is	  crucial	  for	  the	  
required	  level	  of	  interoperability.	  Up	  to	  2012,	  the	  rotation	  period	  amounted	  six	  months	  
instead	  of	   one	   year,	   and	  Bialos	   and	  Koehl	   (2005),	   raised	  questions	   regarding	   this	   six-­‐
month	   rotation	   system.	   First,	   they	   stated	   that	   it	   creates	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   turbulence.	  
Second,	   they	  argued	  that	   it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  reach	  unity,	  as	  “the	  NRF	  will	  barely	  have	  
developed	  cohesion	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  unit	  identity	  before	  it	  must	  disband	  and	  the	  process	  
must	  begin	  anew”	  (p.	  14).	  Last,	  the	  authors	  claimed	  that	  the	  six-­‐month	  rotation	  system	  
influences	  the	  member	  nations	  in	  their	  contributions	  to	  the	  NRF.	  Many	  countries	  chose	  
the	   easy	  way	   by	   sending	   equipment	   and	  material	   such	   as	   aircrafts,	  whereas	   only	   few	  
countries	  contributed	  ground	  forces,	  as	  this	  is	  the	  hardest	  unit	  to	  reach	  interoperability	  
due	  to	  differences	  in	  for	  example	  language	  and	  equipment.	  According	  to	  Krugler	  (2007),	  
“the	  lack	  of	  ground	  forces	  was	  a	  problem	  that	  continued	  affecting	  follow-­‐on	  NRFs	  during	  
2003–2006”	  (p.	  8).	  Although	  these	  critiques	  are	  based	  on	  the	  six-­‐month	  rotation	  system,	  
future	   operations	   will	   have	   to	   show	   whether	   the	   extension	   to	   one	   year	   will	   address	  
these	  challenges.	  	  
Besides	   these	   factors	   that	   hinder	   effective	   interoperability,	   the	   issue	   of	   funding	   is	  
another	  matter	   that	   recurs	  when	   reading	  on	   the	  NRF.	  The	  NRF	   is	   not	   funded	   through	  
NATO’s	  common	  account,	  coming	  down	  to	  the	  fact	   that	  participating	  countries	  have	  to	  
bear	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  own	  contributions.	  This	  suggests	  that	  countries	  that	  make	  a	  large	  
contribution	   of	   force	   elements	   to	   NRF	   are	   automatically	   faced	   with	   a	   high	   financial	  
burden,	   which	   makes	   participation	   more	   difficult	   for	   nations	   with	   a	   limited	   defense	  
budget.	  
	  
The	  most	  recent	  development,	  concerning	  the	  NRF	  has	  been	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Very	  High	  
Readiness	   Joint	   Task	   Force	   (VJTF)	   in	   2014.	   It	   has	   been	   implemented	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	  
NRF’s	   new	   structure,	   spurred	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   recent	   security	   challenges	   such	   as	   the	  
Russian	  aggression	  against	  neighboring	  Ukraine	  and	  the	  growing	  threat	  posed	  by	  ISIL.	  
The	   boosting	   factor	   of	   this	   force	   is	   that	   it	   can	   already	   be	   deployed	   when	   there	   are	  
warning	   signs	   for	   the	   outbreak	   of	   a	   potential	   crisis.	   Thus,	   this	   force	   can	   be	   sent	   to	   a	  
	  	  
49	  
potential	   crisis	   area	   to	   prevent	   escalation.	   Just	   as	   the	   NRF,	   the	   VJTF	   comprises	  
components	   of	   national	   armies	   and	   also	   has	   the	   capability	   to	   rapidly	   deploy	   within	  
several	  days.	  
	  
In	   short,	  NATO	  has	   an	   excellent	   civilian	   and	  military	   structure	   for	   disaster	   assistance,	  
designed	   for	   missions	   that	   need	   a	   high	   level	   of	   readiness	   and	   flexibility.	   Specifically	  





























Chapter	  5	  -­‐	  Case	  Study:	  Pakistan	  earthquake	  relief	  operation	  
§5.1	  The	  Earthquake	  
On	  8	  October	  2005	  a	  powerful	  earthquake	  struck	   the	   Indian-­‐Pakistani	  border,	   causing	  
damage	   in	   India,	  Pakistan	  and	  Afghanistan.	  The	  earthquake	   caused	  a	  particularly	  high	  
level	  of	  destruction	  to	   the	  Kashmir	  region	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  The	  damage	   in	   the	  Pakistan-­‐
controlled	   Kashmir	   area	   was	   overwhelming.	   In	   total,	   the	   earthquake	   caused	   80.000	  
casualties	   and	   left	   70.000	  wounded	   and	  2.5	  million	   homeless.	  Numerous	   people	  were	  
forced	  to	  sleep	  outdoors	  under	  harsh	  conditions.	  Moreover,	  an	  estimated	  number	  of	  2.3	  
million	  people	  barely	  had	  access	   to	  basic	  needs,	  or	  not	  at	  all.	  What	  made	  the	  situation	  
particularly	  acute	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  region	  where	  the	  earthquake	  struck	  hardest	  was	  
very	  mountainous,	  therefore	  the	  affected	  population	  was	  spread	  out	  over	  remote	  areas	  
that	  were	  extremely	  hard	  to	  reach,	  aggravated	  by	  the	  degradation	  and	  destruction	  of	  the	  
infrastructure.	  Besides,	  winter	  was	  coming	  and	  the	  worsening	  weather	  conditions	  were	  
another	  cause	  for	  concern.	  Thus,	   the	  destruction	  of	   the	  earthquake	  was	  widespread	  as	  
such	  that	  it	  asked	  for	  an	  immediate	  response.	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1	  –	  Area	  struck	  by	  earthquake	  	  
Source:	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4321490.stm	  
	  
Context	  in	  which	  the	  earthquake	  occurred	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   first	  discuss	   the	  historical	  background	  of	  Pakistan,	   and	   in	  particular	  
the	  Kashmir	  region,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  the	  bigger	  picture	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  in	  
which	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  the	  crisis	  occurred.	  In	  1947	  Britain	  prepared	  
to	  end	  nearly	  a	  century	  of	  rule	  over	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent	  and	  its	  millions	  of	  people.	  
Generally,	   Hindus	   were	   concentrated	   in	   central	   and	   southern	   India,	   and	   Muslims	   in	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Bengal	   and	   the	   northwest.	   A	   British	   commission	   divided	   the	   territory	   in	   majority-­‐
Muslim	   Pakistan	   and	   majority-­‐Hindu	   India.	   In	   the	   chaos	   that	   followed	   partition,	   15	  
million	   people	   fled	   across	   the	   new	   borders	   and	   thousands	   died	   in	   riots.	   One	   of	   the	  
border	  regions	  that	  saw	  the	  worst	  of	  it	  is	  the	  Kashmir	  region.	  In	  the	  years	  following,	  the	  
region	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  struggle	  for	  territory	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan,	  leading	  to	  
three	  wars	  in	  total.	  In	  addition,	  what	  makes	  the	  Kashmir	  conflict	  particularly	  dangerous	  
is	  the	  fact	  that	  militant	  groups	  are	  largely	  present	  in	  the	  areas	  and	  that	  both	  countries,	  
apart	  from	  having	  strong	  armies,	  also	  have	  successfully	  tested	  and	  presumably	  deployed	  
nuclear	  weapons.	   For	  more	   detailed	   information	   on	   the	   historical	   context	   of	   Pakistan	  
and	  the	  Kashmir	  region,	  please	  refer	  to	  appendix	  4.	  	  
	  
At	  the	  time	  when	  the	  earthquake	  hit	  the	  region,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  several	  factors	  in	  
mind	  that	  required	  a	  careful	  approach	  of	  the	  relief	  workers.	  First	  of	  all,	  about	  two	  years	  
before	  the	  earthquake	  hit,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  were	  relatively	  on	  peaceful	  terms,	  as	  they	  
agreed	  on	  a	  ceasefire	  along	  the	  Line	  Of	  Control	  (LOC),	  which	  divides	  the	  region	  into	  the	  
Pakistan-­‐controlled	  part	  and	  the	  India-­‐controlled	  part.	  Nonetheless,	  tensions	  in	  the	  area	  
have	   always	   continued	   to	   simmer.	   Importantly,	   “the	   Line	   of	   Control	   (LOC)	   ran	   right	  
through	   the	  Bagh	  district,	  which	  was	   the	   center	   of	   the	   emergency	   aid	   operation”.	   The	  
relief	  personnel,	   therefore,	  had	  to	  be	  careful	  not	   to	  cross	  to	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	   the	   line.	  
Moreover,	  “the	  NATO	  operation	  in	  Pakistan	  was	  a	  sensitive	  issue	  due	  to	  the	  involvement	  
of	  both	  the	  Alliance	  and	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  war	  in	  neighboring	  Afghanistan”	  (NIMH,	  2011,	  p.	  
1).	  Pakistan’s	  role	  in	  the	  “War	  on	  Terror”,	  however,	  is	  a	  controversial	  one	  given	  the	  fact	  
that	   it	   has	   also	   provided	   safe	   haven	   to	   both	   radical	   Islamist	   groups	   and	   the	   Afghan	  
Taliban.	   Respectively,	   extremist	   groups	   were	   largely	   present	   in	   several	   parts	   of	   the	  
country,	  which	  had	   to	  be	   taken	   into	  account	  by	   the	   foreign	  military	  and	  humanitarian	  
personnel.	   Further,	   foreign	   military	   personnel	   were	   perceived	   negatively	   among	   the	  
Pakistani	   population,	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   strong	   anti-­‐American	   (and	   thus	  
anti-­‐Western)	   sentiments.	   Last,	   the	   affected	   region	   was	   one	   characterized	   by	  
widespread	  poverty,	  political	  instability,	  corruption,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  population	  in	  rural	  
areas	  was	  living	  under	  very	  poor	  conditions.	  	  
	  
§5.2	  The	  NATO	  Response	  
NATO	   can	   be	   involved	   in	   a	   disaster	   relief	   operation	   through	   the	   EADRCC	   by	   just	  
coordinating	   the	   supply	   of	   relief	   efforts,	   which	   is	   usually	   the	   case.	   However,	   in	   some	  
cases,	   NATO	   can	   also	   decide	   to	   deploy	   military	   assets	   from	   the	   command	   and	   force	  




First	   relief	   efforts	   were	   conducted	   by	   the	   national	   and	   international	   humanitarian	  
organizations.	   The	   Pakistani	   military	   also	   provided	   an	   immediate	   response	   by	  
coordinating	  the	  relief	  efforts	  and	  deploying	  troops.	  Notwithstanding	  these	  first	  efforts,	  
the	  Pakistani	  authorities	  and	  humanitarian	  organizations	  were	  incapable	  of	  coping	  with	  
the	   immense	   number	   of	   traumatized	   people.	   Moreover,	   the	   rugged	   terrain,	   extreme	  
weather	  conditions,	  and	  the	  destroyed	  infrastructure	  greatly	  obstructed	  their	  attempts	  
to	   provide	   relief	   efforts.	   Accordingly,	   the	   EADRCC	   received	   an	   urgent	   request	   for	  
assistance	   from	   the	   Pakistani	   authorities	   on	   10	   October,	   two	   days	   following	   the	  
earthquake.	   Subsequent	   to	   the	   request	   for	   assistance	   the	  Alliance	   agreed	   to	  provide	   a	  
disaster	  response,	  which	  comprised	  two	  phases.	  It	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  start	  that	  NATO’s	  
involvement	  in	  the	  disaster	  response	  would	  be	  of	  great	  humanitarian	  nature.	  
	  
Timeline	  NATO	  Pakistan	  Earthquake	  Relief	  Operation	  
8	  October	   Earthquake	  hit	  Pakistan	  
10	  October	   Request	  for	  assistance	  by	  Pakistani	  authorities	  
11	  October	   NAC	  approves	  airlift	  	  
21	  October	   Approval	  deployment	  ground	  forces	  
24	  October	   Deployment	  DJTF	  HQ	  
Deployment	  air	  component	  
29	  October	   Deployment	  land	  component	  
6	  November	   First	  NATO	  helicopters	  
9	  November	   NATO	  Hospital	  (NMH)	  starts	  activities	  
10	  November	   First	  engineering	  support	  
1	  February	   End	  of	  the	  mission	  
Figure	  2	  –	  Timeline	  	  
	  
STAGE	  1:	  NATO’S	  AIR	  BRIDGES	  
One	   day	   after	   the	   request	   was	   received,	   the	   NAC	   decided	   that	   NATO’s	   role	   would	   be	  
coordinating	  the	  transportation	  of	  the	  aid	  supplies	  that	  were	  offered	  by	  EAPC	  countries,	  
which	   would	   be	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   EADRCC.	   Hence,	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   NATO’s	  
involvement	   was	   an	   airlift	   operation,	   consisting	   of	   two	   air	   bridges	   that	   allowed	   the	  
delivery	   of	   more	   than	   2500	   tons	   of	   aid	   supplies	   in	   total.	   The	   first	   air	   bridge	   was	  
launched	   from	  Germany	   on	   13	  October,	   and	   served	   to	   deliver	   donated	   relief	   supplies	  
from	  NATO	   and	   partner	   countries,	   and	   the	   second	   one	  was	   opened	   from	  Turkey,	   and	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delivered	   aid	   supplies	   from	  UN	  High	   Commissioner	   for	   Refugees	   (UNHCR).	   Donations	  
included	  for	  example	  tents,	  blankets	  and	  matrasses,	  water	  purification	  tablets,	  medical	  
equipment	  and	  supplies,	  and	  medical	  and	  relief	  personnel.	  	  
	  
STAGE	  2:	  DEPLOYMENT	  OF	  MILITARY	  ASSETS	  ON	  THE	  GROUND	  
Following	  an	  additional	  request	  from	  the	  Pakistani	  authorities,	  NATO	  initiated	  a	  second	  
stage	   of	   the	   disaster	   relief	   operation,	   in	   which	   specialist	   units	   from	   the	   NRF	   were	  
deployed	  on	   the	  ground.	   Importantly,	   this	  disaster	   relief	   operation	   led	  by	   the	  Alliance	  
was	  NATO’s	  first	  major	  relief	  operation	  outside	  the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  territory	  and	  the	  NRF’s	  
first	  major	  deployment.	  Although	  the	  NRF	  was	  first	  deployed	  in	  response	  to	  Hurricane	  
Katrina,	   the	  Pakistan	  earthquake	  operation	  was	  the	  NRF’s	   first	  major	   involvement	   in	  a	  
humanitarian	  mission.	  	  
	  
Decision-­‐making	  process	  
Interestingly,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	  the	  NRF’s	  deployment	  became	  clear	  during	  
a	  personal	  interview	  with	  Portuguese	  Colonel	  [Col]	  Lemos	  Pires	  (April	  7,	  2015)	  from	  the	  
Joint	   Command	   Lisbon	   (JCL),	  whose	   responsibility	  was	   to	   help	   the	   supervision	   of	   the	  
NATO	   rescue	   operation.	   He	   clarified	   that	   given	   the	   dimensions	   of	   the	   earthquake	   the	  
sense	  of	  possible	  utility	  of	  the	  Joint	  Headquarters	  and	  of	  the	  NRF	  (under	  its	  supervision)	  
was	  shared	  by	  all,	  and	  only	  a	  few	  contacts	  led	  to	  the	  commander’s	  determination	  to	  start	  
the	   initial	   planning	   for	   a	   possible	   operation.	   Importantly,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Pakistan	  
earthquake,	   there	  were	   three	   Joint	  Commands:	   Joint	  Force	  Command	   (JFC)	  Brunssum,	  
JFC	   Naples,	   and	   Joint	   Command	   Lisbon.	   It	   was	   Joint	   Command	   Lisbon	   that	   would	  
command	  NRF	  five	  and	  six	  from	  the	  period	  of	   July	  2005	  until	   June	  2006,	  meaning	  that	  
Lisbon’s	  Operational	  Commander	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  NRF’s	  deployment	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  
	  
Operation	  objectives	  
Upon	  deployment	   the	  NRF	  had	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   the	   strategic	  mission,	   the	   operational	  
mission,	  and	  the	  anticipated	  end	  state.	  The	  strategic	  mission	  was,	  as	  defined	  by	  SHAPE,	  
to	  help	   the	  victims	  of	   the	   earthquake	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  necessities	   requested	  by	  
Pakistan.	  The	  JC	  Lisbon	  headquarters	  was	  responsible	  for	  directing	  the	  operation,	  which	  
was	  to	  maintain	  an	  air	  bridge,	  repair	  the	  roads,	  establish	  air	  transport	  within	  Pakistan	  
(helicopters),	  and	  guarantee	  medical	  and	  engineering	  support.	  Important	  to	  note	  is	  that	  
humanitarian	   assistance	   was	   not	   part	   of	   the	   operational	   mission.	   The	   end	   state	  
represents	   the	  desired	  outcome	  of	   the	  mission,	  which	  was	   to	  stabilize	  and	  protect	   the	  
population	   that	   survived	   in	   the	   affected	   area	   in	   order	   to	   help	   them	   prepare	   for	   the	  
	  	  
54	  
coming	  winter.	  	  Accordingly,	  “each	  soldier	  should	  know	  why	  he	  is	  there;	  he	  must	  always	  
know	  what	  the	  end	  state	  is.	  Everything	  NATO	  did	  was	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  end	  state”	  
(Col	  Lemos	  Pires,	  April	  7,	  2015).	  	  	  
	  
Deployment	  
Accordingly,	   the	   second	   phase	   of	   the	   NATO	   deployment	   consisted	   of	   elements	   drawn	  
from	   JCL	   and	   from	   the	   NRF	   units,	   with	   extended	   aviation	   support.	   JCL	   deployed	   a	  
command	  component	  to	  Pakistan,	  belonging	  to	  the	  Headquarters	  and	  maintained	  ready	  
to	   be	   used	   in	   any	   place:	   the	   Deployed	   Joint	   Task	   Force	  Headquarters	   (DJTF	  HQ).	   The	  
NRF	  participation	  was	  mostly	  at	  the	  level	  of	  medical	  and	  engineering	  units.	  The	  overall	  
operation	  took	  on	  the	  name	  “NATO	  Disaster	  Relief	  Team”	  (NDRT).	  	  
	  
The	   first	   NRF	   element	   on	   the	   ground	  was	   the	   deployed	   headquarters	   (DJTF	   HQ).	   Col	  
Lemos	  Pires	   explained	   the	  DJTF	   concept	   as	   a	   “taking	   a	   slice	   of	   the	   fixed	  headquarters	  
and	   applying	   it	   outside”	   (Col	   Lemos	   Pires,	   April	   7,	   2015).	   Ultimately,	   having	   a	  
headquarters	  in	  the	  affected	  area	  allows	  the	  smoother	  coordination	  of	  the	  relief	  efforts.	  
The	   DJTF	   HQ	   was	   sent	   on	   24	   October	   and	   was	   located	   in	   Arga,	   which	   is	   about	   20	  
kilometers	   southwest	   of	   Bagh.	   The	   Pakistani	   authorities	   decided	   that	   the	  Bagh	   region	  
would	  be	  the	  zone	  of	  relief	  efforts	   for	  NATO’s	  deployed	  forces.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Pakistan,	  
only	  land	  and	  air	  components	  were	  deployed−	  the	  maritime	  component	  was	  not	  used.	  	  
	  
Second,	   the	   most	   crucial	   NRF	   assets	   were	   without	   a	   doubt	   the	   specialist	   units	   for	  
medical	  and	  engineering	  support,	  given	  the	  alarming	  public	  health	  risk	  and	  the	  heavily	  
damaged	   infrastructures.	   “The	   local	   health	   infrastructure	   was	   badly	   damaged	   by	   the	  
earthquake:	   796	   health	   facilities	   were	   destroyed	   and	   a	   further	   119	   were	   rendered	  
unsafe”	   (Wiharta	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   115).	   Consequently,	   the	   enormous	   amount	   of	  
earthquake	   victims	   that	   were	   in	   desperate	   need	   of	   medical	   support	   was	   unable	   to	  
receive	   the	  medical	   assistance	   they	   so	   urgently	   needed.	   NATO’s	  main	   contribution	   to	  
health	  care	  relief	  in	  the	  Bagh	  district	  consisted	  of	  the	  Dutch	  Military	  Emergency	  Hospital	  
(MNH),	   which	   was	   deployed	   one	   month	   following	   the	   earthquake.	   The	   role	   of	   the	  
Netherlands	   was	   an	   important	   one,	   as	   “it	   provided	   the	   structure	   within	   which	   the	  
international	   field	  hospital	   could	  be	   set	  up,	   including	   its	   full	   crew	  and	  a	  platoon-­‐sized	  
detachment	   of	   force	   protection”	   (NIMH,	   2010,	   p.	   2).	   In	   total	   there	   were	   two	   field	  
hospitals,	   which	   mainly	   performed	   basic	   healthcare	   tasks	   because	   when	   they	   finally	  
became	  operational,	   the	  need	  for	  acute	  medical	  aid	  was	  no	   longer	  needed.	   In	  addition,	  
the	  Dutch	  medical	  unit	  came	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  introducing	  mobile	  medical	  units,	  which	  
	  	  
55	  
proved	   to	  be	  very	  valuable	  because	   it	  enabled	   the	  provision	  of	  medical	  assistance	  and	  
the	   delivery	   of	   aid	   supplies	   to	   remote	   areas.	   Moreover,	   the	   mobile	   unites	   played	   an	  
essential	   role	   in	   providing	   vaccinations	   to	   the	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   affected	   areas.	   Two	  
mobile	   units	   were	   deployed	   every	   day,	   and	   “each	   team	   consisted	   of	   a	   doctor,	   two	  
medics,	   two	  nurses,	   two	   interpreters	  and	   force	  protection	  and	   they	  had	   three	  off-­‐road	  
vehicles	   at	   their	  disposable”	   (NIMH,	  2010,	  p.	   3).	  However,	   sometimes	   the	  units	  would	  
also	  use	  horses	  and	  mules	  to	  move	  around.	  Later,	  the	  MNH	  also	  had	  an	  airmobile	  team	  
at	   its	  disposal	   after	  Luxembourg	  offered	  a	   trauma	  helicopter.	   In	   total,	  NATO’s	  medical	  
teams	  performed	  8.000	  consults,	  2.300	  vaccinations,	  and	  9.700	  medical	  treatments	  (Col	  
Lemos	  Pires,	  April	  7,	  2015).	  	  
The	  engineering	  team	  was	  the	  second	  specialized	  unit	  and	  was	  led	  by	  the	  Spanish.	  The	  
tasks	   of	   the	   engineers	   can	   roughly	   be	   divided	   into	   three	   groups:	   the	   construction	   of	  
buildings,	   restoring	   the	   road	   infrastructure,	   and	   performing	   water	   treatments.	   The	  
engineers	   were	   responsible	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   medical	   centers,	   as	   most	   of	   the	  
existing	  local	  health	  centers	  had	  been	  destroyed,	  as	  mentioned	  previously.	  In	  addition,	  a	  
total	  of	  60	  shelters	  were	  built,	  which	  provided	  shelter	  to	  the	  numerous	  people	  who	  had	  
become	  homeless	  following	  the	  earthquake.	  Interestingly,	  NATO	  was	  mainly	  prepared	  to	  
build	  shelters	  upon	  arrival	  to	  the	  affected	  area,	  which	  it	  also	  did,	  but	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  
the	   operation	   President	   Musharraf	   requested	   the	   construction	   of	   schools	   for	   a	   very	  
specific	  reason.	  As	  Col	  Lemos	  Pires	  stated	  (April	  7,	  2015),	  the	  first	  NGOs	  to	  arrive	  to	  the	  
scene	  were	  not	  the	  international	  humanitarian	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Red	  Cross,	  but	  
instead	  the	  Taliban’s	  NGOs	  were	  the	  first	  ones	  to	  provide	  humanitarian	  aid.	  Considering	  
that	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   victims	  were	   orphans,	   these	   children	  were	   in	   great	   danger	   of	  
being	  taken	  advantage	  of,	  especially	  by	  terrorist	  networks.	  Upon	  their	  arrival	  in	  affected	  
area,	   they	   started	   building	   Islamic	   religious	   schools	   (Madrassa’s)	   immediately.	  
Consequently,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   children	   from	   being	   recruited	   to	   the	   Taliban’s	  
madrassa’s,	  the	  government	  of	  Pakistan	  asked	  NATO	  to	  build	  schools	  –	  especially	  girls’	  
schools	   –	   because	   girls	   were	   more	   vulnerable.	   Restoring	   road	   infrastructure	   was	  
another	   important	   duty	   assigned	   to	   the	   engineers.	   Their	   tasks	   mainly	   consisted	   of	  
repairing	  the	  roads	  and	  the	  walls	  alongside	  the	  roads	  and	  clearing	  the	  roads	  from	  snow,	  
ice	   and	   rubble.	   The	   earthquake	   had	   left	   most	   of	   the	   roads	   in	   the	   area	   impassable.	  
Because	  of	  these	  bad	  conditions	  of	  the	  roads	  it	  took	  really	  long	  for	  NATO	  troops	  to	  reach	  
their	   destinations,	   yet	   the	   factual	   distances	  were	   not	   really	   far.	   Besides,	   it	   sometimes	  
occurred	   that	   troops	   were	   denied	   access	   to	   certain	   routes.	   It	   is	   for	   this	   reasons	   that	  
repairing	   and	   clearing	   the	   roads	   was	   an	   essential	   activity	   in	   order	   to	   smoothen	   the	  
movement	  of	  NATO	  troops	  and	  supplies.	  Water	  treatments	  were	  a	  third	  important	  field	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of	  activity	  for	  the	  engineers,	  as	  the	  shortage	  of	  (clean)	  drinking	  water	  became	  a	  serious	  
public	   health	   concern,	   just	   as	   the	   poor	   sanitation	   conditions.	   The	   Lithuanians	   had	   the	  
leading	  role	  in	  this	  area,	  as	  they	  sent	  a	  water	  purification	  team	  through	  NATO.	  Besides	  
distributing	   drinking	   water,	   the	   engineers	   “updated	   a	   permanent	   spring	   water	  
distribution	   and	   storage	   system	   to	   serve	   up	   to	   8,400	   persons	   a	   day”	   (NATO,	   2010c,	  
“Pakistan	  earthquake	  relief	  operation”,	  para.	  3).	  	  	  
	  
Last,	  besides	   the	   initial	   airlift	   operation	   in	   the	   first	  phase,	  NATO	  extended	  air	   support	  
through	   maintaining	   the	   air	   bridge	   for	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	   deliverance	   of	   relief	  
supplies.	  Moreover,	  the	  deployment	  of	  helicopters	  allowed	  aid	  workers	  to	  reach	  remote	  
areas	   and	   to	   move	   displaced	   and	   injured	   people.	   In	   order	   to	   sustain	   this	   extent	   of	  
aviation	  operations,	  additional	  airbases	  were	  established	  throughout	  the	  affected	  area.	  
The	  establishment	  of	  a	  fuel	  farm	  by	  the	  French	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  herein,	  as	  it	  enabled	  
the	   refueling	   for	   military	   and	   civilian	   helicopters.	   Thus,	   the	   French	   fuel	   farm	   in	  
Abbottabad,	   “acted	   as	   a	   ‘force	   multiplier’,	   extending	   the	   range	   of	   aviation	   operations	  
significantly	  and	  permitting	  longer	  and	  more	  frequent	  sorties	  to	  the	  more	  remote	  areas”	  
(Wiharta	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  114-­‐115).	  	  
	  
Altogether	  NATO	  deployed	   roughly	   12.000	   soldiers	   from	  17	  different	  NATO	   countries	  
through	   the	   NRF.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   NATO	   forces,	   military	   forces	   from	   the	   US	   and	  
Australia	  also	  contributed	  military	  troops.	  The	  whole	  NATO	  disaster	  relief	  operation	  in	  
Pakistan,	   which	   lasted	   for	   a	   period	   of	   about	   three	   months,	   was	   conducted	   in	   close	  
cooperation	  with	  the	  Pakistani	  authorities	  and	  the	  UN.	  
	  
§5.3	  The	  UN	  cluster	  approach	  
A	  unique	  aspect	  about	  this	  disaster	  response	  in	  specific	  is	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  new	  
UN	   cluster	   approach.	   This	   new	   approach	   was	   commissioned	   in	   August	   2005,	   which	  
means	  that	  only	  two	  months	  after	  its	  approval	  it	  was	  first	  used	  during	  the	  international	  
disaster	  response	   in	  Pakistan.	   In	  addition,	   there	  was	  no	   international	  approval	   for	  this	  
approach	   yet,	   so	   it	   was	   basically	   a	   pilot	   experiment.	   The	   objective	   of	   the	   UN	   cluster	  
approach	  was,	   “to	   improve	   accountability,	   predictability,	   and	   reliability	   by	   identifying	  
organizational	   leaders	   for	   areas	   in	  which	   there	  was	   an	   identified	   gap	   in	  humanitarian	  
response”	   (House	   of	   Commons:	   International	   Development	   Committee,	   2006,	   p.	   189).	  
Each	   organization	  would	   have	   a	   different	   “mission”	   according	   to	   their	   cluster.	   Hence,	  
NATO	  forces	  had	  to	  operate	  according	  to	  this	  new	  approach	  to	  humanitarian	  response,	  
as	   envisioned	   by	   the	  UN.	   Eventually,	   nine	   clusters	  were	   created,	   divided	   according	   to	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three	  main	  areas	  (see	  figure	  3):	  relief	  and	  assistance,	  service	  provision,	  and	  crosscutting	  
concerns.	  Within	   the	   area	   of	   relief	   and	   assistance	   there	  were	   the	   clusters	   of	   food	   and	  
nutrition,	   water	   and	   sanitation,	   health,	   and	   emergency	   shelter.	   Service	   provision	  
included	   the	   clusters	   logistics	   and	   IT	   and	   telecommunications.	   Crosscutting	   concerns	  
encompassed	   and	   early	   recovery	   and	   reconstruction,	   camp	   management,	   and	  
protection.	  Later,	  the	  cluster	  education	  was	  added.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3	  –	  The	  UN	  Cluster	  Approach	  
	  
ActionAid	   International	   (2007)	   has	   evaluated	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   UN	   cluster	  
approach.	   Relevant	   to	   mention	   is	   that	   this	   evaluation	   is	   from	   a	   NGO	   perspective.	  
Although	   the	  report	  acknowledges	   that	   the	  UN	  cluster	  approach	  has	  great	  potential,	   it	  
claims	  that	  a	  lot	  of	  problems	  need	  to	  be	  resolved	  before	  it	  can	  fully	  realize	  its	  objective	  
of	   filling	   up	   the	   gap	   in	   international	   humanitarian	   response.	   First,	   there	  was	   no	   clear	  
understanding	  of	  what	  the	  UN	  cluster	  approach	  exactly	  was	  among	  all	   involved	  actors.	  
When	   the	   approach	  was	  used	   in	  Pakistan,	   it	  was	  not	   fully	  developed	  yet.	   “As	   a	   result,	  
those	  implementing	  the	  approach	  did	  not	  have	  Terms	  of	  Reference,	  appropriate	  support	  
or	   training”	   (p.	  4).	  Second,	   the	  UN	  clearly	   failed	   to	   include	   local	  organizations,	  groups,	  
and	  other	  structures,	  by	  not	  giving	  them	  the	  opportunity	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  decision-­‐
making	   processes.	   To	   illustrate,	   the	   report	   (2007)	   points	   out	   that	   local	   organizations	  
described	   the	   cluster	  meetings	   as	   “meetings	   of	   an	   elite	   group	   of	   foreigners”	   (p.	   4).	   A	  
major	   factor	   herein	   was	   that	   the	   meetings	   were	   solely	   held	   in	   English,	   without	   the	  
presence	   of	   translators.	   Third,	   some	   clusters	   got	   distracted	   by	   all	   the	   procedures,	  
numerous	  meetings,	  compartmentalization,	  and	  consequently	  lost	  sight	  of	  the	  objective.	  
As	   a	   result,	   there	   were	   strong	   differences	   in	   performance	   per	   cluster.	   For	   instance,	  
Relief	  and	  
Assistance	  


















“those	   oriented	   towards	   ground-­‐level	   work,	   such	   as	   logistics,	   food	   and	   shelter,	   were	  
more	  successful”	  (ActionAid	  International,	  2007,	  p.	  4).	  Last,	  there	  proved	  to	  be	  points	  of	  
improvement	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  coordination,	  monitoring,	  and	  evaluation.	  	  	  
It	  seems,	  however,	   that	  NATO	  experienced	   fewer	  difficulties	  with	   the	  cluster	  approach	  
than	   for	   example	   the	   NGOs	   and	   IOs.	   An	   explanation	   could	   be	   that	   the	   NATO	   forces	  
worked	   closely	   together	   with	   both	   the	   UN	   and	   Pakistani	   government.	   International	  
NGOs,	   however,	   already	   had	   general	   coordination	   problems	   with	   the	   Pakistani	  
authorities,	   and	   perhaps	   the	   UN	   cluster	   approach	   only	   exposed	   these	   tensions	   even	  
more	  because	  of	  the	  exclusion	  of	  local	  structures.	  
	  
§5.4	  An	  evaluation	  	  
It	   cannot	   be	   denied	   that	   NATO’s	   role	   was	   a	   very	   important	   one,	   and	   that	   it	   made	   a	  
substantial	  positive	  difference	  to	  the	  overall	  response.	  However,	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  
Alliance	  was	  also	  a	  topic	  of	  controversy,	  questioning	  why	  military	  assets	  should	  be	  used	  
in	   disaster	   operations,	   and	   what	   exactly	   NATO’s	   added	   value	   is.	   In	   this	   paragraph	  
NATO’s	  response	  will	  be	  evaluated	  by	   identifying	  which	  factors	  hampered	  the	  disaster	  
response	   (A),	  but	  also	  by	  discussing	   the	  successes	  of	   the	  operation	  and	  NATO’s	  added	  
value	  in	  specific	  (B).	  What	  makes	  this	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  case	  study	  is	  that	  it	  only	  
has	   happened	   a	   few	   times	   that	   NATO	   has	   deployed	   military	   capabilities	   during	   a	  
humanitarian	   operation,	   but	   never	   as	   high	   profile	   as	   during	   the	   Pakistan	   earthquake	  
response.	  	  
	  
A)	  Obstructing	  factors	  
When	  closely	  assessing	  the	  Pakistan	  disaster	  response,	  several	  factors	  can	  be	  identified	  
that	  hampered	  the	  overall	  disaster	  response.	  In	  this	  section	  these	  hampering	  factors	  will	  
be	   discussed	   by	   dividing	   them	   into	   three	   areas	   from	   which	   the	   problem	   originated:	  
NATO,	   Pakistan,	   and	   civil-­‐military	   coordination.	   In	   other	   words,	   each	   of	   these	   three	  
areas	  represents	  the	  “source”	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  
	  
Obstructing	  factors	  originating	  from	  within	  NATO	  	  
Throughout	   the	   disaster	   response	   several	   problems	   can	   be	   identified	   that	   arose	   from	  
within	  NATO’s	   structure.	   Important	   to	   note,	   however,	   is	   that	  many	   aspects	   about	   this	  
specific	  disaster	  response	  were	  new	  for	  NATO	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  the	  NRF’s	  
first	   major	   deployment.	   Therefore,	   the	   identified	   problems	   should	   rather	   be	   seen	   as	  




Lack	  of	  a	  NATO	  policy	  for	  complex	  humanitarian	  operations	  
In	  2005,	  NATO	  had	  not	  yet	  developed	  a	  doctrine	  specifically	  for	  humanitarian	  missions	  
like	  these.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  2008	  that	  a	  policy	  document	  was	  adopted	  for	  this	  matter.	  This	  
lack	  of	  an	  encompassing	  NATO	  policy	  therefore	  meant	  that	  the	  deployed	  forces	  had	  little	  
guidance	  from	  the	  strategic	  level.	  As	  Col	  Lemos	  Pires	  puts	  it:	  “They	  just	  said:	  do	  what	  the	  
Pakistani’s	  ask	  you”	  (7	  April,	  2015).	  It	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  his	  open	  guidance	  led	  to	  
confusion	  and	  misunderstandings.	  	  
The	   complexity	   of	   the	   situation	   furthermore	   caused	   a	   lot	   of	   doubt	   within	   the	   NAC	  
whether	   to	  get	   involved	   in	   the	  operation	  or	  not.	  Not	  all	  NATO	  members	  agreed	  with	  a	  
disaster	   response	  mission	  of	   such	  clear	  humanitarian	  nature	  outside	  of	   the	   traditional	  
area	   (Wiharta	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   pp.	   112-­‐113).	   This	   unease	  was	   reinforced	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  
Pakistan	  in	  specific	  was	  a	  sensitive	  matter,	  as	  NATO’s	  involvement	  could	  be	  associated	  
with	  the	  Alliance’s	  participation	  in	  the	  “War	  on	  Terror”	  and	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  
NATO	   wanted	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   area,	   even	   after	   the	   disaster	   response	   would	   be	  
concluded.	   Eventually,	   after	   a	   rather	   time-­‐consuming	   process,	   the	   NAC	   approved	   the	  
mission,	  but	   in	  order	   to	   invalidate	  any	  suspicions	  about	  NATO’s	   involvement,	   the	  NAC	  
set	  out	  several	  principles	  for	  the	  mission	  (Wiharta	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  113).	  
NATO’s	  mission	  would:	  
• Only	  last	  for	  the	  prefixed	  period	  of	  three	  months;	  	  
• Solely	   include	   emergency	   relief	   and	   recovery	   efforts	   and	   not	   involve	   any	  
reconstruction	  activities;	  
• Be	   executed	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   principles	   as	   set	   out	   by	   the	   Pakistani	  
authorities;	  	  
• Not	  serve	  as	  a	  model	  for	  future	  missions	  alike.	  	  
	  
The	  available	  NRF	  Package	  
During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  NATO’s	  structure	  was	  basically	  designed	  to	  dissuade	  or	  to	  defend	  
the	  Allied	  territory	  against	  a	  massive	  full-­‐scale	  invasion.	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  
and	  particularly	  after	   the	  September	  11	  Attacks	  reality	  came	  to	  check	  and	  the	  concept	  
was	   developed,	   making	   forces	   designed	   to	   be	   ready	   and	   responsive	   (first-­‐in	   first-­‐out	  
concept).	   The	   NATO	   Response	   Forces	   are	   primarily	   designed	   to	   fight,	   not	   to	   conduct	  
humanitarian	  assistance	  activities,	  although	  it	  could	  be	  part	  of	  its	  mission.	  Thus,	  the	  NRF	  
force	  package	  that	  NATO	  had	  prepared	  at	  the	  time	  was	  not	  fully	  prepared	  for	  complex	  
humanitarian	  emergencies.	  This	  focus	  on	  combat	  is	  striking	  however,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  
natural	   disasters	   are	   much	   more	   likely	   to	   happen	   than	   for	   example	   high-­‐intensity	  
conflicts.	   As	   the	   assets	   that	   the	   NRF	   had	   available	   were	   not	   quite	   what	   they	   needed,	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additional	   forces	   needed	   to	   be	   generated	   in	   order	   to	   fit	   the	   requirements.	   These	  
additional	   forces	  needed	   to	  be	  prepared	  as	  well,	  which	  was	   a	  demanding	  process.	   Col	  
Lemos	  Pires	   (7	  April,	  2015)	  summarizes	   the	  situation	  as	   follows:	   “We	  had	   to	  generate	  
additional	   forces.	  The	  NRF	  has	   a	  package	  prepared	   for	  war,	   so	   in	   a	   situation	   like	   this,	  
capability	  needs	  to	  be	  added	  on	  top	  of	  the	  package.	  What	  we	  needed	  for	  an	  earthquake	  
like	  this,	  was	  not	  yet	  in	  the	  package,	  so	  additional	  forces	  needed	  to	  be	  generated”.	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  Dutch	  Military	  Emergency	  Hospital	  (MNH)	  “had	  to	  take	  the	  coordination	  
of	   the	   build-­‐up	   and	   the	   assistance	   into	   its	   own	   hands”	   because	   the	   NATO	   Disaster	  
Response	  Team	  (NDRT)	  took	  too	   long	  to	  start	  up	  (NIMH,	  2010,	  p.	  3).	  Because	  of	   these	  
delays,	   the	  MNH	  only	  performed	  basic	  medical	   treatments	   instead	  of	   first	  aid,	  because	  
there	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  need	  for	  direct	  emergency	  aid	  by	  the	  time	  the	  hospital	  had	  been	  
set	   up.	   Also,	   foreign	   colleagues	   had	   to	   be	   introduced	   to	   Dutch	   working	   habits	   and	  
procedures.	  
Moreover,	  it	  occurred	  that	  when	  Pakistani	  authorities	  assigned	  tasks	  to	  NATO	  response	  
forces,	   they	   were	   unable	   to	   carry	   out	   these	   tasks	   adequately,	   even	   though	   it	   did	   fall	  
within	  their	  field	  of	  expertise	  and	  capabilities.	  	  
	  
Absence	  of	  a	  lead	  nation	  
During	   the	   personal	   interview,	   Col	   Lemos	   Pires	   pointed	   out	   that	   having	   a	   lead	   nation	  
during	   the	  operation	  would	  have	  been	  desirable.	  The	   fact	   is	   that	   in	  general,	   the	  NATO	  
deployment	   comprises	   separate	   units	   from	  different	   nations,	   and	   that	   all	   these	   forces	  
show	   their	   national	   flag	   on	   their	   uniforms.	   Likewise,	   some	   sort	   of	   competition	   arises	  
between	  the	  different	  nations,	  as	  each	  nation	  wants	  to	  show	  that	  they	  are	  the	  best	  and	  
tend	  to	  plan	  things	  for	  themselves.	  However,	  in	  a	  humanitarian	  mission	  like	  this,	  it	  can	  
cause	  complications.	  Therefore,	  Col	  Lemos	  Pires	  claimed	  that	  a	  change	  in	  mentality	  was	  
necessary:	   no	   transfer	   of	   authority	   (TOA)	   before	   Joint	   Operation	   Area	   (JOA).	   In	   other	  
words,	   cohesion	   among	   the	   different	   national	   forces	   had	   to	   be	   established	   before	   a	  
transfer	  of	  authority	  could	  take	  place.	  After	  all,	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  mission	  was	  
to	   help	   the	   earthquake	   victims	   and	   assist	   the	   Pakistani	   authorities	   in	   preparing	   for	  
winter.	  So	  the	  NATO	  forces	  had	  to	  completely	  set	  aside	  their	  “national	  pride”	  in	  order	  to	  
establish	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  cohesion	  among	  the	  troops.	  	  	  
	  
Political	  limitations	  (decision-­‐making	  processes)	  
In	  missions	   like	   these,	   time	   is	   the	   enemy	  and	   therefore	   speed	  of	  movement	   is	   crucial.	  
Yet,	  politicians	  take	  time	  to	  make	  decisions,	  but	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  decision	  is	  agreed	  upon	  
they	  want	  action	  fast.	  As	  discussed	  before,	  NATO	  could	  not	  do	  anything	  while	  the	  NAC	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was	  deciding	  on	  whether	   to	  deploy	   forces	  on	  Pakistani	   soil.	   Eventually,	   it	   took	  almost	  
two	  weeks	  before	  the	  NAC	  approved	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  NATO	  response	  forces,	  and	  
three	  weeks	  before	  the	  forces	  arrived	  to	  the	  affected	  area	  (see	  figure	  2).	  Thus,	  the	  period	  
in	   between	   the	   approval	   and	   the	   deployment	   still	   lasted	   one	   week.	   Especially	   in	   a	  
situation	   in	   which	   speed	   of	   movement	   is	   crucial,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   forces	   were	   only	  
deployed	   three	   weeks	   following	   the	   request	   proves	   that	   much	   time	   was	   lost	   in	   the	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	   In	  spite	  of	   this,	   the	  air	  bridge	  was	  established	  really	  quickly,	  
only	  three	  days	  after	  the	  earthquake	  and	  one	  day	  after	  the	  request	  for	  assistance.	  	  
Further,	   the	   exchange	   of	   diplomatic	   letters	   also	   caused	   some	   delays.	   The	   exchange	   of	  
diplomatic	  letters	  is	  a	  mandatory	  custom	  when	  forces	  are	  deployed	  on	  foreign	  soil.	  For	  
instance,	  it	  had	  to	  be	  decided	  whether	  NATO	  forces	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  carry	  arms.	  It	  
was	   eventually	   decided	   that	   it	   would	   not	   be	   allowed,	   which	   in	   turn	   caused	   much	  
opposition	   among	  members,	   some	   even	   claiming	   that	   they	  would	   refuse	   to	   go	   if	   they	  
would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  carry	  arms.	  
Besides	   delaying	   factors	   from	  within,	  NATO	   also	   had	   to	   deal	  with	   political	   limitations	  
from	   the	   outside,	   upon	  which	   they	   had	   no	   influence.	   For	   instance,	   Iran	   did	   not	   allow	  
NATO	  forces	  to	  fly	  over.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  NATO’s	  air	  transport	  had	  to	  fly	  around	  Iran,	  
which	  took	  more	  time,	  required	  more	  planning,	  and	  cost	  more	  fuel.	  
	  
Thin	  line	  between	  relief	  and	  rehabilitation	  work	  
From	  the	  start,	  the	  clear	  objective	  of	  the	  NATO	  mission	  was	  that	  the	  forces	  would	  solely	  
help	  the	  survivors	  of	  the	  earthquake	  and	  to	  help	  preventing	  a	  second	  death	  wave.	  It	  was	  
stressed	   that	  NATO	  would	  not	  participate	   in	  any	   type	  of	  development	  work.	  However,	  
this	  was	  easier	  said	  than	  done.	  Experiences	  have	  shown	  that	  NATO	  soldiers	  were	  easily	  
drawn	  into	  rehabilitation	  or	  development	  work	  not	  related	  to	  the	  earthquake,	  caused	  by	  
for	   example	   the	   poor	   position	   of	   women	   and	   children,	   mainly	   because	   of	   their	  
excitement	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  moment,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  so.	  
The	  line	  between	  relief	  and	  rehabilitation	  work,	  therefore,	  has	  shown	  to	  be	  really	  thin.	  	  
	  
NATO	  standards	  vs.	  local	  standards	  
All	  relief	  efforts	  by	  NATO	  happened	  according	  to	  EU	  standards.	  Up	  to	  today,	  there	  are	  no	  
NATO	   standards	   yet,	   because	   its	   involvement	   in	   humanitarian	   aid	   is	   still	   subject	   to	  
discussion	   within	   the	   Alliance.	   Wiharta	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   found	   that	   the	   “standard	   of	  
rehabilitation	   work	   carried	   out	   by	   NATO	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   higher	   than	   the	   usual	  
minimum	  standards	  for	  humanitarian	  aid”	  (p.	  117).	  This	  became	  particularly	  evident	  in	  
the	   area	   of	   medical	   assistance:	   the	   health	   care	   standards	   during	   the	   response	   were	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better	   than	   before	   the	   earthquake	   even	   happened.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Kashmiris	   became	  
used	   to	   these	   conditions,	   and	   it	   would	   occur	   earthquake	   victims	   with	   minor	   injuries	  
would	  refuse	  to	  go	  to	  medical	  centers	  with	  lower	  standards.	  Moreover,	  Kashmiris	  used	  
the	   NATO	   medical	   centers	   also	   for	   minor	   injuries	   that	   were	   not	   earthquake-­‐related.	  
These	   high	   standards	   of	   medical	   care	  made	   the	   handover	   to	   civilian	   actors	   upon	   the	  
withdrawal	  of	  the	  NATO	  troops	  more	  difficult.	  	  
	  
Supply-­‐driven	  approach	  
Although	  many	   assets	  were	   ones	   that	   the	   Pakistani	   authorities	   specifically	   requested,	  
there	  were	  also	  military	  assets	  sent	  to	  the	  affected	  areas	  that	  did	  not	  quite	  fit	  the	  need.	  
These	   unsolicited	   offers	   made	   the	   coordination	   of	   military	   assets	   somewhat	   more	  
difficult,	  especially	  in	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  operation.	  
	  
Obstructing	  factors	  originating	  from	  within	  Pakistan	  
NATO’s	   deployment	  was	   hampered	   by	   several	   problems	   that	   had	   to	   do	  with	   Pakistan	  
itself,	  such	  as	  its	  political,	  cultural,	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  factors.	  	  	  
	  
Disputed	  area	  
On	  top	  of	  the	  disaster,	  the	  affected	  area	  was	  a	  very	  complicated	  one.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
earthquake	   President	   Musharraf,	   who	   was	   both	   President	   and	   Chief	   of	   Army,	   ruled	  
Pakistan.	   Although	   the	   country	   did	   have	   some	   democratic	   aspects,	   it	   was	   still	   largely	  
subject	   to	   an	   authoritarian	   regime.	  The	  mission	  was	   a	   sensitive	   issue,	  mainly	   because	  
Pakistan	  was	  also	  an	  US-­‐ally	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Afghanistan.	  The	  Kashmir	  region	  in	  specific	  is	  
a	   troubled	  one,	   characterized	  by	   three	   territorial	  wars	  with	   India,	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  
Taliban	  and	  other	  militant	  groups,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	  both	   India	  and	  Pakistan	  had	   their	  
nuclear	  weapons	  stored	  in	  the	  region.	  That	  is,	  the	  NATO	  forces	  were	  deployed	  in	  a	  very	  
complex	  situation	  and	  a	  very	  sensitive	  area,	  and	  this	  had	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  throughout	  
the	  whole	  operation.	  	  
	  
Opposition	  to	  NATO	  forces	  
At	   the	   start	   of	   the	   mission,	   the	   level	   of	   acceptance	   toward	   NATO’s	   involvement	   was	  
extremely	  low	  among	  the	  Kashmiri	  population,	  politicians,	  officials,	  and	  policymakers	  in	  
Pakistan	   (Col	   Lemos	   Pires,	   April	   7,	   2015).	   Generally	   there	   was	   a	   very	   negative	  
perception	   towards	   foreign	   military	   forces.	   For	   instance,	   Pakistani’s	   did	   not	   make	   a	  
difference	   between	   Dutch	   or	   Portuguese	   forces.	   To	   them,	   the	   NATO	   forces	   were	   all	  
Americans.	   The	   role	   of	   the	   Pakistani	   was	   considerable	   in	   influencing	   the	   opinion	   on	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western	   soldiers	   among	   the	   population.	   “They	   were	   told	   that	   we	   were	   cannibals,	  
pedophiles,	  would	   sell	   their	   children,	   and	   so	  on”	   (Col	   Lemos	  Pires,	  April	   7,	   2015).	   Col	  
Lemos	   Pires	   shared	   one	   of	   his	   experiences	   that	   perfectly	   illustrates	   the	   Pakistani’s	  
negative	  attitude	  toward	  foreign	  military	   forces,	  resulting	   from	  the	  bad	  publicity:	  “The	  
first	  time	  we	  went	  on	  the	  road	  in	  Pakistan,	  all	  children	  were	  running	  away,	  because	  they	  
were	  afraid	  of	  us”.	  Hence,	  NATO	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  against	  them	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
operation,	  which	  undoubtedly	  hampered	  their	  relief	  efforts.	  It	  also	  meant	  that	  NATO	  had	  
to	  proof	  itself	  in	  order	  to	  win	  their	  trust.	  	  
	  
Cultural	  boundaries	  
Throughout	   the	   deployment,	   NATO	   forces	   encountered	   several	   cultural	   barriers	   that	  
delayed	   the	   disaster	   response.	   This	   section	   will	   illustrate	   three	   situations	   in	   which	  
NATO’s	  activities	  were	  hampered	  because	  of	  cultural	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  took	  significantly	  
longer	  than	  usual	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  collapsed	  girl’s	  schools	  and	  clear	  the	  area.	  “Usually	  
it	   takes	   4	   days	   to	   clear	   the	   area,	   this	   time	   it	   took	   24	   days”	   (Col	   Lemos	   Pires,	   7	   April,	  
2015).	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   was	   as	   follows:	   each	   time	   the	   aid	   workers	   would	   find	   a	  
corpse,	  they	  could	  not	  touch	  it	  until	  someone	  would	  arrive	  that	  was	  capable	  of	  carrying	  
out	  a	  ghusl,	  that	  is	  a	  Muslim	  ceremony	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  performed	  before	  the	  body	  can	  
be	  buried.	  	  
Moreover,	  transporting	  and	  constructing	  the	  NMH	  took	  longer	  than	  expected	  because	  of	  
the	   Eid	   holidays,	   which	   is	   a	   Muslim	   celebration	   linked	   to	   the	   Ramadan	   and	   lasts	   for	  
three	  days.	  Because	  of	   this	   three-­‐day-­‐holiday	   “there	  were	  considerable	  delays	  and	   the	  
ground	  at	  the	  camp	  in	  Bagh	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  leveled”	  (NIMH,	  2010,	  p.	  3).	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  
also	   took	   them	   some	   time	   to	   establish	   good	   connections	   with	   the	   Pakistani	   military	  
forces.	  	  
What	   is	  more,	  Pakistan’s	  high	   level	  of	  gender	   inequality	   led	   to	  some	  problems	  as	  well.	  
Female	  workers	  often	  perceived	  difficulties	  in	  providing	  relief	  efforts	  due	  to	  Pakistan’s	  
poor	   position	   of	   women.	   The	   NMH	   moreover	   experienced	   is	   that	   Pakistani	   females	  
would	   often	   refuse	   to	   seek	   medical	   help	   when	   there	   would	   be	   no	   female	   doctors.	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  hospital	  did	  not	  have	  any	  female	  doctors	  at	  its	  disposal.	  This	  is	  where	  
Portugal	   stepped	   in	  and	  sent	   female	  doctors	   to	   the	  campsite.	  Of	   course,	   this	   is	  again	  a	  
process	  that	  took	  time.	  	  
	  
Absence	  of	  central	  authority	  for	  managing	  disasters	  
Pakistan	   did	   not	   have	   a	   central	   authority	   to	   manage	   disasters.	   “The	   only	   national	  
disaster	  contingency	  plans	  were	  related	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  emergency	  relief	  cell	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(ERC),	  a	  warehouse	  facility	  that	  stockpiled	  emergency	  supplies”	  (Wiharta,	  2008,	  p.	  108).	  
Besides,	   the	   few	   arrangements	   that	   were	   in	   place	   for	   natural	   disasters	   were	   solely	  
focused	  on	  floods,	  not	  earthquakes.	  There	  was	  also	  an	  entity	  for	  security	  crises,	  but	  was	  
also	  insignificant	  for	  the	  disaster	  response.	  
	  
Unjust	  initial	  assessment	  
The	  Pakistani	  authorities	  took	  really	  long	  to	  rightly	  assess	  the	  graveness	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  
The	   initial	   assessments	   did	   not	   reflect	   the	   reality:	   they	  made	   the	   situation	   seem	   less	  
severe	  than	  it	  was	  in	  reality.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  some	  of	  the	  relief	  supplies	  that	  were	  sent	  
in	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   the	   disaster	   response	   were	   inappropriate	   (Centre	   of	   Excellence,	  
“Pakistan	   Earthquake:	   A	   Review	   of	   the	   Civil-­‐Military	   Dimensions	   of	   the	   International	  
Response”2006,	   p.	   6).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   an	   inadequate	   information	   sharing	   arose	  
between	   relief	   organizations,	   NATO	   forces	   and	   the	   Pakistani	  military,	   as	   the	   situation	  
reports	   of	   the	   Pakistani	   military	   were	   the	   main	   source	   of	   information	   for	   both	   the	  
humanitarian	  organizations	  and	  the	  foreign	  military	  forces.	  	  
	  
Obstructing	  factors	  caused	  by	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  
Given	   the	   strong	   coordinating	   role	   of	   the	   Pakistani	   army,	   the	   extensive	   presence	   of	  
foreign	  military	  forces,	  and	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  humanitarian	  organizations,	  the	  overall	  
disaster	   response	   had	   a	   strong	   civil-­‐military	   dimension.	   The	   involvement	   of	   all	   these	  
different	   actors	   and	   the	   complex	   nature	   of	   the	   disaster,	   of	   course,	   gave	   rise	   to	  
difficulties.	  	  
	  
Reluctance	  among	  humanitarian	  actors	  
It	   seems	   that	   humanitarian	   actors	  were	   often	   reluctant	   to	  work	   closely	   together	  with	  
foreign	  military	  forces,	  afraid	  it	  would	  influence	  how	  other	  humanitarian	  workers	  would	  
perceive	   them	   (loss	   of	   image),	   and	   therefore	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   hampering	   their	  
future	  humanitarian	  activities	  in	  other	  countries.	  Striking	  is,	  that	  the	  hesitancy	  to	  civil-­‐
military	   coordination	   mainly	   came	   from	   humanitarian	   actors	   and	   not	   so	   much	   from	  
military	   actors.	   In	   genera,l	   the	   military	   forces	   seemed	   willing	   to	   cooperate	   with	  
humanitarian	   actors,	   while	   humanitarian	   workers	   were	   more	   reluctant	   to	   work	   with	  
military	  forces.	  This	  is	  logical,	  however,	  as	  NATO	  is	  a	  rather	  new	  actor	  in	  this	  area,	  and	  
humanitarian	   actors	  might	   feel	   that	   they	   are	   intruding	   in	   “their”	   field.	   Humanitarians	  
also	   often	   believe	   that	   military	   involvement	   damages	   the	   humanitarian	   principles.	  
(Metcalfe	  et	  al.,	  2012,	  pp.	  5-­‐6).	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In	   addition,	   humanitarian	   and	   military	   actors	   did	   not	   fully	   understand	   each	   other’s	  
limitations	   and	   capabilities,	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   civil-­‐military	   education	   or	   training,	  
experience,	   and/or	   biases	   from	   previous	   experiences	   (Center	   of	   Excellence,	   2006,	  
“Pakistan	   earthquake:	   a	   review	   of	   the	   civil-­‐military	   dimensions	   of	   the	   international	  
response”	  p.	  3-­‐4).	  Consequently,	  it	  took	  too	  much	  time	  before	  a	  smooth	  communication	  
was	   established	   between	   the	   civilian	   and	   military	   actors	   that	   were	   present	   in	   the	  
affected	  area.	   	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  NATO	  forces	  had	  just	  arrived,	   it	  was	  not	  clear	  to	  
many	  humanitarian	  organizations	  what	  the	  capabilities	  of	  NATO	  were,	  and	  it	  what	  their	  
exact	  involvement	  was	  going	  to	  be.	  	  
Last,	  besides	  the	  hesitant	  attitude	  among	  humanitarian	  actors	  to	  closely	  cooperate	  with	  
the	  foreign	  military	  forces,	  Metcalfe	  et	  al.	  	  (2002)	  found	  that	  humanitarians	  were	  not	  too	  
eager	  to	  coordinate	  with	  the	  Pakistani	  military	  either,	  although	  after	  a	  period	  of	  time	  it	  
was	  acknowledged	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  an	  effective	  response	  (p.	  17).	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  Pakistani	  army	  perhaps	  granted	  the	  foreign	  military	  forces	  more	  freedom	  than	  it	  did	  
to	  humanitarian	  organizations	  given	  its	  authoritarian	  structure.	  	  
	  
Lack	  of	  common	  guidelines	  and	  structures	  
Although	   the	   Oslo	   Guidelines	   are	   supposed	   to	   serve	   as	   the	   major	   framework	   during	  
civil-­‐military	   coordination	   in	   complex	   emergencies,	   the	   Center	   of	   Excellence	   (2006)	  
reports	  that	  both	  civil	  and	  military	  actors	  were	  not	  very	  much	  aware	  of	  the	  content	  of	  
the	  Oslo	  Guidelines	  (“Pakistan	  Earthquake:	  A	  Review	  of	  the	  Civil-­‐Military	  Dimensions	  of	  
the	  International	  Response”,	  p.	  4),	  which	  basically	  invalidates	  the	  whole	  purpose	  of	  the	  
Guidelines.	  	  
The	  report	  also	  finds	  that	  there	  was	  no	  standardized	  data	  collection	  and	  reporting,	  such	  
as	  incompatible	  communication	  systems	  between	  different	  actors.	  To	  illustrate,	  whereas	  
most	  actors	  used	  email	  as	  a	  means	  of	  communication,	  Pakistan	  was	  heavily	  dependent	  
on	   communication	   by	   fax	   (p.	   7).	   Also,	   it	   was	   hard	   to	   establish	   a	   clear,	   joint	  
understanding	  of	  the	  needs,	  as	  groups	  and	  organizations	  were	  conducting	  assessments	  
independently	   from	   each	   other.	   Moreover,	   there	   was	   a	   lack	   of	   coordinated	  
communication	   between	   emergency	   services,	   worsened	   by	   insufficient	   resources.	  
Therefore,	   it	   was	   hard	   to	   form	   a	   clear	   overview	   of	   what	  medical	   supplies	   were	   both	  
required	  and	  available	  because	  there	  was	  no	  central	  dispatch.	  
Last,	   it	   took	   time	   for	   military	   actors	   and	   humanitarian	   actors	   to	   establish	   a	   good	  
coordination.	  For	  instance,	  the	  NMH	  lost	  some	  time	  at	  the	  start	  of	  their	  deployment	  as	  




Insignificant	  role	  of	  OCHA-­‐CMCS	  
Surprisingly,	  “the	  OCHA	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  section	  (CMCS)	  was	  not	  a	  key	  player	  
in	   the	   channeling	   of	   assets”	   (Wiharta	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   112).	   Its	   activities	   had	   little	  
influence	   on	   the	   overall	   disaster	   response,	   as	   they	   just	   conducted	   some	   information	  
gathering	   and	   deployed	   a	   small	   number	   of	   personnel	   on	   the	   ground.	   Therefore,	   the	  
overall	  significance	  of	   the	  group	  was	  very	   limited,	  although	  they	  claim	  to	  be	  “the	   focal	  
point	   in	   the	   UN	   system	   for	   humanitarian	   civil-­‐military	   coordination”	   (OCHA,	   n.d.,	  
“Humanitarian	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  (UN-­‐CMCoord)”,	  para.	  3).	  
	  
B)	  What	  went	  well?	  
Although	   the	   operation	   did	   not	   run	   perfectly,	   the	   overall	   disaster	   response	   achieved	  
considerable	   successes,	   and	   the	   operation	   surely	   would	   not	   have	   been	   as	   successful	  
without	  NATO’s	  involvement.	  	  
	  
NATO’s	  added	  value	  
Without	  a	  doubt,	  NATO’s	  contributions	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  crucial	  to	  the	  overall	  success	  
of	   the	   disaster	   response	   and	   probably	   the	   outcome	   would	   have	   been	   a	   lot	   different	  
without	  its	  involvement.	  NATO’s	  added	  value	  is	  dependent	  on	  several	  factors.	  	  
	  
Perfect	  timing	  
Although	  this	  is	  a	  factor	  that	  goes	  beyond	  NATO’s	  power,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that	  
the	  mission	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	   if	   it	   had	  occurred	   recently.	  The	  earthquake	  
happened	   in	  2005.	  That	   is,	  before	  the	  unrest	  started	   in	  2006.	  At	   that	   time,	   the	  Taliban	  
accepted	   the	   presence	   of	   NATO,	   as	   there	   was	   a	   common	   understanding	   between	   the	  
Taliban	  and	  Pakistan	   that	   the	  Western	  people	   should	  be	  protected.	  Now,	  NATO	   forces	  
would	  probably	  not	  be	  deployed	  because	  it	  would	  be	  too	  dangerous.	  	  	  
	  
Diplomatic	  interest	  
Most	   likely	   NATO’s	   involvement	   was	   also	   of	   diplomatic	   interest.	   Participating	   in	   this	  
specific	   relief	  operation	  was	  a	  good	  opportunity	   for	   the	  Alliance	   to	  promote	   itself	   in	  a	  
positive	   way	   given	   its	   security	   interest	   in	   the	   region,	   but	   most	   of	   all	   to	   reassure	   its	  
prominent	   role	   in	   crisis	  management.	   Although	   others	   use	   it	   as	   a	   criticism,	   here	   it	   is	  






NATO	  has	  an	  excellent	  structure	  for	  these	  types	  of	  operations,	  as	   it	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  
coordinate,	   liaise,	  and	  facilitate	  the	  availability	  of	  assets.	  NATO	  works	  24/7,	  all	  days	  of	  
the	   year,	   and	   it	   can	   deploy	   its	   assets	   at	   a	   short	   notice.	   It	   further	   has	   the	   ability	   to	  
concentrate	  power.	  Besides,	  an	   important	   factor	   is	   that	  NATO	  has	  the	  ability	   to	  secure	  
themselves,	  whereas	  humanitarian	  workers	  can	  encounter	  risky	  situations,	  as	  they	  often	  
do	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  ensure	  their	  own	  security.	  Another	  important	  component	  of	  
NATO’s	  structure	   is	   the	  reach	  back	  concept,	  meaning	  that	  the	  deployed	  assets	  can	  rely	  
on	  teams	  working	  from	  the	  bases	  in	  the	  original	  countries,	  such	  as	  ACO	  Belgium	  and	  JCL	  
Lisbon.	  For	  instance,	  intelligence	  staff	  from	  the	  headquarters	  supported	  NATO	  in	  order	  
to	  guarantee	  the	  security	  of	  the	  NATO	  response	  forces.	  All	  the	  preparation	  work	  is	  also	  
done	  back	  in	  the	  original	  countries.	  	  
	  
Unique	  capabilities	  
NATO’s	  involvement	  simply	  resulted	  from	  necessity.	  The	  Pakistani	  authorities,	  IOs,	  and	  
NGOs	   were	   overwhelmed	   by	   the	   destruction	   caused	   by	   the	   disaster.	   Pakistan	   was	   in	  
desperate	   need	   of	   international	   relief	   support,	   and	   thus	   requested	   NATO	   for	   disaster	  
assistance.	   Importantly,	   Pakistan	   was	   solely	   concerned	   with	   receiving	   the	   assistance	  
they	  needed;	  it	  was	  unimportant	  to	  them	  whether	  the	  relief	  support	  came	  from	  NATO	  or	  
civilian	   actors.	   However,	   military	   forces	   can	   be	   of	   great	   value	   during	   disaster	   relief	  
efforts	  because	  of	  their	  unique	  capabilities.	  Moreover,	  the	  question	  of	  deploying	  military	  
assets	  is	  one	  that	  is	  carefully	  considered:	  they	  are	  only	  deployed	  when	  there	  is	  no	  other	  
option	   left	   (last	   resort).	   Important	   to	   mention	   is,	   however,	   that	   sometimes	   NATO	   is	  
really	  the	  only	  option	  for	  affected	  states,	  because	  other	  entities	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  assets	  
that	  are	  needed.	  
	  
Change	  of	  opinion	  
A	  very	  important	  achievement	  for	  NATO	  was,	  that,	  considering	  the	  strong	  opposition	  at	  
the	  start	  of	  the	  operation,	  it	  managed	  to	  establish	  a	  positive	  image	  in	  the	  course	  of	  time.	  
According	  to	  Col	  Lemos	  Pires	  (7	  April,	  2015),	  when	  the	  end	  of	  the	  operation	  was	  near,	  
many	  asked	   the	  NATO	   forces	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   area,	   such	   as	  Pakistani	  politicians	   and	   the	  
Kashmiris.	   This	   perfectly	   demonstrates	   the	   importance	   of	   NATO’s	   involvement.	   The	  
change	  of	  opinion	  has	  been	  a	  very	  valuable	  development,	  both	  for	  NATO	  and	  Pakistan,	  





Throughout	  the	  operation,	  NATO	  showed	  its	  great	  ability	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  different	  
actors	   involved	  and	  spread	  a	  sense	  of	  cohesion.	  To	   illustrate,	  during	  the	   interview,	  Col	  
Lemos	  Pires	  clarified	  that	  when	  he	  spoke	  about	  “we”	  he	  did	  not	  refer	  just	  to	  NATO,	  but	  
to	  all	  the	  entities	  that	  were	  there	  to	  help	  (7	  April,	  2015).	  Although	  NATO’s	  role	  was	  vital,	  
it	  was	  not	  a	   leading	  one:	   it	  provided	  the	  military	  assets	  that	  were	  needed,	  coordinated	  
the	   relief	   supplies,	   maintained	   the	   communication	   with	   the	   different	   actors	   involved,	  
and	  most	  importantly	  helped	  out	  wherever	  they	  were	  needed.	  The	  cooperation	  between	  
the	   NATO	   military	   forces	   and	   the	   Pakistani	   army	   went	   particularly	   well,	   which	   was	  
crucial	  because	  in	  situations	  like	  these,	  unlike	  normal	  military	  situations,	  the	  interaction	  
with	   the	   local	  authorities	   is	  vital.	  Accordingly,	  Col	  Lemos	  Pires	  repeatedly	  emphasized	  
that	  the	  Pakistanis	  were	  of	  great	  help	  throughout	  the	  operation	  (7	  April,	  2015).	  	  
	  
The	  numbers	  
Above	   all,	   NATO’s	   added	   value	   becomes	   clear	   when	   looking	   at	   the	   numbers	   of	   the	  
operation:	  
• 3.100	  tons	  of	  aid	  delivered	  in	  total	  through	  the	  air	  bridges	  and	  helicopters:	  
-­‐ Air	  bridges:	  
• 160	  flights	  in	  total	  
• 18.000	  tents	  
• 500.000	  matrasses	  and	  sleeping	  bags	  
• 17.000	  stoves	  
• Medical	  supplies	  and	  food	  
-­‐ Helicopters	  
• 792	  flights	  in	  total	  
• Replenished	  with	  1736	  m³	  
• Transportation	  of	  6321	  displaced,	  sick,	  and	  injured	  people	  
• 59	  kilometers	  of	  roads	  have	  been	  repaired	  
• 4	  kilometers	  of	  roads	  have	  been	  cleared	  from	  snow,	  ice,	  and	  rubble	  
• 41.500m³	  rubble	  has	  been	  removed	  
• 30.000	  litres	  of	  fresh	  water	  supplies	  per	  day	  
• 220	  trucks	  full	  of	  rubble	  from	  the	  collapsed	  girls	  schools	  	  
• 113	  schools	  and	  medical	  centres	  have	  been	  built	  




In	  total,	  an	  estimated	  40.000	  Pakistanis	  directly	  benefited	  from	  NATO	  aid	  and	  100.000	  
indirectly.	  	  
	  
Pakistan’s	  added	  value	  
NATO’s	  important	  role	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  
authorities.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   was	   no	   national	   structure	   for	   natural	   disaster	  
management	  in	  place	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  earthquake,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  army	  was	  
very	  effective.	  The	  authorities	  showed	  strong	  leadership	  and	  flexibility.	  
First,	   the	   Pakistani	   authorities	   launched	   Operation	   Lifeline	   right	   after	   the	   earthquake	  
struck,	  which	  allowed	  the	  deployment	  of	  60.000	  military	  forces	  in	  total.	  	  These	  military	  
forces	  conducted	  significant	  relief	  efforts	  in	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	  the	  disaster	  response.	  
Second,	  the	  Federal	  Relief	  Commission	  (FRC)	  was	  created	  on	  10	  October	  in	  order	  to	  fill	  
the	   vacuum	   that	   had	   arisen	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   existing	   disaster	   management	  
structure.	  The	  FRC	  was	   led	  by	   the	  Pakistani	  army	  and	  was	  designed	   to	   streamline	   the	  
overall	   disaster	   response.	   An	   important	   component	   of	   the	   FRC	   was	   the	   Strategic	  
Oversight	   Group	   (SOG),	   which	   “purpose	   it	   was	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   various	   groups	  
represented	  (the	  FRC,	  foreign	  militaries,	  the	  UN	  and	  key	  donors)	  understood	  priorities	  
and	  acted	  in	  a	  coordinated	  manner	  (Wiharta	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  111).	  Moreover,	   it	  was	  the	  
FRC	  who	  was	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  UN	  cluster	  approach.	  In	  general,	  The	  
FRC	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  very	  effective	  link	  throughout	  the	  disaster	  response.	  	  
Third,	   Pakistan	   demonstrated	   its	   willingness	   to	   change	   after	   the	   earthquake.	  
Accordingly,	   in	  order	   to	   improve	  responses	   for	  any	   future	  disasters	   two	  structures	   for	  
disaster	  management	  were	   created:	   the	  National	   Disaster	  Management	   Authority	   and	  
the	  Earthquake	  Reconstruction	  and	  Rehabilitation	  Authority.	  	  
	  
Good	  experiences	  from	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  
From	  a	  NATO	  perspective	  the	  overall	  civil-­‐military	  coordination	  went	  well,	  although	  not	  
perfect,	  mainly	  in	  the	  area	  of	  logistics	  and	  engineering.	  NATO	  showed	  great	  willingness	  
to	  cooperate	  with	  civilian	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  best	  possible	  results.	  	  
	  
§5.5	  Conclusion	  
In	  order	   to	   analyze	  overall	   success	  of	   the	  NATO	  disaster	  operation,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	  
evaluate	  whether	  the	  operation	  was	  conducted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  set	  out	  




• The	  mission	  would	  only	  last	  for	  the	  prefixed	  period	  of	  three	  months:	  yes	  
The	   first	   NATO	   forces	   arrived	   on	   Pakistani	   soil	   on	   24	   October	   2005	   (DJTF)	   and	   the	  
mission	   was	   officially	   concluded	   on	   1	   February	   2006.	   This	   means	   that	   in	   total,	   the	  
mission	  lasted	  for	  100	  days,	  which	  is	  3	  months	  and	  8	  days.	  This	  means	  that,	  although	  the	  
mission	   slightly	   exceeded	   the	   timeframe,	   the	   mission	   was	   in	   accordance	   with	   this	  
principle.	  	  
	  
• The	   mission	   would	   solely	   include	   emergency	   relief	   and	   recovery	   efforts	   and	   forces	  
would	  not	  involve	  any	  reconstruction	  activities:	  no	  
This	  is	  a	  tricky	  matter.	  The	  line	  between	  relief	  work	  and	  development	  work	  has	  proven	  
to	   be	   very	   thin	   and	   easily	   to	   cross.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   some	   NATO	   soldiers	   did	   find	  
themselves	  getting	  involved	  in	  activities	  that	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  mission.	  Nonetheless,	  
it	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  affected	  the	  operation	  in	  a	  negative	  way	  in	  any	  sense.	  	  	  
	  
• The	   mission	   would	   be	   executed	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   principles	   as	   set	   out	   by	   the	  
Pakistani	  authorities:	  yes	  
The	  effective	  coordination	  between	  the	  Pakistani	  army	  and	  NATO	  forces	  proved	  to	  have	  
been	  a	  smoothening	  factor	  in	  the	  overall	  response.	  The	  Pakistani	  army	  was	  very	  willing	  
to	  cooperate	  and	  adapt	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  most	  effective	  response.	  	  
	  
• The	  mission	  would	  not	  serve	  as	  a	  model	  for	  future	  missions	  alike:	  partially	  
The	   mission	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   a	   very	   successful	   humanitarian	   operation	   for	   NATO,	  
especially	  given	  the	  circumstances	  (disputed	  area,	  strong	  civil-­‐military	  component,	  first	  
major	  deployment	  NRF).	  Although	  the	  principle	  states	  that	  the	  mission	  would	  not	  serve	  
as	   a	   model	   for	   future	   missions	   alike,	   it	   should.	   As	   the	   Center	   of	   Excellence	   (2010)	  
comments:	   “The	   Pakistan	   earthquake	   serves	   as	   an	   example	   of	   how,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	  
disaster,	  despair,	  and	  overwhelming	  need	  over	  a	   large	  area,	  communities,	  nations,	  and	  
organizations	   can	   come	   together	   for	   the	   common	   good”	   (“Pakistan	   Earthquake:	   A	  
Review	  of	  the	  Civil-­‐Military	  Dimensions	  of	  the	  International	  Response”,	  p.	  12).	  	  
	  
To	  conclude,	  NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  earthquake	  response	  was	  an	  interesting	  one,	  as	  
besides	  serving	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  relief	  donations	  from	  EAPC	  members	  
through	   the	   EADRCC,	   NATO	   also	   deployed	   military	   forces	   on	   the	   ground.	   The	  
deployment	  of	  the	  NATO	  Response	  Force	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  mission	  a	  controversial	  one,	  
as	  NATO	  soldiers	  became	  directly	  involved	  in	  humanitarian	  assistance;	  a	  field	  in	  which	  
not	  everyone	  agrees	  that	  NATO	  should	  be	  in	  involved	  in.	  
	  	  
71	  
However,	  NATO	  proved	  during	  the	  disaster	  response	  that	  it	  can	  be	  of	  great	  help	  during	  
these	   types	   of	   missions.	   Even	   though	   NATO	   was	   faced	   with	   many	   external	   but	   also	  
internal	  challenges,	  NATO	  managed	  to	  stand	  firm	  and	  achieve	  impressive	  results.	  In	  the	  
end,	  NATO	  realized	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  mission,	  which	  was	  to	  help	  the	  survivors	  of	  the	  































The	   dissertation	   sought	   to	   research	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   NATO	   disaster	   relief	  
operations.	   Although	   definitely	   not	   perfect	   and	   still	   prone	   to	   many	   developments,	  
NATO’s	  involvement	  in	  disaster	  assistance	  is	  certainly	  appropriate.	  NATO	  disaster	  relief	  
operations	   can	   be	   justified	   on	   two	   grounds.	   First,	   they	   are	   fully	   in	   accordance	   with	  
NATO’s	   fundamental	   principles	   and	   purpose.	   Second,	   it	   is	   evident	   that	   NATO’s	  
capabilities	  can	  be	  of	  great	  added	  value	  and	  therefore	  can	  make	  significant	  contributions	  
to	  the	  overall	  disaster	  response.	  
	  
An	  analysis	  of	  the	  1949	  founding	  Treaty	  and	  the	  strategic	  concepts	  that	  emanated	  from	  
it,	   reaffirms	   that	   disaster	   relief	   operations	   are	   fully	   in	   consonance	  with	   the	   Alliance’s	  
fundamental	   principles,	   that	   is,	   to	   promote	   stability,	   preserve	   security,	   and	   safeguard	  
the	  existence	  of	  the	  peoples	  in	  the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  area,	  while	  respecting	  the	  UN	  Charter’s	  
principles.	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  gradual	  development	  of	  NATO’s	  humanitarian	  role,	  and	  the	  
fact	  that	  NATO	  has	  always	  been	  committed	  to	  civil	  protection,	  support	  this	  statement.	  	  	  
In	  accordance	  with	  the	  liberal	  institutional	  point	  of	  view,	  NATO	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  dynamic	  
and	   reactive	   organization,	   continuously	   evolving	   apace	   with	   the	   changing	   security	  
environment,	  while	  staying	  faithful	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  1949	  founding	  Treaty.	  	  
The	   Alliance	   succeeded	   to	   maintain	   its	   important	   position	   by	   adopting	   a	   broad	   and	  
comprehensive	  approach,	  tailored	  to	  the	  contemporary	  security	  environment.	  The	  focus	  
would	  be	  more	  on	   complex	  multidimensional	   risks,	  where	   crisis	  management	  and	   the	  
promotion	   of	   international	   security	   through	   cooperation	   and	   dialogue	   became	   vital	  
functions	   of	   the	   Alliance.	   Natural	   disasters	   were	   identified	   as	   increasing	   threats	   to	  
common	   peace	   and	   stability,	   causing	   NATO	   to	   become	   a	   more	   active	   and	   prominent	  
actor	   in	   disaster	   assistance,	   in	   line	   with	   changes	   in	   the	   notion	   of	   civil	   protection.	  
Disaster	  assistance	  therefore	  fits	  perfectly	  in	  NATO’s	  evolved	  role,	  as	  it	  aims	  to	  protect	  
civilian	  populations	  from	  the	  consequences	  of	  disasters,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  greatly	  
emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  cooperation.	  
	  
NATO’s	   involvement	   in	   disaster	   assistance	   is	   further	   appropriate	   because	   its	   added	  
value	  is	  to	  disaster	  relief	  is	  evident	  through	  its	  positive	  contributions.	  	  
First,	   the	   Alliance	   is	   an	   experienced	   actor	   in	   the	   field	   of	   disaster	   assistance,	   already	  
having	   dealt	  with	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   disasters	   given	   its	   extensive	   track	   of	   disaster	   relief	  




Second,	  NATO	  only	  gets	   involved	  out	  of	  necessity	  when	  the	  affected	  state	  and	  the	   first	  
aid	  organizations	  are	  overwhelmed.	  It	  is	  always	  the	  host	  nation	  that	  holds	  the	  primary	  
authority	   during	   disaster	   relief	   operations,	   therefore	   NATO	   does	   not	   have	   a	  
commanding	   role	   in	   any	   way:	   it	   only	   helps	   out	   where	   needed,	   wherefore	   its	   role	   is	  
exclusively	  complementary.	  	  
Third,	   NATO’s	   civilian	   structure,	   but	   most	   of	   all	   its	   military	   transformation	   to	   rapid,	  
flexible,	   and	   multinational	   forces	   in	   particular	   are	   important	   factors	   for	   NATO’s	  
usefulness,	  with	   the	   NATO	  Response	   Force	   and	   the	   CJTF	   concept	   as	   crucial	   elements.	  
Besides	  being	  in	  accordance	  with	  humanitarian	  principles,	  NATO’s	  military	  involvement	  
is	   effective	   and	   adequate	   because	   its	   military	   assets	   are	   unique,	   rapidly	   deployable,	  
suitable	   for	   extreme	   conditions,	   self-­‐sufficient,	   and	   enjoy	   protection,	   therefore	  
significantly	  contributing	  to	  the	  overall	  response.	  In	  addition,	  NATO’s	  involvement	  kills	  
two	  birds	  with	  one	  stone,	  as	  not	  only	  the	  affected	  state	  benefits,	  but	  also	  NATO	  itself.	  
Fourth,	  besides	  conducting	  actual	  disaster	  relief	  operations,	  NATO	  has	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  
elements	   for	  disaster	  assistance	  at	   its	  disposal,	  by	  also	  being	  committed	   to	   the	  phases	  
prior	   to	   and	   following	   the	   disasters	   through	   information	   sharing	   and	   training	   and	  
exercises.	  Therefore,	  the	  disaster	  capabilities	  of	  both	  NATO	  and	  the	  host	  nation	  improve	  
through	   cooperation	   and	   dialogue.	   Moreover,	   its	   involvement	   does	   not	   only	   increase	  
cooperation	   between	   NATO	   members	   and	   partners,	   but	   also	   fosters	   the	   relations	  
between	  NATO	  and	  international	  organizations	  and	  host	  nations.	  	  	  
	  
All	   NATO’s	   meaningful	   contributions,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   became	   clear	   during	   the	  
Pakistan	  earthquake	  response.	  The	  case	  study	  therefore	  reaffirmed	  that	  NATO	  functions	  
as	   a	   crucial	   actor,	   essentially	   making	   diverse	   and	   meaningful	   contributions	   to	   the	  
objective	   of	   disaster	   assistance,	   which	   is	   to	   safe	   lives	   and	   alleviate	   human	   suffering,	  
while	   conducting	   its	   activities	   in	   line	   with	   the	   requests	   from	   the	   host	   nation.	   It	   is	  
therefore	  hard	  to	  argue	  why	  NATO	  should	  not	  be	  involved	  in	  disaster	  relief	  operations.	  
After	   all,	   its	   added	   value	   is	   evident	   through	   its	   highly	   integrated	   structure,	   unique	  
capabilities	   that	   it	   can	   offer	   in	   times	   of	   crises,	   and	   its	   ability	   to	   establish	   good	  
cooperation	  with	  all	  involved	  actors.	  	  
	  
This	   of	   course	   does	   not	   change	   the	   fact	   that	  NATO	  has	   to	   keep	   evolving	   and	   learning	  
from	  its	  previous	  experiences	  because	  each	  situation	  is	  unique	  and	  there	  will	  always	  be	  
areas	   for	   improvement.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   only	   apply	   to	   just	   NATO,	   but	   to	   all	  
involved	   actors,	   among	  which	   humanitarian	   actors	   and	   the	   host	   nations.	   After	   all,	   the	  
success	  of	  a	  disaster	  relief	  operation	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  joint	  effort	  of	  all	  involved	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actors,	   whether	   they	   are	   civilian	   or	   military.	   In	   the	   end,	   all	   that	   matters	   is	   that	   the	  
affected	  state	  receives	  the	  assistance	  it	  so	  urgently	  needs,	   irrespectively	  of	  from	  which	  
type	   of	   actor	   the	   assistance	   comes	   from.	   So	   where	   NATO	   has	   the	   capability	   and	  
opportunity	   to	  make	  a	  positive	   contribution	   to	  a	  disaster	   response,	  which	   it	  definitely	  
has,	  it	  should.	  	  
	  
Recommendations	  
Following	  this	  dissertation,	  some	  points	  of	  recommendations	  could	  be	  presented.	  
• Foster	  cooperation	  and	  dialogue	  between	  civilian	  and	  military	  actors	  
Noticeable	  gains	  could	  be	  made	  in	  the	  area	  of	  civil-­‐military	  coordination.	  However,	  this	  
is	  not	   just	  NATO’s	   responsibility,	  but	   it	  must	  be	  a	   two-­‐way	  process.	  Common	  grounds	  
should	   be	   established	   between	   both	   actors,	   which	   could	   be	   realized	   through	   training	  
and	  education.	  Accordingly,	  biases	  toward	  the	  other	  group	  can	  be	  diminished	  and	  both	  
actors	   will	   have	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   each	   other’s	   working	   methods	   and	  
procedures.	  An	  important	  factor	  herein	  could	  be	  to	  establish	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
the	  existing	  policies,	  frameworks,	  and	  guidelines	  on	  disaster	  assistance,	  such	  as	  the	  Oslo	  
Guidelines	   and	   the	   UN	   Cluster	   Approach.	   Moreover,	   militaries	   should	   involve	   civilian	  
actors	  in	  their	  working	  methods	  and	  preparation,	  just	  as	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  in	  order	  
to	  become	  more	  comfortable	  with	  working	  with	  one	  another	  and	  create	  common	  goals	  
already	   at	   an	   early	   stage.	   Eventually,	   important	   is	   to	  make	   both	   actors,	   but	   especially	  
civilian	  actors,	  feel	  more	  comfortable	  with	  working	  closely	  with	  one	  another.	  
• Improve	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  
The	  Pakistan	   case	   study	   showed	   that	   some	   time	  was	   lost	   in	   the	   deployment	   of	  NATO	  
forces	   because	   of	   slow	   decision-­‐making	   processes,	   therefore	   stimulating	   speedier	  
decision-­‐making	   processes	   within	   NATO	   to	   deploy	   forces	   on	   the	   ground	   would	   be	  
beneficial.	  Also,	   clearer	  guidelines	  and	  standards	   for	  humanitarian	  assistance	  could	  be	  
created	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  clearer	  line	  between	  relief	  and	  rehabilitation	  work,	  just	  as	  
to	  avoid	  that	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  NATO	  relief	  efforts	  are	  too	  high	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  
local	  standards	  
• Increased	  cooperation	  with	  potential	  host	  nations	  
Although	  NATO	  is	  already	  involved	  in	  activities	  that	  aim	  to	  promote	  nations	  to	  become	  
better	  prepared	  for	  potential	  disasters,	  there	  would	  be	  an	  opportunity	  for	  NATO	  to	  play	  
an	  even	  greater	  role	  in	  this	  field	  through	  increased	  cooperation,	  for	  instance	  by	  helping	  
nations	   in	   developing	   disaster	   management	   structures.	   Moreover,	   establishing	   good	  
connections	  with	  potential	  host	  nations	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  would	  be	  desirable,	  in	  order	  to	  
have	   a	   better	   cultural	   awareness	   and	   get	   accustomed	   to	   the	   national	   and	   local	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structures.	  This	  will	  eventually	  contribute	  to	  the	  disaster	  response,	  as	  cultural	  barriers	  
seem	  to	  be	  an	  important	  delaying	  factor.	   It	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  however	  that	   it	   is	  
impossible	  for	  NATO	  to	  establish	  good	  relationships	  with	  every	  single	  nation,	  and	  that	  it	  
cannot	  be	  foreseen	  which	  nation	  will	  be	  the	  next	  one	  to	  be	  struck	  by	  a	  disaster.	  	  
• Image	  building	  
Although	   NATO’s	   tasks,	   activities	   and	   attitude	   have	   adapted	   to	   the	   contemporary	  
environment,	   it	  seems	  that	   its	   image	  has	  not.	  NATO	  is	  still	   largely	  perceived	  as	  a	  static	  
and	  robust	  actor;	  therefore	  its	  image	  still	  lingers	  in	  the	  old	  NATO	  times.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  
general	  public	  is	  not	  really	  aware	  of	  NATO’s	  exact	  activities	  and	  therefore	  automatically	  
makes	  the	  link	  to	  well	  known	  operations,	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  in	  Libya	  and	  Kosovo,	  which	  at	  
the	   same	   time	   are	   more	   controversial	   and	   therefore	   misrepresent	   the	   organization.	  	  
Therefore,	   it	  would	  be	   important	   for	  NATO	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  creating	  a	  positive	   image	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Appendix	  1	  -­‐	  Glossary	  of	  terms	  
Base	  
An	  area	  or	  locality	  containing	  
installations	  which	  provide	  logistic	  or	  
other	  support	  /	  A	  locality	  from	  which	  
operations	  are	  projected	  or	  supported.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  20)	  
	  
Civil	  Emergency	  Planning	  (CEP)	  
To	  collect,	  analyse	  and	  share	  
information	  on	  national	  planning	  
activity	  to	  ensure	  the	  most	  effective	  use	  
of	  civil	  resources	  for	  use	  during	  
emergency	  situations,	  in	  accordance	  
with	  Alliance	  objectives.	  It	  enables	  
Allies	  and	  Partner	  nations	  to	  assist	  each	  
other	  in	  preparing	  for	  and	  dealing	  with	  
the	  consequences	  of	  crisis,	  disaster	  or	  
conflict.	  (NATO,	  2006,	  p.	  1)	  
	  
Civil	  Protection	  
Activities	  undertaken	  by	  emergency	  
services	  to	  protect	  populations,	  
properties,	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  
environment	  from	  the	  consequences	  of	  
natural	  and	  technological	  disasters	  and	  
other	  emergencies	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  27)	  
	  
Civil-­‐Military	  Cooperation	  (CIMIC)	  
The	  coordination	  and	  cooperation,	  in	  
support	  of	  the	  mission,	  between	  the	  
NATO	  Commander	  and	  civil	  actors,	  
including	  the	  national	  population	  and	  
local	  authorities,	  as	  well	  as	  
international,	  national	  and	  non-­‐	  
governmental	  organizations	  and	  
agencies.	  	  (CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  28)	  
	  
Combined	  Joint	  Task	  Force	  CJTF	  
A	  combined	  joint	  task	  force	  is	  a	  
combined	  (i.e.	  made	  up	  of	  forces	  from	  
different	  nations)	  and	  joint	  (i.e.	  
comprising	  different	  services:	  land,	  air,	  
navy,	  marines,	  special	  forces,	  and	  
others)	  deployable	  task	  force,	  tailored	  
to	  the	  mission,	  and	  formed	  for	  the	  full	  
range	  of	  the	  Alliance’s	  military	  missions.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  32)	  
	  
Complex	  emergency	  
A	   humanitarian	   crisis	   in	   a	   country,	  
region,	  or	  society	  where	  there	   is	  a	   total	  
or	  considerable	  breakdown	  of	  authority	  
resulting	   from	   internal	   or	   external	  
conflict	   and	   which	   requires	   an	  
international	  response	  that	  goes	  beyond	  
the	   mandate	   or	   capacity	   of	   any	   single	  
agency	   and/or	   the	   ongoing	  UN	   country	  
program.	  
(UN,	  2003,	  “The	  use	  of	  military	  and	  civil	  
defense	   assets	   to	   support	   United	  
Nations	   humanitarian	   activities	   in	  
complex	  emergencies”,	  p.	  3).	  
	  
Crisis	  management	  (CM)	  
The	  coordinated	  actions	  taken	  to	  defuse	  
crises,	  prevent	  their	  escalation	  into	  an	  
armed	  conflict	  and	  contain	  hostilities	  if	  
they	  should	  result.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  49)	  
	  
Deployment	  
The	  movement	  of	  forces	  within	  areas	  of	  
operations.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  57)	  
	  
Direct	  assistance	  
The	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  distribution	  of	  relief	  
items	  and	  services.	  
(Wiharta	  et	  al,	  2008,	  p.	  2)	  
	  
Doctrine	  	  
Fundamental	  principles	  by	  which	  the	  
military	  forces	  guide	  their	  actions	  in	  
support	  of	  objectives.	  It	  is	  authoritative	  
but	  requires	  judgement	  in	  application.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  60)	  
	  
End	  state	  	  
The	  political	  and/or	  military	  situation	  
to	  be	  attained	  at	  the	  end	  of	  an	  
operation,	  which	  indicates	  that	  the	  
objective	  has	  been	  achieved.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  63)	  
	  
Forces	  allocated	  to	  NATO	  	  
Those	  forces	  made	  available	  to	  NATO	  by	  
a	  nation	  under	  the	  categories	  of:	  a.	  
NATO	  command	  forces;	  b.	  NATO	  
assigned	  forces;	  c.	  NATO	  earmarked	  
forces;	  d.	  other	  forces	  for	  NATO.	  





Foreign	  military	  assets	  	  
Personnel,	  equipment	  and	  services	  of	  a	  
military	  nature	  provided	  by	  
governments	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  
affected	  state	  for	  IDRA.	  
(Wiharta	  et	  al,	  2008,	  p.	  2)	  
	  
Host	  nation	  	  
A	  nation	  which,	  by	  agreement:	  a.	  
receives	  forces	  and	  materiel	  of	  NATO	  or	  
other	  nations	  operating	  on/from	  or	  
transiting	  through	  its	  territory;	  b.	  allows	  
materiel	  and/or	  NATO	  organizations	  to	  
be	  located	  on	  its	  territory;	  and/or	  c.	  
provides	  support	  for	  these	  purposes.	  	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  84)	  
	  
Host-­‐Nation	  Support	  (HNS)	  
Host-­‐nation	  support	  HNS	  Civil	  and	  
military	  assistance	  rendered	  in	  peace,	  
crisis	  or	  war	  by	  a	  host	  nation	  to	  NATO	  
and/or	  other	  forces	  and	  NATO	  
organizations	  that	  are	  located	  on,	  
operating	  on/from,	  or	  in	  transit	  through	  
the	  host	  nation's	  territory.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  86)	  
	  
Humanitarian	  actor	  
Humanitarian	  actors	  are	  civilians,	  
whether	  national	  or	  international,	  UN	  or	  
non-­‐UN,	  governmental	  or	  
nongovernmental,	  which	  have	  a	  
commitment	  to	  humanitarian	  principles	  
and	  are	  engaged	  in	  humanitarian	  
activities.	  
(UN,	  2008,	  p.	  11)	  
	  
Humanitarian	  aid	  	  
The	  resources	  needed	  to	  directly	  
alleviate	  human	  suffering.	  	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  86)	  
	  
Humanitarian	  assistance	  	  
As	  part	  of	  an	  operation,	  the	  use	  of	  
available	  military	  resources	  to	  assist	  or	  
complement	  the	  efforts	  of	  responsible	  
civil	  actors	  in	  the	  operational	  area	  or	  
specialized	  civil	  humanitarian	  
organizations	  in	  fulfilling	  their	  primary	  
responsibility	  to	  alleviate	  human	  
suffering.	  	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  87)	  
	  
	  
Humanitarian	  operation	  	  
An	  operation	  specifically	  mounted	  to	  
alleviate	  human	  suffering	  in	  an	  area	  
where	  the	  civil	  actors	  normally	  
responsible	  for	  so	  doing	  are	  unable	  or	  
unwilling	  adequately	  to	  support	  a	  
population.	  	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  87)	  
	  
Indirect	  assistance	  
At	  least	  one	  step	  removed	  from	  the	  
people	  affected	  by	  the	  disaster	  and	  
involves	  activities	  such	  as	  transporting	  
relief	  items	  or	  personnel.	  
(Wiharta	  et	  al,	  2008,	  p.	  2)	  
	  
Infrastructure	  support	  	  
The	  provision	  of	  general	  services—such	  
as	  road	  repair,	  airspace	  management	  
and	  power	  generation—that	  facilitate	  
relief	  but	  are	  not	  necessarily	  visible	  to	  
or	  solely	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  affected	  
population.	  
(Wiharta	  et	  al,	  2008,	  p.	  2)	  
	  
International	  disaster	  relief	  
assistance	  (IDRA)	  	  
Material,	  personnel	  and	  services	  
provided	  by	  the	  international	  
community	  to	  an	  affected	  state	  at	  its	  
request,	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  people	  
affected	  by	  a	  disaster.	  The	  primary	  
purposes	  of	  IDRA	  are	  to	  save	  lives	  and	  
alleviate	  suffering.	  
(Wiharta	  et	  al,	  2008,	  p.	  2)	  
	  
International	  organization	  (IO)	  
An	  entity	  established	  by	  a	  treaty	  or	  
other	  instrument	  governed	  by	  
international	  law	  and	  possessing	  its	  
own	  international	  legal	  personality.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  98)	  
	  
Interoperability	  	  
The	  ability	  to	  act	  together	  coherently,	  
effectively	  and	  efficiently	  to	  achieve	  
Allied	  tactical,	  operational	  and	  strategic	  
objectives	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  99)	  
	  
Joint	  operations	  area	  (JOA)	  	  
A	  temporary	  area	  defined	  by	  the	  
Supreme	  Allied	  Commander	  Europe,	  in	  
which	  a	  designated	  joint	  commander	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plans	  and	  executes	  a	  specific	  mission	  at	  
the	  operational	  level	  of	  war.	  A	  joint	  
operations	  area	  and	  its	  defining	  
parameters,	  such	  as	  time,	  scope	  of	  the	  
mission	  and	  geographical	  area,	  are	  
contingency	  or	  mission-­‐specific	  and	  are	  
normally	  associated	  with	  combined	  
joint	  task	  force	  operations.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  105)	  
	  
Military	  Actor	  
Military	  actors	  refer	  to	  official	  military	  
forces,	  i.e.,	  military	  forces	  of	  a	  state	  or	  
regional-­‐/inter-­‐governmental	  
organisation	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  
hierarchical	  chain	  of	  command,	  be	  they	  
armed	  or	  unarmed,	  governmental	  or	  
inter-­‐governmental.	  This	  may	  include	  a	  
wide	  spectrum	  of	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  
local	  or	  national	  military,	  multi-­‐national	  
forces,	  UN	  peacekeeping	  troops,	  
international	  military	  observers,	  foreign	  
occupying	  forces,	  regional	  troops	  or	  
other	  officially	  organized	  troops.	  
(UN,	  2008,	  p.	  11)	  
	  
Multinational	  force	  
A	  force	  composed	  of	  elements	  of	  two	  or	  
more	  nations.	  






Disasters	  that	  follow	  natural	  hazards.	  
Other	  types	  of	  disaster	  are	  man-­‐made	  
and	  complex.	  Disasters	  can	  be	  classified	  
according	  to	  the	  speed	  of	  their	  onset	  
(rapid	  or	  slow).	  




Any	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  group	  or	  
institution	  motivated	  by	  humanitarian	  
or	  religious	  values,	  usually	  independent	  
of	  government,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  
commercial	  sectors.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  136)	  
	  
Strategic	  concept	  	  
The	  course	  of	  action	  accepted	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  estimate	  of	  the	  strategic	  situation.	  
It	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done	  in	  
broad	  terms	  sufficiently	  flexible	  to	  
permit	  its	  use	  in	  framing	  the	  military,	  
diplomatic,	  economic,	  psychological	  and	  
other	  measures	  which	  stem	  from	  it.	  
(CCOE,	  2015,	  p.	  174)	  
	  
Transfer	  of	  authority	  TOA	  	  
Within	  NATO,	  an	  action	  by	  which	  a	  
member	  nation	  or	  NATO	  Command	  
gives	  operational	  command	  or	  control	  
of	  designated	  forces	  to	  a	  NATO	  
Command.	  

















Appendix	  2	  -­‐	  Frameworks	  for	  disaster	  reduction	  
Yokohoma	  Strategy	  
From	  23	  until	  27	  May	  in	  1994,	  a	  UN	  world	  conference	  on	  natural	  disaster	  reduction	  took	  
place	  in	  Yokohoma,	  resulting	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Yokohoma	  Strategy.	  The	  Yokohoma	  
Strategy	   sets	   out	   guidelines	   for	   natural	   disaster	   prevention,	   preparedness	   and	  
mitigation.	   It	   makes	   an	   appeal	   to	   the	   international	   community	   to	   save	   human	   lives	  
through	   an	   integrated	   approach	   for	   disaster	   management,	   reducing	   the	   level	   of	  
destruction	  following	  a	  disaster.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  strategy	  is	  the	  
recognition	   that	   natural	   disasters	   were	   happening	   more	   frequently	   and	   were	   more	  
powerful.	  Accordingly,	  the	  strategy	  is	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  
progress	  on	  disaster	  reduction.	  The	  UN	  pinpoints	  that	  until	  thus	  far,	  the	  focus	  had	  been	  
too	  much	  on	  disaster	  response	   instead	  of	  disaster	  prevention.	   It	   is	   for	   this	  reason	  that	  
the	  main	  objective	  of	  the	  strategy	  is	  focused	  on	  measures	  for	  improving	  and	  promoting	  
disaster	  prevention	  and	  preparedness.	  In	  addition,	  spreading	  awareness	  and	  education	  
and	  training	  is	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  guidelines	  as	  the	  strategy	  points	  out	  the	  lack	  
of	   attention	   and	   commitment	   for	   the	  matter.	  Moreover,	   the	  UN	   especially	   emphasizes	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  more	  vulnerable	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  disadvantaged	  people	  in	  the	  
least	  developed	  and	  developing	   countries.	  Especially	   these	  groups	  need	  help	   from	   the	  
international	  community,	  as	  they	  are	  not	  adequately	  equipped	  for	  natural	  disasters	  and	  
therefore	   suffer	   the	   most.	   Indispensible	   to	   disaster	   prevention,	   preparedness,	   and	  
mitigation	   is	   the	   integration	   of	   participation	   of	   actors	   at	   the	   community	   and	   local,	  
regional	   and	   sub	   regional,	   and	   international	   level	   through	   among	   others	   exchanging	  
information,	   sharing	   technology,	   and	   integrating	   research	   activities.	   Consequently,	   all	  
these	  factors	  will	  “contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  global	  culture	  of	  prevention”	  (UN,	  
1994,	  p.	  9)	  
	  
Hyogo	  Framework	  
During	   the	   World	   Conference	   for	   Disaster	   Reduction,	   taking	   place	   from	   18	   until	   22	  
January	   in	   2005,	   the	   Yokohoma	   Strategy	   was	   upgraded	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  
Hyogo	  Framework	  for	  Action	  2005-­‐2015.	  The	  framework	  is	  designed	  to	  fill	  the	  gaps	  of	  
the	   Yokohama	   Strategy.	   According	   to	   the	   Hyogo	   framework,	   the	   attention	   for	   and	  
commitment	   to	   the	   issue	  of	  disaster	  reduction	  and	  response	  has	  grown,	  but	   “disasters	  
and	   in	   particular	   the	   management	   and	   reduction	   of	   risk	   continue	   to	   pose	   a	   global	  
challenge”	  (2005,	  p.	  1).	  Nowadays,	  disaster	  risks	  have	  become	  a	  global	  concern	  as	  they	  
spread	   out	   more	   easily	   and	   are	   correlated	   with	   many	   other	   factors.	   The	   expected	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outcome	  of	  the	  framework	  is	  as	  follows:	  “the	  substantial	  reduction	  of	  disaster	  losses,	  in	  
lives	   and	   in	   the	   social,	   economic	   and	   environmental	   assets	   of	   communities	   and	  
countries”	   (2005,	   p.	   3).	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   written	   that	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   this	   expected	  
outcome,	  a	  full	  commitment	  and	  involvement	  of	  all	  actors	  is	  necessary.	  This	  statement,	  
however,	   is	   a	   rather	   idealistic	   and	   vague	   one.	   What	   exactly	   do	   they	   consider	   as	   a	  
“substantial	   reduction”?	   	  And	   is	   it	  even	  realistic	   to	  wish	   for	   the	   full	   commitment	  of	  all	  
actors?	  Roughly,	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  Yokohoma	  strategy:	  it	  calls	  
for	  the	  effective	  and	  systematic	  approach	  for	  disaster	  risk	  reduction.	  Essential	  herein	  is	  
the	   effective	   integration	   of	   policies	   and	   programs	   at	   all	   levels,	   just	   as	   promoting	  
education	  and	  innovation.	  However,	  where	  the	  Yokohoma	  Strategy	  does	  not,	  the	  Hyogo	  
Framework	  does	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  cultural	  diversity	  in	  disaster	  reduction	  planning.	  	  
	  
Sendai	  Framework	  
The	   most	   recent	   framework	   for	   disaster	   risk	   reduction	   is	   the	   2015-­‐2030	   Sendai	  
Framework,	   as	   adopted	   on	   the	   third	   World	   Conference	   on	   Disaster	   Risk	   Reduction.	  
Whereas	  compared	  to	  the	  Yokohoma	  Strategy,	  the	  Hyogo	  Framework	  did	  not	  offer	  many	  
new	  and	  specific	  approaches;	  the	  Sendai	  Framework	  does	  provide	  a	  clearer	  vision	  that	  
is	  more	  specific.	  The	  Sendai	  Framework	  has	  various	  new	  aspects.	  First,	  it	  largely	  focuses	  
on	  tackling	  the	  underlying	  drivers	  of	  disaster	  risk.	  Specifically,	  the	  framework	  mentions	  
climate	   change	   and	   poverty	   as	   the	   main	   drivers.	   In	   addition,	   weak	   institutions,	  
urbanization,	  and	  epidemics	  are	  mentioned	  as	  drivers	  of	  disaster	  risk.	  Second,	  it	  calls	  for	  
a	  people-­‐centered	  preventive	  approach:	  “while	  recognizing	  their	  leading,	  regulatory	  and	  
coordination	   role,	   Governments	   should	   engage	   with	   relevant	   stakeholders,	   including	  
women,	  children	  and	  youth,	  persons	  with	  disabilities,	  poor	  people,	  migrants,	  indigenous	  
peoples,	  volunteers,	  the	  community	  of	  practitioners	  and	  older	  persons	  in	  the	  design	  and	  
implementation	   of	   policies,	   plans	   and	   standard”	   (2015,	   p.	   5).	   Third,	   the	   “build	   back	  
better”	   concept	   is	   introduced,	   which	   underscores	   the	   importance	   of	   recovering,	  
rehabilitating,	   and	   reconstructing	   the	   area	   and	   community	   affected	   by	   the	   disaster.	  
Nonetheless,	  disaster	  prevention	  and	  preparedness	  still	  remains	  important	  as	  well.	  	  
The	   expected	   outcome	  of	   the	   Sendai	   Framework	   remains	   the	   same	   as	   the	  Hyogo	   one,	  
namely	  “the	  substantial	  reduction	  of	  disaster	  losses,	  in	  lives	  and	  in	  the	  social,	  economic	  
and	  environmental	   assets	  of	   communities	  and	  countries”	   (p.	  6).	  However,	   instead	  of	   a	  
full	   commitment	   and	   involvement	   of	   all	   actors,	   this	   framework	   calls	   for	   a	   strong	  
commitment	  and	  involvement	  of	  political	  leadership	  at	  all	  levels.	  Besides	  this	  increasing	  
expediency,	   the	   Sendai	   Framework	   also	   introduces	   seven	   global	   targets,	   which	   partly	  
takes	   away	   the	   previous	   vagueness	   of	   the	   Hyogo	   Framework.	   However,	   these	   targets	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still	   are	   rather	   ambiguous,	   with	   only	   two	   targets	   providing	   specific	   numbers.	   One	   of	  
them	   is	   two	   “Substantially	   reduce	   global	   disaster	  mortality	   by	   2030,	   aiming	   to	   lower	  
average	   per	   100,000	   global	   mortality	   between	   2020-­‐2030	   compared	   to	   2005-­‐2015”	  
(2015,	  p.	  7).	  Then,	  the	  targets	  continue	  to	  be	  very	  broad,	  such	  as	  “substantially	  increase	  
the	   number	   of	   countries	   with	   national	   and	   local	   disaster	   risk	   reduction	   strategies	   by	  





























Appendix	  3	  –	  NATO’s	  military	  structure	  
The	  military	  command	  and	  force	  structure	  
The	  military	  structure	  of	  NATO	  is	  one	  that	  stands	  out	  due	  to	  the	  high	  level	  of	  integration	  
and	   is	   ultimately	   designed	   to	   ensure	   security	   and	   stability	   in	   the	   Euro-­‐Atlantic	   area.	  
NATO’s	   military	   structure	   comprises	   the	   Military	   Committee	   (MC),	   the	   International	  
Military	  Staff	  (IMS),	  the	  NATO	  Command	  Structure	  (NCS),	  and	  the	  NATO	  Force	  Structure	  
(NFS).	   The	   NATO	   Military	   Command	   structure	   is	   made	   up	   of	   the	   Allied	   Command	  
Operations	  (ACO)	  and	  Allied	  Command	  Transformation	  (ACT).	  The	  Command	  Structure	  
has	  a	  strategic	  role,	  namely	  commanding	  and	  controlling	  NATO	  joint	  operations.	  At	  the	  
tactical	   level	   stands	   the	   NATO	   Force	   structure,	   which	   supports	   the	   NATO	   command	  
Structure	   by	   offering	   additional	   command	   and	   control	   at	   the	   single	   service	   level.	   It	  
consists	   of	   three	   types	   of	   forces:	   in-­‐place	   forces,	   intended	   for	   collective	   defense	  
operations,	  deployable	  forces,	  characterized	  by	  a	  high	  level	  of	  readiness,	  and	  long-­‐term	  
build-­‐up	   forces,	  designed	   for	  Article	  5	  operations	   that	   are	   large	   in	   scale	  and	   require	  a	  
low	  level	  of	  readiness.	  
	  
The	   Military	   Committee	   (MC)	   is	   NATO’s	   senior	  military	   authority	   and	   its	   role	   is	   to	  
provide	   the	   NAC	   with	   consensus-­‐based	   advise	   on	   military	   matters.	   The	   Committee	  
comprises	   the	   Chiefs	   of	   Staff1	  of	   the	   member	   nations.	   In	   order	   to	   guarantee	   the	  
continuous	   functioning	  of	   the	  MC,	   each	  nation	  appoints	   a	  Military	  Representative	   as	   a	  
permanent	   member	   of	   the	   Committee.	   The	   MC’s	   advice	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  
Alliance’s	   objectives,	   whilst	   respecting	   and	   representing	   the	   national	   interests	   of	   the	  
member	   countries.	   When	   shaping	   the	   advice,	   the	   MC	   involves	   to	   the	   military	  
commanders	   of	   Allied	   Command	   Operations	   (ACO)	   and	   Allied	   Command	  
Transformation	   (ACT),	   the	   Supreme	   Allied	   Commander	   Europe	   (SACEUR)	   and	   the	  
Supreme	   Allied	   Commander	   Transformation	   (SACT)	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	  
Besides	   giving	   them	   the	   possibility	   to	   influence	   the	   final	   advice,	   the	   MC	   also	   gives	  
guidance	  to	  the	  military	  commanders.	  	  
The	   Military	   Committee	   further	   operates	   in	   three	   other	   entities,	   each	   made	   up	   by	  
different	  members.	  First,	   the	  50	  Military	  Representatives	  of	  NATO	  and	  Partner	  nations	  
constitute	   the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  Partnership	  Military	  Committee.	  Although	   it	   operates	   in	   a	  
similar	  way,	  the	  agenda	  is	  different.	  Second,	  the	  NATO-­‐Russia	  Military	  Committee	  under	  
the	  Founding	  Act	  on	  Mutual	  Relations,	  Cooperation	  and	  Security	  between	  NATO	  and	  the	  
Russian	   Federation	   comprises	  Military	   Representatives	   of	   both	   the	   Allied	   and	   Russia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Civil	  servants	  represent	  Iceland	  in	  the	  MC,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  have	  military	  forces.	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Third,	   the	   Military	   Representatives	   of	   the	   Allied	   nations	   and	   Ukraine	   constitute	   the	  
NATO-­‐Ukraine	   Military	   Committee,	   functioning	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   Charter	   on	   a	  
Distinctive	  Partnership	  between	  Ukraine	  and	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization.	  
	  
Another	   important	  element	  of	  NATO’s	  military	  structure	   is	  the	  International	  Military	  
Staff	   (IMS),	  whose	  role	  is	  to	  support	  the	  MC	  and	  therefore	  serves	  as	  an	  important	  link.	  
Its	  responsibility	  is	  to	  develop	  policies	  on	  military	  matters,	  just	  as	  the	  implementation	  of	  
the	   policies.	   The	   IMS	   consists	   of	  military	   and	   civilian	   personnel	   that	   have	   no	   national	  
interest	   in	   the	   advice,	   unlike	   the	   MC.	   Therefore,	   the	   IMS	   works	   purely	   in	   the	   best	  
interest	  of	  the	  Alliance’s	  objectives,	  whereas	  the	  positions	  within	  the	  MC	  are	  more	  based	  
on	  national	  interests	  as	  it	  is	  made	  up	  of	  military	  representatives.	  	  The	  responsibilities	  of	  
the	   IMS	   encompasses	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   activities,	   including	   planning	   and	   policy,	  
monitoring	   operations,	   trainings	   and	   exercises,	   liaison	   with	   partners,	   logistics	   and	  
resources	   of	   NATO	   operations,	   intelligence	   support,	   and	   the	   consultation	   on	  
communications	  and	  information	  systems.	  The	  advice	  procedure	  is	  as	  follows.	  First,	  the	  
MC	  receives	  a	  request	  for	  advice	  on	  a	  military	  issue	  from	  the	  NAC.	  When	  NAC	  asks	  for	  
advice,	   the	  matter	   thus	   far	   is	  mainly	  of	  political	  nature.	  The	  IMS’	  role,	   then,	   is	   to	  bring	  
forward	   the	   military	   dimension	   of	   the	   issue.	   This	   happens	   with	   input	   from	   the	   two	  
commanders,	  SACEUR	  and	  SACT.	  Next,	  the	  IMS	  presents	  an	  initial	  assessment	  to	  the	  MC,	  
who	   then	  needs	   to	   shape	   it	   into	  a	   consensus-­‐based	  advice	   for	   the	  NAC.	   It	   is	   a	  difficult	  
process	   to	   reach	   consensus,	   as	   there	   needs	   to	   be	   dealt	   with	   28	   different	   national	  
standpoints.	  	  
	  
As	   mentioned	   previously,	   there	   are	   two	   NATO	   strategic	   commanders	   at	   the	   strategic	  
level	  of	  the	  NATO	  Command	  Structure.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  the	  Supreme	  Allied	  Command	  
Transformation	   commander	   (SACT)	   and	   is	   the	   commanding	   officer	   of	   the	   Allied	  
Command	  Transformation	  (ACT),	  whose	  role	  is	  develop	  NATO’s	  military	  framework,	  
doctrine,	  forces,	  and	  capabilities	  through	  training	  and	  exercises.	  More	  important	  for	  this	  
thesis,	  is	  the	  Supreme	  Allied	  Commander	  Europe	  (SACEUR),	  who	  is	  the	  commanding	  
officer	  of	   the	  Supreme	  Headquarters	   Allied	   Powers	   Europe	   (SHAPE),	   the	   strategic	  
headquarters	   of	   Allied	   Command	   Operations	   (ACO).	   SHAPE	   leads	   the	   operational	  
commands,	   supported	   by	   the	   tactical	   commands.	   The	   SACEUR’s	   role,	   therefore,	   is	   to	  
prepare,	   plan,	   and	   execute	   all	   NATO	   military	   operations.	   In	   NATO’s	   Public	   Affairs	  
Handbook	  for	  ACO	  and	  ACT	  (2014),	  ACO	  is	  envisioned	  as	  the	  “sword	  and	  shield	  of	   the	  




The	  operational	   level	  commands	  of	  ACO	  consist	  of	  the	  Joint	  Force	  Commands	   (JFCs).	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  JFCs	  is	  to	  manage	  military	  operations,	  either	  from	  the	  static	  location	  or	  
from	  a	  deployed	  headquarters.	  In	  case	  of	  the	  latter	  situation,	  the	  headquarters	  is	  called	  a	  
Joint	   Task	   Force	   Headquarters	   (JTF	   HQ).	   The	   JFC	   needs	   to	   be	   prepared	   to	   plan,	  
conduct,	  and	  sustain	  different	  NATO	  operations,	  which	  can	  differ	  in	  size	  and	  type.	  Once	  
deployed,	   a	   JFC	  only	   commands	  one	  operation	  at	   a	   time,	  but	  assets	   that	  are	  not	  being	  
used	  can	  be	  deployed	  for	  other	  missions.	  Besides,	  JFCs	  need	  to	  maintain	  communication	  
with	   partners	   and	   relevant	   organizations	   involved	   in	   the	  mission.	   Currently	   there	   are	  
two	   JFCs:	   JFC	   Brunssum,	   located	   in	   the	   Netherlands,	   and	   JFC	   Naples,	   located	   in	   Italy.	  
Before	  there	  was	  also	  a	  JFC	  in	  Lisbon,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  deactivated	  in	  2012.	  The	  JFCs	  are	  
supported	   by	   the	   Single	   Service	   Commands	   (SSC),	   operating	   on	   the	   tactical	   level	   of	  
command	  and	  therefore	  part	  of	  the	  NATO	  force	  structure	  (NFS).	  Hence,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
SSCs	  is	  to	  offer	  their	  expertise	  to	  the	  JFCs.	  Presently	  there	  are	  three	  SSCs	  in	  place.	  The	  
first	  Single	  Service	  Command	  is	  the	  land	  command,	  LANDCOM,	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  
the	   land	   forces	   in	   terms	   of	   readiness,	   expertise	   and	   standardization.	   Moreover,	   HQ	  
LANDCOM	   has	   the	   ability	   to	   provide	   deployable	   land	   commands	   in	   support	   of	   a	   JFC.	  
Second,	  the	  maritime	  command,	  HQ	  MARCOM,	  commands	  all	  of	  NATO’s	  maritime	  forces	  
and	  likewise	  has	  the	  capability	  to	  command	  “a	  small	  maritime	  joint	  operation	  or	  act	  as	  
the	   maritime	   component	   in	   support	   of	   an	   operation”	   (NATO,	   n.d.,“Military	   command	  
structure”,	  para.	  10).	  Last,	  HQ	  AIRCOM,	  the	  air	  command,	   is	  responsible	   for	  all	  NATO’s	  
operations	  that	  have	  air	  components	   involved.	   Indeed,	   it	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  
NATO	  mission	  which	  ones	  of	  the	  SSCs	  provide	  their	  expertise	  and	  support.	  For	  example,	  















Appendix	  4	  –	  Context	  in	  which	  the	  earthquake	  occurred	  
Indian	  partition	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  Pakistan	  
Pakistan	  resulted	  from	  the	  partition	  of	  India	  in	  1947	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  British	  rule.	  For	  
decades,	   British	   India	   was	   subjected	   to	   British	   rule	   and	   Hindus,	   Muslims	   and	   Sikhs	  
populated	  the	  country.	  Hindus	  were	  in	  majority,	  and	  Muslims	  were	  mainly	  concentrated	  
in	  the	  Northeastern	  and	  Northwestern	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  Sikhs	  were	  mainly	  present	  
in	   the	   Punjab	   region,	   which	  was	   India’s	  most	   wealthy	   region	   in	   terms	   of	   history	   and	  
culture.	  After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  in	  1946,	  Britain	  went	  bankrupt	  and	  the	  
independence	  movement	  became	  stronger.	   India’s	   independence	   leaders	  were	  divided	  
on	  what	  would	  happen	  after	  Britain	  left.	  One	  the	  one	  hand,	   leaders	  advocated	  a	  united	  
India,	  in	  which	  religions	  would	  live	  side	  by	  side	  peacefully.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  idea	  
of	  a	  Muslim	  homeland	  became	  popular	  among	  the	  Muslims,	  as	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  live	  
under	   Hindu	   majority.	   The	   leader	   of	   this	   movement,	   the	   Muslim	   League,	   was	  
Muhammed	   Ali	   Jinnah,	   demanding	   the	   division	   of	   India	   in	   two:	   the	   Muslims	   and	   the	  
Hindus	   and	   Sikhs.	   Negotiations	   on	   the	   future	   of	   the	   country	   collapsed,	   and	   Muslims	  
started	  to	  demand	  direct	  action	  for	  Pakistan,	  the	  Muslim	  homeland.	  Tensions	  arose,	  and	  
Hindus	   and	   Muslims	   started	   to	   slaughter	   each	   other.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	  
united	  India	  vanished	  and	  the	  violence	  spread	  even	  more.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1	  –	  Indian	  partition	  
Source:	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml	  
	  
As	   the	   conflict	   was	   escalating,	   a	   deal	   became	   a	   matter	   of	   urgency	   and	   eventually,	  
partition	   was	   accepted.	   Those	   provinces	   with	   Muslim	   majority	   would	   be	   given	   to	  
Pakistan,	  and	  those	  provinces	  with	  Hindu	  majority	  would	  be	  given	  to	  India.	  The	  Punjab	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and	   Bengal	   regions	   were	   treated	   differently:	   they	   would	   be	   cut	   in	   half	   and	   divided	  
between	   India	  and	  Pakistan.	  The	  major	   task	   that	  was	   left	   to	  be	  done	  was	  drawing	   the	  
boundary,	  and	  as	  Britain	  decided	  to	  leave	  almost	  one	  year	  earlier	  than	  planned,	  it	  had	  to	  
be	  done	  quickly.	  A	  date	  for	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  boundary	  was	  planned,	  and	  tension	  
build	   up	   even	   more	   among	   communities.	   Subsequently,	   ethnic	   cleansings	   of	   entire	  
districts	  occurred,	  and	  many	  people	  were	  forced	  to	  flee	  their	  homes.	  In	  August	  1947,	  the	  
partition	  was	   official	   and	   Pakistan	  was	   born.	   Consequently,	   huge	   refugee	  movements	  
took	  place,	  in	  which	  Muslims	  living	  in	  India	  left	  to	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  In	  
only	   a	   few	  months	   time	   India	  had	  been	  divided	  along	   religious	   lines,	   although	  Hindus	  
and	  Muslims	  had	  lived	  together	  in	  peace	  for	  century.	  The	  Indian	  part	  of	  the	  Punjab	  was	  
cleared	  of	   nearly	   all	   its	  Muslims,	  while	  Pakistan	  was	   emptied	  of	  most	   of	   its	   Sikhs	   and	  
Hindus.	  The	  border	  created	  in	  1947	  would	  become	  the	  focus	  for	  three	  wars	  and	  60	  years	  
of	  troubles	  between	  the	  government	  of	  India	  and	  Pakistan.	  
	  
The	  conflicted	  Kashmir	  region	  
1947:	  First	  Kashmir	  War	  	  
As	   a	  part	   of	   the	  partition	   in	  1947,	   the	   Indian	  Princely	   states	  were	   given	   the	   choice	   to	  
either	   join	   India,	   Pakistan,	   or	   become	   autonomous.	   The	   prince	   of	   Kashmir	  Hari	   Singh	  
wanted	  Kashmir	  to	  become	  a	  part	  of	  India	  because	  he	  was	  a	  Hindu.	  However,	  the	  largest	  
part	  of	   the	  population	  consisted	  of	  Muslims	  who	  wanted	  Kashmir	   to	  become	  a	  part	  of	  
Pakistan.	   Ultimately,	   the	   prince	   decided	   to	   remain	   independent	   and	   therefore	   neither	  
join	   India	   nor	   Pakistan.	   This	   decision	   led	   to	   much	   turbulence	   in	   the	   region,	   causing	  
Pakistan	  to	  invade	  Kashmir.	  Hari	  Singh	  fled	  to	  India	  and	  requested	  assistance	  from	  the	  
Indian	   Government,	   who	   in	   turn	   would	   only	   do	   so	   if	   the	   ruler	   agreed	   on	   Kashmir	  
acceding	  to	  India.	  Hari	  Sing	  agrees	  and	  Indian	  troops	  are	  sent	  to	  the	  Kashmir	  region	  to	  
block	  the	  Pakistani	  invasion.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  a	  Line	  Of	  Control	  (LOC)	  is	  drawn	  in	  1948	  
that	   embodies	   the	  dividing	   line	  between	   the	  part	   controlled	  by	   the	  Pakistanis	   and	   the	  





Figure	  2	  –	  The	  Kashmir	  region	  
Source:	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7515458.stm	  
	  
1965:	  Second	  Kashmir	  War	  
After	  continued	   tensions	  after	   the	   first	  war,	  a	   second	  confrontation	  between	  Pakistani	  
and	   Indian	   armies	   occurred	   in	   1965.	   Not	   long	   after	   the	   clash	   the	   Pakistani	   forces	  
attempted	  to	  seize	  Kashmir,	  without	  success.	  After	  the	  Pakistanis	  invasion,	  India	  turned	  
to	   the	   UN	   for	   help	   in	   ending	   the	   conflict.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   UN	   passed	   a	   resolution	  
summoning	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  a	  settlement	  of	  the	  dispute.	  The	  US	  and	  the	  UK,	  in	  
response,	  halted	  arms	  sales	  to	  both	  Pakistan	  and	  India.	  This	  act	  most	  affected	  Pakistan,	  
as	  it	  had	  a	  weaker	  army	  than	  the	  Indians.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  ceasefire	  was	  accepted	  by	  both	  
India	  and	  Pakistan.	  This	  agreement	  on	  a	  ceasefire,	  however,	  was	  not	  enough.	   In	  1966,	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  acted	  as	  a	   third-­‐party	  mediator	  during	  negotiations	   in	  Tashkent.	  The	  
results	   of	   the	   negotiations	  were	   that	   both	   parties	  would	   remove	   their	  military	   forces	  
and	  drop	  their	  territorial	  claims.	  	  	  	  
	  
1971:	  Third	  Kashmir	  War	  
In	   1971	   a	   third	   war	   took	   place	   after	   East	   Pakistan	   attempts	   to	   separate,	   and	   India	  
declared	  war	  to	  Pakistan	  after	  attacks	  by	  the	  Pakistani	  air	  forces.	  The	  Indians	  attacked	  
the	  Pakistanis	  in	  support	  of	  East	  Pakistan,	  and	  Pakistan	  surrendered	  not	  long	  after.	  The	  
third	  war	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  independent	  nation	  of	  Bangladesh.	  In	  
1972,	  the	  Simla	  peace	  agreement	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  India	  sets	  the	  new	  frontline	  in	  
the	   Kashmir	   region.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   singing	   of	   the	   Simla	   peace	   agreement,	   the	   area	   is	  
taunted	   by	   clashes	   between	   the	   violent	   Pakistani	   fundamentalists	   and	   Indian	   army	  






The	   Kashmir	   conflict	   is	   the	   only	   conflict	   in	   which	   both	   countries	   possess	   nuclear	  
weapons.	  In	  1998,	  both	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  conduct	  series	  of	  nuclear	  tests.	  
	  
1999:	  May-­‐Kargil	  conflict	  
In	   1999,	   another	   crisis	   arises,	   known	   as	   the	   May-­‐Kargil	   conflict.	   Pakistan-­‐backed	  
militates	   occupied	   the	   Indian-­‐controlled	   Kargil	   area.	   An	   intense	   clash	   took	   place	  
between	   the	  Pakistani	   forces	   and	   the	   Indian	  army,	  while	   the	   international	   community	  
feared	  a	  nuclear	  escalation.	  Subsequently,	  the	  US	  decided	  to	  act	  and	  pressured	  Pakistan	  
to	  withdraw	  its	  forces	  from	  the	  area.	  	  
	  
Militancy	  in	  Kashmir	  
The	  Kashmir	  region	  continues	  to	  be	  taunted	  by	  insurgencies	  from	  militant	  groups.	  Some	  
militants	   aimed	   for	  Pakistan	   to	   take	   control	   of	   the	  whole	  Kashmire	   region,	   but	   others	  
fought	  for	  the	  Kashmir	  region	  as	  a	  new	  independent	  state.	  Besides	  these	  militant	  groups,	  
another	  threat	  arose:	   fundamentalists	  from	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan,	  and	  Arab	  states	  that	  
came	  to	   the	  Kashmir	  region	  not	   to	   fight	   for	  Pakistani	  control	  of	   the	  Kashmir	  region	  or	  
independency,	  but	  for	  a	  global	  jihad.	  Up	  to	  this	  day,	  the	  countries	  have	  been	  taunted	  by	  
terrorist	  attacks	  and	  nuclear	  threats	  and	  the	  conflict	  is	  still	  unfinished	  business.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
